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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses new security challenges in the Internet of Things (IoT). The current transition 
from legacy Internet to Internet of Things leads to multiple changes in its communication paradigms. 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) initiated this transition by introducing unattended wireless 
topologies, mostly made of resource constrained nodes, in which radio spectrum therefore ceased to be 
the only resource worthy of optimization. Today's Machine to Machine (M2M) and Internet of Things 
architectures further accentuated this trend, not only by involving wider architectures but also by 
adding heterogeneity, resource capabilities inconstancy and autonomy to once uniform and 
deterministic systems.  
The heterogeneous nature of IoT communications and imbalance in resources capabilities between 
IoT entities make it challenging to provide the required end-to-end secured connections. Unlike 
Internet servers, most of IoT components are characterized by low capabilities in terms of both energy 
and computing resources, and thus, are unable to support complex security schemes. The setup of a 
secure end-to-end communication channel requires the establishment of a common secret key between 
both peers, which would be negotiated relying on standard security key exchange protocols such as 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Handshake or Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Nevertheless, a direct 
use of existing key establishment protocols to initiate connections between two IoT entities may be 
impractical unless both endpoints be able to run the required (expensive) cryptographic primitives– 
thus leaving aside a whole class of resource-constrained devices. The issue of adapting existing 
security protocols to fulfil these new challenges has recently been raised in the international research 
community but the first proposed solutions failed to satisfy the needs of resource-constrained nodes. 
In this thesis, we propose novel collaborative approaches for key establishment designed to reduce 
the requirements of existing security protocols, in order to be supported by resource-constrained 
devices. We particularly retained TLS handshake, Internet key Exchange and HIP BEX protocols as 
the best keying candidates fitting the end-to-end security requirements of the IoT. Then we redesigned 
them so that the constrained peer may delegate its heavy cryptographic load to less constrained nodes 
in neighbourhood exploiting the spatial heterogeneity of IoT nodes. Formal security verifications and 
performance analyses were also conducted to ensure the security effectiveness and energy efficiency 
of our collaborative protocols.  
However, allowing collaboration between nodes may open the way to a new class of threats, known 
as internal attacks that conventional cryptographic mechanisms fail to deal with. This introduces the 
concept of trustworthiness within a collaborative group. The trustworthiness level of a node has to be 
assessed by a dedicated security mechanism known as a trust management system. This system aims 
to track nodes behaviours to detect untrustworthy elements and select reliable ones for collaborative 
services assistance. In turn, a trust management system is instantiated on a collaborative basis, wherein 
multiple nodes share their evidences about one another's trustworthiness. Based on an extensive 
analysis of prior trust management systems, we have identified a set of best practices that provided us 
guidance to design an effective trust management system for our collaborative keying protocols. This 
effectiveness was assessed by considering how the trust management system could fulfil specific 
requirements of our proposed approaches for key establishment in the context of the IoT. Performance 
analysis results show the proper functioning and effectiveness of the proposed system as compared 
with its counterparts that exist in the literature. 
 
KEY WORDS:  
Internet of Things, Wireless Sensor Networks, M2M, heterogeneity, resource constraints, end-to-end 
security, key establishment, energy efficiency, collaboration, internal attacks, trust.  
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RESUME 
Cette thèse aborde des nouveaux défis de sécurité dans l'Internet des Objets (IdO). La transition 
actuelle de l'Internet classique vers l'Internet des Objets conduit à de nombreux changements dans les 
modèles de communications sous-jacents. Les réseaux de capteurs sans fil ont initié cette transition en 
introduisant des topologies sans fil, sans opérateur humain, et principalement composées de nœuds à 
ressources limitées. Aujourd'hui, les architectures Machine à Machine (M2M) et Internet des Objets 
accentuent cette évolution, non seulement en mettant en œuvre des ensembles de nœuds plus 
importants, mais aussi en intégrant une plus grande autonomie et une plus grande hétérogénéité entre 
les nœuds (disparates en particulier du point de vue de leurs contraintes en ressources) à des systèmes 
jusqu'alors déterministes et uniformes. 
La nature hétérogène des communications de l’IdO et le déséquilibre entre les capacités des entités 
communicantes qui le constituent rendent difficile l'établissement de connexions sécurisées de bout en 
bout. Contrairement aux nœuds de l’Internet traditionnel, la plupart des composants de l'Internet des 
Objets sont en effet caractérisés par de faibles capacités en termes d'énergie et de puissance calcul. Par 
conséquent, ils ne sont pas en mesure de supporter des systèmes de sécurité complexes. En particulier, 
la mise en place d'un canal de communication sécurisé de bout en bout nécessite l’établissement d'une 
clé secrète commune entre les deux nœuds souhaitant communiquer, qui sera négociée en s'appuyant 
sur un protocole d'échange de clés tels que le Transport Layer Security (TLS) Handshake ou l’Internet 
Key Exchange (IKE). Or, une utilisation directe de ces protocoles pour établir des connexions 
sécurisées entre deux entités de l’IdO peut être difficile en raison de l'écart technologique entre celles-
ci et des incohérences qui en résultent sur le plan des primitives cryptographiques supportées. Le sujet 
de l'adaptation des protocoles de sécurité existants pour répondre à ces nouveaux défis a récemment 
été soulevé dans la communauté scientifique. Cependant, les premières solutions proposées n'ont pas 
réussi à répondre aux besoins des nœuds à ressources limitées. 
Dans cette thèse, nous proposons de nouvelles approches collaboratives pour l'établissement de 
clés, dans le but de réduire les exigences des protocoles de sécurité existants, afin que ceux-ci puissent 
être mis en œuvre par des nœuds à ressources limitées. Nous avons particulièrement retenu les 
protocoles TLS Handshake, IKE et HIP BEX comme les meilleurs candidats correspondant aux 
exigences de sécurité de bout en bout pour l'IdO. Puis nous les avons modifiés de sorte que le nœud 
contraint en énergie puisse déléguer les opérations cryptographiques couteuses à un ensemble de 
nœuds au voisinage, tirant ainsi avantage de l'hétérogénéité spatiale qui caractérise l’IdO. Nous avons 
entrepris des vérifications formelles de sécurité et des analyses de performance qui prouvent la sureté 
et l'efficacité énergétique des protocoles collaboratifs proposés. 
Dans une deuxième partie, nous avons porté notre attention sur une classe d’attaques internes que la 
collaboration entre les nœuds peut induire et que les mécanismes cryptographiques classiques, tels que 
la signature et le chiffrement, s'avèrent impuissants à contrer. Cela nous a amené à introduire la notion 
de confiance au sein d'un groupe collaboratif. Le niveau de fiabilité d'un nœud est évalué par un 
mécanisme de sécurité dédié, connu sous le nom de système de gestion de confiance. Ce système est 
lui aussi instancié sur une base collaborative, dans laquelle plusieurs nœuds partagent leurs 
témoignages respectifs au sujet de la fiabilité des autres nœuds. En nous appuyant sur une analyse 
approfondie des systèmes de gestion de confiance existants et des contraintes de l’IoD, nous avons 
conçu un système de gestion de confiance efficace pour nos protocoles collaboratifs. Cette efficacité a 
été évaluée en tenant compte de la façon dont le système de gestion de la confiance répond aux 
exigences spécifiques à nos approches proposées pour l'établissement de clés dans le contexte de l'IdO. 
Les résultats des analyses de performance que nous avons menées démontrent le bon fonctionnement 
du système proposé et une efficacité accrue par rapport à la littérature.  
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INTRODUTION 
A major trend of today's Internet is its extension into domains, scenarios and even objects that all 
would have been considered unrelated to Information and Communications Technologies a few 
decades ago. Energy management, personal health monitoring, safer transportation systems, to name a 
few frameworks, benefit from the proven design of Internet protocols and become part of a global 
connected world whose foundations lay in the first packet switched networks and in the TCP/IP 
protocol suite. 
In fact, it was not the Internet protocols themselves that initially opened new domains to 
interconnection with the legacy Internet architecture. More useful were advances in energy-efficient 
radio technologies and protocols, which were the essential bricks to design small size autonomous 
communicating modules, able to monitor and act upon the physical world. First Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) relied on leaf nodes that were gathering data about the physical environment and 
delivered it to a central collecting node, often known as the sink node. This latter could be (and often, 
was) an IP node, part of the legacy Internet and, as such, remotely accessible and manageable. 
Today's transition from legacy WSN systems to the Internet of Things (IoT) can be in a first 
approach summarized as an extension of the Internet boundaries up to the leaf devices. Instead of 
stopping at the sink node, as was the case in WSNs, Internet protocols can now run between any two 
IoT nodes. Accordingly, the architectures and communication types in the IoT are becoming closer to 
those of legacy Internet. Decentralisation is appearing within once-monolithic, sink-centric sub-
systems whose end nodes are now able to be involved in peer-to-peer, bidirectional communications 
with any remote Internet peer. 
Figure 1 schematically depicts the transition of Internet subsets dedicated to the monitoring of 
physical assets, from Wireless Sensor Networks to the Internet of Things. It highlights the existence of 
an intermediary step, namely Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications. The M2M paradigm 
considers that all nodes can communicate with each other on a peer-to-peer basis, but restricts the 
application of such communications to a single scenario (e.g. home automation or energy 
management). 
 
 
Fig. 1. From Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) to the Internet of Things (IoT). 
Figure 1 also highlights another characteristic of the transition from WSN to the IoT: the evolution 
from a human-centric management to autonomous behaviours. This evolution goes along with a 
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parallel trend in legacy Internet, in which self-* systems (e.g. self-monitoring or self-healing) are 
emerging. It is even more worthy in unattended, scattered and largely vulnerable (to attackers, radio 
channel changing conditions or faulty nodes) topologies, such as those considered in the WSN, M2M 
or IoT architectures. Autonomy can be defined as a local (node) or global (system) ability to monitor 
the environment, to induce measures needed to correct a foreseen or ongoing incident and to 
eventually apply the best corrective action. This qualitative description can be mapped to a numeric 
process, wherein a value obtained as a function of a set of parameters and expressing the overall node 
or system efficiency, has to be maximized. Among autonomous processes, adaptive ones can be 
distinguished from cognitive ones. The former merely apply the same function to varying observed 
parameters, leading to always choosing the same answer if confronted to the same contextual situation. 
The latter introduce a learning step as part of their reasoning operation, which makes them aware of 
the results of their last decision. As a consequence, they dynamically update the performance 
evaluation function used to identify the best action to undertake. The node, or system, will therefore 
not answer identically to identical situations. 
 
The mere delivery of data from a node to another is the most elementary service in which 
autonomous processes take place. Basic IP routing is essentially an adaptive process, wherein 
resilience of a service (packet delivery) can be achieved even though incidents (faulty routing nodes) 
happen, through a specified monitoring and planning operation (routing table update). Likewise, the 
ability of networked nodes to exchange information with one another in a dynamically shared radio 
environment involve adaptive or even cognitive processes that aim at optimizing the use of a scarce 
resource, namely the radio spectrum. In both cases, autonomy is complemented with collaboration: 
various nodes collaborate with each other in order to perform end-to-end delivery of an IP packet or to 
achieve best usage of a radio channel. 
The ability for any two nodes of exchanging information with one another is however not sufficient 
for a networked architecture being deployed in proximity of the physical world (either sensed or acted 
upon) and therefore vulnerable to malicious attacks on nodes and/or communications channels. 
Security is another essential service that has to be provided. Here again, autonomy and collaboration 
offer valuable advantages for the optimisation and resilience of security services. Before going into the 
details of how autonomous collaborative security services can be profitable in M2M or IoT topologies, 
it is worth giving a quick overview of how security functions can be categorized in these 
environments. 
Classification of information security functions is often approached with the objective of 
performing a risk assessment for a system and to eventually develop countermeasures to identified 
threats. As such, classes of security functions correspond to main families of attacks, wherein an 
attacker may attempt to alter information (integrity security concept), to access sensitive information 
(confidentiality security concept) or to disrupt information-processing services (availability security 
concept). Depending on the scenario, the integrity/confidentiality/availability kernel can be extended 
to include other security services such as non-repudiation. 
Things are somewhat different when considered from the viewpoint of a legitimate member of a 
protected topology. For example, the security procedures applied to set up integrity protection and 
confidentiality services between two nodes are very similar: generally, an authenticated key exchange 
protocol, leveraging on nodes' respective credentials, is invoked; a key derivation/diversification 
function follows; eventually, the generated keys are used to compute message authentication codes 
and/or to run symmetric encryption/decryption algorithms. The whole process is reiterated whenever 
secure (confidential and/or integrity-protected) communications have to be established with a new 
peer, or when a given key material expires. On the other hand, availability at node's side merely relies 
on security by design (e.g. use of protocols resilient against Denial of Service attacks) –without 
requiring active involvement of the node or the use of a dedicated security procedure. 
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Fig. 2. Schematic view of the main security threats and corresponding countermeasures. 
Figure 2 provides a schematic view of how the three main security properties (integrity, 
confidentiality and availability) relate to their associated security primitives and how they answer the 
corresponding possible attacks. At defender's side, authenticated key exchange protocols represent the 
bulk of security primitives used for integrity and confidentiality. However, they rely on 
computationally heavy cryptographic operations, which may prevent their use by constrained nodes, 
limited in terms of computing power and/or battery. 
 
This limitation is problematic for a wide range of nodes, found in M2M and IoT scenarios, which 
precisely exhibit these constraints in both computing power and battery capacity. On one hand, these 
constrained nodes are involved in end-to-end transactions with remote peers, as required by the 
decentralized characteristic of the considered scenarios. On the other hand, the prerequisite for any 
secure channel setup, that is, key establishment, could be either unaffordable or prohibitively 
expensive for these nodes. While latency could be induced, this is not where the main problem lies: a 
key establishment operation occurs indeed at the beginning of a novel communication without 
affecting it afterwards, except when rekeying is needed. For example, a lengthy key establishment 
phase, in the order of a few seconds or dozens of seconds, would still be acceptable if it occurred only 
once a day. More critical are the consequences in terms of energy consumption. Battery-powered 
sensor nodes can be disseminated in hazardous environments. Some are built-in within products and 
are expected to have at least the same lifetime as their hosts. Changing a discharged battery could 
therefore be either demanding, or unacceptable. This even without considering the consequences on 
other neighbouring nodes, which may find themselves disconnected from the infrastructure if their 
default route passed through a battery-depleted node. 
This is where collaboration comes into play. It can be expected, from the heterogeneous aspect of 
M2M and IoT scenarios, that the architecture containing the constrained nodes also hosts 
unconstrained ones. We proposed to take advantage of this heterogeneity to involve said unconstrained 
nodes in a collaborative key establishment process, wherein they would make available to otherwise 
hindered peers their computing and energy capabilities. By delegating the computationally expensive 
tasks to a set of peers, a constrained node could thus establish secure, end-to-end communication 
channels with remote peers instead of relying on inefficient or vulnerable lightweight alternatives that 
include static shared secrets or use of an intermediary security gateway. 
The reliance on collaboration for any kind of service, and even more for the fulfilment of a security 
service, should however be done on a controlled basis. Collaboration per se may indeed open the way 
to a new class of attacks, all the more insidious as they would involve internal attackers. Having 
already passed cryptographic filtering barriers during network access control procedures, these latter 
have to be identified and excluded based on their behaviours only. This amounts, in a nutshell, to 
introducing the concept of trustworthiness within a networked architecture. As can be expected, 
trustworthiness can be difficult to measure when different nodes providing different services have to 
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be assessed by the same trust management system, especially when these nodes, subject to regular 
exhaustion of their (low) resource capabilities, become temporarily unable to provide assistance to 
their peers without being nevertheless to be qualified as malicious. Of course, truly malicious nodes do 
exist too and have to be dealt with, even though these would likely try to fail the trust metric by 
camouflaging their misbehaviours. 
 
Like the collaborative key establishment mentioned above, a trust management system is also a 
security system instantiated on a collaborative basis, wherein multiple nodes share their views about 
one another's trustworthiness in order to exclude misbehaving nodes from future selections. The 
present PhD thesis therefore approaches IoT security from two complementary levels that leverage on 
similar relationships patterns. On one hand, we identified key establishment as the most crucial 
security procedure in the setup of secure channels, and proposed a novel collaborative key 
establishment approach for adapting it to highly resource-constrained nodes. On the other hand, we 
identified trust management as an essential autonomous security procedure for making viable 
collaborative solutions and proposed a cognitive approach for handling it. Meanwhile, both levels of 
collaborative security had to be thoroughly tuned in order to take advantage of (when possible), or at 
least to be resilient against the heterogeneity in nodes, capabilities and services that characterize 
today's emerging M2M and IoT architectures. 
OBJECTIVES AND CHALLENGES 
The main objective of this thesis is to design a collaborative solution for end-to-end key 
establishment in heterogeneous environments. This objective encompasses the following challenges, 
which are to be specifically addressed: 
• Design of a collaborative key establishment system answering the constraints and 
characteristics of heterogeneous Machine to Machine or Internet of Things environments. 
For this purpose, these constraints and their impact on the keying design decisions are to be 
investigated. 
• Adaptation to existing key establishment modes and protocols. The designed key 
establishment protocol will have to leverage on existing key establishment modes (namely 
key transport, key agreement and key distribution), highly different to one another, and for 
which collaborative embodiments will have to be designed –if these modes are judged 
suitable for the Internet of Things. Likewise, the proposed collaborative solution will have 
to fit within the scope of current key establishment protocols (similar syntax and 
authentication model). 
• Security of the proposed collaborative scheme against malicious players. Relying on a 
collaborative process, the developed key establishment solution will indeed be exposed to 
attack schemes targeting its early design. In order not to be self-contradictory, the security 
system we design must be resilient against these attacks. Security by design and 
autonomous security will be the key to protect it against information disclosure and Denial 
of Service attacks. Special care will be taken to protect the established key as well as to 
exclude from the collaborative process the malicious or faulty nodes. 
• Evaluation of the proposed key establishment solution. In order to be satisfactory, the 
developed key establishment protocol and its accompanying security framework must be 
validated both in terms of security (formal security analysis whenever possible, rigorous 
simulation of attacks otherwise) and performance (usability by constrained devices). 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
In order to reach the planned objectives, the following contributions were produced. 
• An overall overview of key establishment schemes and protocols was carried out. Its results 
were confronted to a study of Internet of Things characteristics and requirements. 
Accordingly, relevant key establishment protocols, belonging to the key transport and key 
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agreement families were identified. A study of how to securely and efficiently design 
collaborative versions of these protocols was conducted. This work is to be published in: 
o Y. Ben Saied, A. Olivereau, M. Laurent and D. Zeghlache, Lightweight 
collaborative keying for the Internet of Things, submitted to Elsevier Ad hoc 
Networks, 2013. 
• The technical design of collaborative key establishment schemes led to the development of 
two classes of solutions, respectively adapted to the key transport and key agreement 
families. Complementarily, we designed a framework for lightweight authorisation of 
assistant nodes (lightweight signing and validating). We also focused on the development of 
performance evaluation techniques: the security of the developed solutions was formally 
proven using the AVISPA tool. We also designed a quantitative performance evaluation 
model which allowed us to compare the energy cost of the developed solutions to other key 
establishment protocols, with respect to both computations and data transmissions. Finally, 
we developed resilience schemes allowing collaborative keying to withstand faulty assisting 
nodes. These contributions were published in: 
o Y. Ben Saied, A. Olivereau and D. Zeghlache, Energy Efficiency in M2M 
Networks: A Cooperative Key Establishment System, 3rd International Congress on 
Ultra-Modern Telecommunications and Control Systems (ICUMT) 2011. 
o Y. Ben Saied, A. Olivereau and D. Zeghlache, Etablissement de clé de session en 
environnement M2M entre nœuds à ressources fortement hétérogènes, Computer & 
Electronics Security Applications Rendez-vous (C&ESAR) 2011. 
o Y. Ben Saied and A. Olivereau, HIP Tiny Exchange (TEX): A Distributed Key 
Exchange Scheme for HIP-based Internet of Things, 3rd International Conference 
on Communications and Networking (ComNet) 2012. 
o Y. Ben Saied, A. Olivereau and M. Laurent, A Distributed Approach for Secure 
M2M Communications, 5th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, 
Mobility and Security (NTMS), 2012. 
o Y. Ben Saied and A. Olivereau, D-HIP: A Distributed Key Exchange Scheme for 
HIP-based Internet of Things, First IEEE WoWMoM Workshop on the Internet of 
Things: Smart Objects and Services (IoT-SoS) 2012. 
o Y. Ben Saied and A. Olivereau, (k, n) Threshold Distributed Key Exchange for HIP 
based Internet of Things, 10th ACM International Symposium on Mobility 
Management and Wireless Access (MOBIWAC) 2012. 
• The need to reinforce our collaborative approaches with a solid trust model was highlighted 
in our previous studies. We therefore conducted a survey on collaborative systems security 
management. The synthesis of this survey led us to identify a set of best practices for the 
design of a Trust Management System in the framework of Internet of Things. This work is 
to be published in: 
o Y. Ben Saied, A. Olivereau, D. Zeghlache and M. Laurent, A Survey of 
Collaborative Services in Modern Wireless Communications and their Security-
related Issues, submitted to Elsevier Journal of Network and Computer 
Applications, 2013. 
• In accordance with the identified best practices, we specified a novel trust management 
system, named COACH (COntext Aware and multi-service trust model for Cooperation 
management in Heteregenous wireless networks) and highlighted how our proposed trust 
management system can be compared with the state of the art solutions proposed for 
enabling various collaborative networking services. These contributions were published in: 
o Y. Ben Saied, A. Olivereau and R. Azzabi, COACH: a COntext Aware and multi-
service trust model for Cooperation management in Heteregenous wireless 
networks, 9th International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 
Conference (IWCMC) 2013. 
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STRUCTURE 
This thesis report is organized as follows. We start in chapter 1 with a review of the challenges 
introduced by the transition from legacy Internet to Internet of Things, especially from the viewpoint 
of security. We highlight the relevance of the key establishment problem and its general inconsistency 
with nodes constraints. We assess the adaptability to the IoT paradigm of the legacy Internet protocols, 
as well as that of ad-hoc solutions purposely designed to fit the needs of constrained devices; we 
conclude on the inadequacy of either to manage end to end security associations involving highly 
constrained nodes. 
Consequently, we introduce the concept of collaborative key establishment in chapter 2, with the 
objective of providing a means for highly constrained nodes to establish end-to-end secured contexts 
with distant peers. New collaborative key establishment techniques are proposed for key transport and 
key agreement schemes. Accordingly, we details the prerequisites and bootstrapping approaches for 
these techniques, as well as their actual embodiments within the retained security protocols identified 
in previous chapter. We also provide a detailed performance evaluation from the points of view of 
security (formal security analysis) and energy consumption (evaluation of computation and 
communication energy costs) that proves the pertinence of our proposed key establishment approach. 
With collaborative key establishment arises the need to choose the best peers to outsource security 
functions to, a recurring need in collaborative processes. For this reason, we explore in chapter 3 the 
collaborative solutions for networking services that exist in the literature, as well as the security 
mechanisms that are designed to protect them. From this study, we identify both useful design choices 
and improvable areas, especially with respect to applicability of a common trust management system 
to a wide range of collaborative services, involving nodes whose resource availability is expected to 
vary a lot over time. 
These considerations lead us to propose in chapter 4 a novel trust management system for 
collaborative networking services in the Internet of Things. Along with the specification of this 
system, we pay a particular attention to its behaviour when subject to a class of attacks specifically 
designed to target trust management systems. The results show that our proposed system is able to 
withstand these attacks more efficiently than its counterparts that exist in the literature. 
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Chapter 1: KEY ESTABLISHMENT IN THE 
INTERNET OF THINGS 
1.1. INTRODUCTION  
The heterogeneous nature of Internet of Things (IoT) architecture, involving a wide variety of 
entities with different resource capabilities, makes it challenging to provide end-to-end secured 
connections. A direct use of existing key exchange schemes between two IoT entities may be 
unfeasible unless both entities be able to run the (expensive) cryptographic primitives required to 
bootstrap them – thus leaving aside a whole class of resource-constrained devices. Clarifying how 
existing security protocols can be adapted to fulfil these new challenges still has to be improved. In 
this chapter, we revisit existing end-to-end security standards and key establishment schemes and 
discuss their limitations considering the specific scenarios of the IoT. After having defined in section 
1.2 the concepts that underlie the Internet of Things, we introduce in section 1.3 the technical elements 
that will help us to characterize a key establishment protocol. We then carry out an in-depth study of 
the key establishment solutions that have been proposed for constrained devices, from legacy WSNs to 
Internet-integrated pre-IoT topologies. We conclude this chapter in section 1.5. 
1.2. FROM LEGACY INTERNET TO THE IOT 
The current transition from legacy Internet to Internet of Things (IoT) involves multiple changes in 
its communication paradigms. The diversity of scenarios where internetworked entities have to 
exchange information with one another without human interaction is increasing and is planned to 
extend to almost all environments, from individual customers’ everyday life to industrial processes. 
Accordingly, more and more objects become able to communicate, following as a rule of thumb an 
always greater interaction with the physical world, which is not only timely and accurately sensed but 
also understood and acted upon. Wireless sensor networks [1] were the first step in this direction.  
 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of a large number of physical devices, geographically 
close to one another, deployed inside a monitored site, and communicating together in a wireless 
multi-hop manner. These devices target the same objective: the wireless infrastructure they build aims 
to detect events that take place in the monitored environment and convey results of sensing to a small 
number of dedicated gateways called sinks, which eventually send aggregated data to remote 
management units. WSNs are widely applied in a large number of monitoring applications such as 
military, environmental, health, home and industrial applications.  Usually sensor nodes are small and 
inexpensive devices powered using batteries, so that their capabilities in terms of both energy and 
computing resources are highly constrained. Accordingly, optimizing energy consumption has been 
the key motivation in the research field of sensor networks. Proposed protocols and applications are 
being designed keeping in mind energy efficiency. More recently, energy harvesting technologies have 
been proposed for the same goal of maximizing the lifetime of the WSNs: a sensor node can be able to 
draw energy from the environment and supplements its battery, as long as it disposes of a harvesting 
circuit and a nearby convertible energy source such as light, wind or vibrations.  
 
Machine to machine (M2M) environment, largely extending the sensor networking model, 
represents a more advanced type of network referring to data communication between physical devices 
without human intervention [2]. M2M networks inherit resource-limited, un-guarded and mass 
deployed nature of sensor networks while developing it through embedded intelligence and self-
organisation. The Machine to Machine (M2M) paradigm can be characterized by three main features. 
First, it involves a highly diversified pool of components, ranging from low-resource sensors to 
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powerful servers, these components being distributed over a large geographical environment. Second, 
it emphasizes the increase of autonomy, as compared with legacy Internet. While all of the M2M 
systems are designed to provide decentralisation and minimize the requirement of human involvement, 
most advanced ones may even implement functions of situation awareness, self-organisation or 
cognition. Finally, M2M systems adopt a distributed communication model wherein any two nodes 
may establish relationship with each other, provided that one is offering the service, or resource, which 
is needed at the other end. To that respect, M2M systems broke the logical and topological simplicity 
of sensor networks. Contrary to what happens in WSNs, the communication path between two nodes 
does not have to follow a hierarchical path, e.g. from sensor to sink, and from sink to remote 
management units. A sensor in an M2M environment will likely have direct communications with 
other peers irrespective of their distance, role and capabilities, provided that these relationships are 
desirable from the viewpoint of the M2M scenario. This novel paradigm, wherein nodes communicate 
with a large set of heterogeneous entities through a decentralized pattern, leads to situations where 
unbalanced resource capabilities between the two communicating peers are confronted. 
 
The Internet of Things further extends the M2M paradigm into two directions. First, it aims to 
interconnect much wider sets of objects, even those that were not natively supposed to be able to 
communicate. Barcodes and tags allow otherwise inert objects to advertise their presence and 
sometimes to receive and store information. This makes them part of the connected world. Second, the 
IoT targets universality and global interoperability whereas most M2M architectures are dedicated to 
the fulfillment of a given task, be it wide-scale (e.g. Smart Grid operation [3]) or small-scale (e.g. 
home automation [4]). The advantages of interconnecting huge sets of “things” belong to the fields of 
adaptation (ability to sense / act on the environment) and autonomous orchestration of new services 
(interactions appear when entities discover each other, along with their needs and capabilities). In this 
perspective, IoT is defined as a global architecture featuring a large number of heterogeneous players 
with a wide variety of mechanisms and scenarios, hence leading to the vision of “anytime, anywhere, 
any media, anything” communications. 
1.3. REVIEW OF KEY ESTABLISHMENT SCHEMES 
Like legacy Internet nodes, IoT nodes require security for their communications. The major 
requirements related to security concern authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation and data 
integrity. These security services rely on the use of cryptographic primitives consisting of 
encryption/decryption and signature/verification schemes. In turn, these primitives require an initial 
key establishment process that must fit to the low capabilities and cost constraints of IoT components, 
most of which cannot implement complex security schemes. Key establishment protocols exist in 
today's Internet. However, the underlying cryptographic algorithms are either too heavy to run on 
resource-constrained nodes, or do not provide a satisfactory security level. 
 
Key establishment protocols, also named key exchange protocols, are used to "provide shared 
secrets between two or more parties, typically for subsequent use as symmetric keys for a variety of 
cryptographic purposes" [5]. These purposes include the use of symmetric ciphers and message 
authentication codes, which are in turn used as security primitives for enabling various security 
protocols such as source authentication, integrity protection or confidentiality. 
The word "protocol" in the above definition could be misleading, because it is used in multiple 
contexts in which its sense changes slightly. It has thus to be clarified first. 
1.3.1.  Algorithmic protocols, communication protocols 
A protocol can be defined as "a multi-party algorithm, defined by a sequence of steps precisely 
specifying the actions required of two or more parties in order to achieve a specified objective" [5]. 
This definition however encompasses two kinds of protocols that exist in the world of 
telecommunications and that collide in the field of security. On one hand, classical communication 
protocols of the OSI model – as specified for example in the Internet Engineering Task Force – define 
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how two or more networked entities interoperate. These protocols include precise packet format 
specification along with state machine definitions. On the other hand, cryptographic algorithmic 
protocols define how two or more logical entities carry out a cryptographic operation. They define 
mandatory elements for doing so, such as the data structures that have to be transported, and the 
corresponding order. They do not specify, however, how data are to be transported (e.g. encoding, 
optional parameters, resilience support, networking parameters…). 
Let us take the example of the key establishment operation for the IPsec protocol1. The key 
establishment communication protocol for IPsec, in the sense of the first definition, is the Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE, [12]) protocol. However, the key establishment algorithmic protocol for IPsec, in the 
sense of the second definition, is the cryptographic protocol on which IKE relies, that is, the Diffie-
Hellman protocol. This distinction is clear and easily understandable. Things become more complex 
however when a single communication protocol, such as EAP, can leverage on a multitude of distinct 
algorithmic protocols. Complexity increases even more when the algorithmic protocol within a well-
known telecommunication security protocol such as TLS can be entirely modified through the mere 
change of one bit in the handshake sequence. The distinction between these types of protocols is 
therefore of high importance. Unless otherwise stated, this chapter deals with cryptographic 
algorithmic protocols2. 
1.3.2.  Classification of key establishment protocols 
Key establishment protocols can be classified according to three criteria: the key delivery scheme 
(key transport or key agreement), the underlying cryptographic primitive family (symmetric or 
asymmetric) and the authentication method. The number of involved peers3 (two, peer-to-peer or 
three, server-assisted) is sometimes added to these criteria. These notions are discussed in what 
follows. 
1.3.2.1. Key transport vs. key agreement 
A two-party key transport protocol is a protocol that runs between two peers, in which one or more 
secret value(s) are generated at one or both peers and securely transferred to the other peer. The 
resulting key is obtained as a function of the transferred secret values and possibly of other parameters 
that may have been exchanged as part of key transport. 
In a one-pass key exchange, only one secret value is sent from one of the peers to the other. The 
established key may be either this secret value itself, or may be derived from it along with other 
parameters, such as nonces. In a two-pass key exchange, both peers exchange secret values that are 
used as input for the key generation function. Note that it is generally not safe to let one partner 
entirely control the key value. 
A variety of server-assisted key transport is the distribution of a session key from a central server 
(key distribution center) to two peers. This requires, of course, that the central server be able to 
perform the distribution in a secure manner, e.g. through pre-established secured channels to both 
peers. Another, less frequent, variety of server-assisted key transport consists for the server to let one 
peer generate the session key, obtain it from this peer, and retransmit it over another secure tunnel to 
the second peer. In this second variety the assisting server is called a key translation center. 
A two-party key agreement protocol is a protocol that runs between two peers, in which the 
resulting key is derived at both peers from public information exchanged between the peers. While 
said public information might take the form of an encrypted secret, the decrypting of this encrypted 
secret by either the recipient peer or by the originating peer itself is never required. 
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol [6] is the best known and most widely used key agreement 
protocol. It requires that two peers A and B first agree on appropriate prime (p) and generator (g). 
Then, A and B choose secret values, respectively a and b, compute the corresponding public values, 
respectively ga mod p and gb mod p, and exchange these public values with each other. The same 
                                                     
1
 Actually, a protocol suite made of the AH and ESP protocols. 
2
 In the literature, these protocols can also be designated as "methods", "algorithms" or "sub-protocols". 
3
 A key establishment protocol runs between two or more parties. In this thesis, we focus on peer-to-peer (pairwise) key establishment and do 
not consider the joint setup of a group key between more than two parties. 
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Diffie-Hellman shared secret K is then obtained at A by computing (gb mod p)a and at B by computing 
(ga mod p)b. The protocol exchange is depicted in figure 3 below: 
 
 
Fig. 3. Diffie-Hellman key agreement. 
An often claimed security property of the Diffie-Hellman protocol is the perfect forward secrecy. 
This property ensures that the established secret could not be retrieved even though all long-term 
secrets of both peers are divulged. In the base Diffie-Hellman protocol, a and b are random numbers 
that are dynamically chosen as part of the key management protocol and immediately erased from 
memory afterwards. They could therefore not be qualified as "long-term secrets", which ensures that 
the Diffie-Hellman protocol fulfils the perfect forward secrecy property. This should not be 
generalized to all key agreement protocols, though. Some key agreement protocols are based on key 
pre-distribution. For example, the variant of the Diffie-Hellman protocol used in the HIP-DEX key 
establishment communication protocol (reviewed in what follows) requires that the Diffie-Hellman 
secrets a and b be statically fixed and remain the same in all key establishment operations. This use of 
Diffie-Hellman leads to losing the perfect forward secrecy property that is generally associated with it. 
1.3.2.2. Cryptographic primitives 
Both key transport and key agreement exist in embodiments that rely either on symmetric or on 
asymmetric cryptography. These cryptographic primitives should not be confused with those of the 
authentication mechanisms that may be integrated with the key establishment protocol and that are the 
subject of the next classification criterion. To clarify this distinction, let us take again the example of 
the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. Diffie-Hellman is based on asymmetric cryptography 
primitives (actually, most of the key agreement protocols are). Yet Diffie-Hellman, natively 
unauthenticated and vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, has to rely on authentication techniques, 
some of which can be based on symmetric techniques. 
Considering only the key delivery scheme and the cryptographic primitive type, four cases are 
possible: 
• Key transport based on symmetric cryptographic primitives. This category regroups algorithms in 
which two peers, already owning a shared key, derive another one. Such operation typically 
happens when a symmetric key has to be refreshed, or when an ephemeral secret (e.g. transient 
session key) has to be derived from a long-term one. 
• Key transport based on asymmetric cryptographic primitives. In this category are found various key 
establishment protocols ranging from simple one-pass encryption of a secret key with a public key 
to more complex X.509 keying protocols. 
• Key agreement based on symmetric cryptographic primitives. A corresponding protocol, Blom's 
scheme, is presented in [1]. Although interestingly dissociating the key agreement notion from the 
Diffie-Hellman protocol, one cannot but notice that such algorithmic protocols are not used by main 
(and even minor) communication protocols. 
• Key agreement based on asymmetric cryptographic primitives. With rare exceptions, this category 
is composed of the Diffie-Hellman protocol and its variants. 
A B
Generate a Generate b
Agree on g, p Agree on g, p
ga mod p
Compute KDH=(g
a mod p)b
gb mod p
Compute KDH=(g
b mod p)a
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1.3.2.3. Authentication method 
Authentication for a pairwise key establishment protocol relates to the ability, for one or both nodes 
that undertake it, to bind the established key material with the identity of its peer. While it is generally 
a good thing to have a pairwise key establishment protocol authenticate both peers to each other, it is 
not always the case. Commonly, only one peer is authenticated to the other; the authentication of the 
other peer, if required, has then to be ensured by another mechanism, possibly at another layer. 
Authentication brings us back to the distinction we introduced in the beginning of this chapter 
between algorithmic and communication protocols. Some algorithmic protocols natively provide 
authentication. This is the case, for example, of a one-pass key transport protocol wherein a session 
key k is sent from a node A to its peer B, encrypted with B's public key. This protocol achieves indeed 
more than confidential key delivery: it proves to A that a node knowing k must be identified as B, 
since only B is expected to have been able to decipher the message containing k4. On the other hand, 
as mentioned above, the Diffie-Hellman protocol does not natively provide authentication. The Diffie-
Hellman public values have therefore to be authenticated at communication protocol level, as is done 
by the IKE protocol, which ensures through digital signatures or keyed hashes that their origins can be 
validated. 
Like those of key establishment protocol, the cryptographic primitives that underlie the 
authentication method can be classified as symmetric vs. asymmetric techniques. With the objective of 
defining the best practices for an IoT key establishment protocol, it is worth, though, going beyond 
this distinction and considering the underlying identity models. The categories of authentication that 
can be distinguished are listed hereafter. For clarity reasons, this list is made simpler by assuming that 
mutual authentication is desired, and that both peers use the same authentication method to each other. 
• Shared secret –based authentication. This is the classical symmetric authentication scheme wherein 
two parties are statically configured with, or otherwise acquire, a common shared secret mapped to 
their respective identities. 
• Static public key authentication. In this asymmetric authentication scheme, the two parties are 
statically configured with their respective public keys, mapped to their respective identities. Proving 
the knowledge of the corresponding private key implicitly ensures ownership of the matching 
identity. 
• Certificate-based authentication. This is a variant of the previous category, wherein the mapping of 
a public key to an identifier is not a static configuration parameter but is obtained in the form of a 
signed certificate. Certificate-based authentication requires that a third party, the certificate 
authority, be trusted by both authenticating peers. 
• Cryptographically generated identifiers. This family of asymmetric techniques changes the implicit 
assumption that any kind of identifier can be authenticated, provided that it is securely bound to a 
public key. These techniques assume indeed that the authenticated identifier of a node is obtained 
from the node public key, e.g. in the form of a hash of this public key. Mechanisms are then defined 
in order to build protocol stack identifiers (typically, IPv6 addresses) from these cryptographically 
generated identifiers. 
• Identity-based authentication. This last set of asymmetric techniques bases on the Identity Based 
Cryptography paradigm wherein, oppositely to the previous category, a node’s public key is derived 
from its identity (whatever the format of this identity). Like in all asymmetric techniques, a node 
proves its identity by providing a proof of knowledge of the corresponding private key. 
1.3.2.4. Synthesis 
Our objective is here to provide a global view of the existing algorithmic protocols, in order to ease 
the identification among them of the best candidates for IoT key establishment. This synthetic global 
view is provided in the form of a table, on which we chose to superpose the most known/used 
communication protocols. Usability of algorithmic protocols within communication protocols 
currently in use in today's Internet is indeed a criteria that should not be left apart: the Internet of 
                                                     
4
 The two steps of ensuring that only B may know the key k and obtaining the proof that some node knows the key k are respectively 
designated in [5] as implicit key authentication and key confirmation. Together, they form the explicit key authentication property. 
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Things will definitely not start with a "clean slate" design approach, but will likely have to interoperate 
with widely adopted protocols of legacy Internet. 
 
Table 1. Classification of key establishment protocols according to the key delivery scheme and authentication method, with 
main key establishment communication protocols represented in overlay. 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, the existing key establishment communication protocols mainly base on 
asymmetric cryptography, be it for the delivery/agreement scheme itself, or for the authentication 
method implemented within the protocol. Empty cells in the table are mostly found in the symmetric 
key transport and symmetric key agreement columns. Symmetric key transport protocols do exist, 
though; however, they mainly consist in key refresh / key derivation protocols, which we found did 
not fully qualify as key establishment protocols. Only the MIKEY [7] and TLS-PSK [11] protocols are 
included in the column, since they are used to distribute session keys from long-term shared keys. 
Symmetric key agreement protocols are uncommon and require complex setup (pre-distribution). 
1.3.3.  IoT key establishment: generic design decisions 
This subsection reviews the generic design decisions that are involved in the identification of a key 
establishment protocol for the Internet of Things. These decisions fall into four main categories: those 
that are related to the fulfilment of security requirements, those that are related to pervasiveness (the 
Internet of Things is to encompass a wide variety of devices and networks, including legacy Internet), 
those that are related to efficiency (among IoT devices, some are resource-constrained) and those that 
are related to adoptability or interoperability (the IoT should preferably use proven and deployed 
technologies and protocols). 
1.3.3.1. Security 
Contrary to wireless sensor network security, security in the IoT context involves end-to-end 
communications. The decentralized and bidirectional IoT communication paradigm also rules out the 
definition of static client and server roles: depending on the context, it is expectable that an IoT node 
will act alternatively as a client and as a server. These considerations translate into two security 
requirements. On one hand, end-to-end security should be provided. This means that only the two 
participants involved in the pairwise key exchange protocol should have access to the generated key. 
On the other hand, mutual authentication has to be provided. The two peers that establish a key 
between them should in the meantime authenticate to each other and bind the generated key to their 
respective identities. 
1.3.3.2. Pervasiveness 
By qualifying the Internet of Things as "pervasive", we refer to its foreseen universality, as a 
communication network interconnecting much more nodes than today's Internet, and actually 
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encompassing this today's Internet. Pervasiveness puts additional requirements on a key establishment 
protocol for the IoT. Especially, it makes it highly unlikely that two nodes wishing to generate a key 
between them can leverage on a pre-existing security relationship based on long-term shared secrets or 
static public keys. For this reason, dynamic asymmetric key delivery schemes and authentication 
methods should be favoured when designing an IoT key establishment protocol. 
Pervasiveness also means that any two nodes may have to interoperate with each other, without 
considering their respective nature. Special care should therefore be taken, when designing an IoT key 
establishment protocol, to make sure that two nodes with important differences in capabilities are 
nevertheless able to generate a key with each other. 
1.3.3.3. Adoptability 
The Internet of Things will not emerge through the definition of entirely novel protocols. The 
approaches that rely on key generation schemes or authentication methods of limited usage should not 
be favoured. Of course, interoperability mechanisms with these latter should be developed when 
desirable, though. 
At this stage, it is worth quickly describing the two most widely adopted end-to-end security 
protocols we refer to in Table 1. 
The Internet Protocol security (IPsec) [8] resides at the Network Layer of the OSI Model, which 
enables it to function independently of any application. It creates a secure (encrypted and/or integrity-
protected) tunnel between two endpoints, through which data can be exchanged safely, without being 
vulnerable to eavesdropping, packet forging/replaying or sender spoofing attacks. 
Like IPsec and unlike hop-by-hop solutions, the Transport Layer Security TLS [9] provides the 
same end-to-end security services at the transport layer while still being application-independent. 
Hence it can encapsulate higher-level protocols layering on top of the transport layer protocols. TLS 
has been designed to work with reliable transport protocols providing in-sequence delivery, such as 
the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). Recently, a datagram-oriented variant DTLS [10] has been 
proposed to operate on top of datagram-oriented transport protocols, such as the User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP). Both IPsec and TLS have the same design and provide equivalent security measures. 
IPsec and TLS security protocols rely on the use of cryptographic mechanisms such as 
encryption/decryption block ciphers and hash functions, in order to ensure the required security 
services for a communication. In turn, each of these mechanisms requires an initial key establishment 
phase allowing two communicating entities to authenticate each other and set up the required 
cryptographic keys. TLS protocol is preceded by a handshake protocol called TLS Handshake, which 
is responsible for key establishment and authentication. Likewise, the Internet Key Exchange [12] 
protocol and the Host Identity Protocol Base Exchange (HIP BEX) [13] are both designed to perform 
keying for IPsec protocol. In practice, IKE is by far the most widely used IPsec keying protocol.  
Nevertheless, HIP BEX, the base key exchange mechanism of the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [13], is 
gaining momentum in the Internet of Things. Indeed, HIP is a secure protocol that provides not only 
identifier ownership and identifier/locator split5, but also supports mobility and interoperability [14], 
in addition to being based on a mature, proven design, for which various embodiments on different 
OSI layers have been proposed [15], [16]. 
Each of these key exchange schemes independently implements specific techniques and 
cryptographic algorithms to derive a secret key and ensure the required mutual authentication between 
the endpoints of a communication. 
1.3.3.4. Efficiency 
Efficiency has always to be considered when designing a new protocol. Four criteria are especially 
relevant when assessing cryptographic protocol efficiency: the number of exchanged messages, the 
needed bandwidth, the complexity of computations, and the possibility of pre-computations. 
Importance of these criteria increases when designing a protocol that will have to be run by highly 
resource-constrained nodes with low computational power, low memory, and limited battery capacity. 
                                                     
5
 Beyond being reasonable from an implementation point of view, the distinction between to whom a data unit 
should be sent, and to which location it has to be routed offers interesting opportunities in the field of IoT, 
especially for aggregation or resilience purposes, where the identifier/locator bindings can become quite loose. 
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Overall energy consumption, induced by both computations and message exchanges, is a good metric 
for these nodes. A protocol will be defined as more efficient than another if it obtains a metric value 
inferior to that of the other, while providing the same security level. Efficiency requirement is an 
important concern in the IoT, since we consider that most of its components are resource-constrained 
and heavy protocols may hinder their integration. 
1.3.3.5. Synthesis 
From the design decisions reviewed above, we can adapt our initial classification of key 
establishment protocols in order to identify among them the most suitable to the Internet of Things. 
The results of this identification are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Refinement of the key establishment protocols classification. Some candidates are ruled out either because they are 
not judged secure enough (no end-to-end security), or because they would not meet the IoT pervasiveness requirement, or 
because their adoptability is evaluated as low with respect to their use as of today. Efficiency is not discussed here, but will 
be the most important evaluation metric in the next section.  
 
 
Table 2 was obtained as follows. First, solutions relying on key pre-distribution were discarded, as 
they did not meet end-to-end security requirements. Then, solutions relying on symmetric 
cryptography or assuming initial knowledge of peer public key were discarded as they did not meet the 
pervasiveness requirement. It has to be noted that these first two requirements do not contradict each 
other: dynamic obtaining of asymmetric public keys through certificate and induced reliance on a 
certificate authority are different from letting the trusted third party generate the keys for both peers, 
and be thus in position to launch a key escrow attack. Finally, we discarded the solutions that were 
based on identity-based cryptography, which we considered not adopted enough. 
 
The most relevant communication key establishment protocol candidates, retained from the 
juxtaposition of Table 1and Table 2, are summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Retained key establishment protocols for the IoT before considering the efficiency metric. 
Properties 
 
Protocol 
Security protocol Algorithmic protocol Key delivery scheme Authentication method 
TLS Handshake TLS 
One-pass push / 
Diffie-Hellman 
One-pass key transport / 
Key agreement 
Certificates 
Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE) 
IPsec Diffie-Hellman Key agreement 
Certificates
6
 
HIP Base Exchange 
(BEX) 
Cryptographically 
generated identifiers 
 
1.4. APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING KEY EXCHANGE SCHEMES FOR IOT SCENARIOS AND 
RELATED WORK 
In this section, we assess the retained key establishment schemes of Table 3 from the point of view 
of the efficiency requirement. These schemes involve heavy asymmetric cryptographic primitives that 
impact both energy and storage resources of a communicating entity. The resource constraints of most 
IoT components limit the implementation of these complex cryptographic mechanisms required to 
perform the key establishment, which could rapidly drain their resources and reduce the network 
performance. Existing end-to-end security protocols such as TLS and IPsec, with their actual resource 
intensive key exchange design, could not directly cope with the envisioned scenarios and requirements 
in the IoT. The feasibility of these security standards has to be revisited to adapt them to the IoT 
scenarios.  
1.4.1. Energy model of a constrained IoT node 
We consider the following example system to underline the need to address energy efficiency issues 
in key establishment protocols: we determine the energy model of the popular sensor node TelosB 
[17] featuring the 16-bit MSP430 microcontroller with a clock frequency of 4 MHz and operating at a 
transmission data rate of 250 kbps. TelosB, powered by two AA batteries, runs TinyOS and embeds an 
IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver. This platform is the successor to the Mica family of motes 
(Mica2dot, Mica2 and MicaZ). It offers lower power consumption and longer battery life compared 
with the Mica2dot and Mica2.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6
 Shared secret or static public keys IKE authentication methods are not considered here, since they do not 
meet the pervasiveness requirement. EAP-based IKEv2 authentication would likely rely on a certificate-based 
EAP method. 
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Table 4. Energy costs of communication and computational operations on the TelosB platform. 
Operating mode Energy cost 
Transmission (1 bit) 0.72 µJ 
Reception (1 bit) 0.81 µJ 
Symmetric encryption AES-128 (one 128-bit block) 2.47 µJ 
RSA-1024 Sign 24.5 mJ 
RSA-1024 Verify 1.24 mJ 
Diffie-Hellman-1024 public value generation  60 mJ 
Diffie-Hellman-1024 shared key generation 105 mJ 
  
Table 4 presents the energy consumption for common communication and computational operations 
that we obtained for a TelosB platform7. Results show that when asymmetric cryptographic operations 
are performed during a key establishment protocol, the node is observed to consume energy in the 
order of mJoules. The most demanding operations in terms of energy are the computation of the 
Diffie-Hellman shared key, immediately followed by the generation of the Diffie-Hellman public 
values. Signatures computations are also non negligible operations from the point of view of a highly 
resource-constrained node. Verifications, though, are more affordable since they are 20 times less 
expensive than their signing counterparts. Being of the order of µJ, the communication (transmission 
and reception) and symmetric encryption costs are considerably lesser than those of asymmetric 
cryptography operations. 
Putting these cryptographic mechanisms in perspective with each other, as well as in perspective 
with the overall battery capacity of the TelosB (2x AA-sized NiMH batteries, that is 2x 7.7 kJ) 
emphasizes how full reliance on heavy asymmetric cryptographic operations to set up shared secrets 
would speed up the battery drainage. This motivates us to investigate techniques to facilitate energy-
efficient execution of security protocols in the context of the Internet of Things.  
1.4.2. Related work: energy-efficient key establishment solutions   
The need for energy efficient solutions was initially identified to accommodate the resource 
constraints of WSN nodes. To that respect, the design of a lightweight key establishment system for 
WSNs was recognized as a highly relevant challenge, and led to the development of several 
mechanisms. Early on, these mechanisms were adapted to the existing WSN topologies. Since these 
latter were both highly hierarchical and either disconnected from the Internet, or connected to it by 
means of dedicated gateways, these systems favoured hop-by-hop security. Another reason for relying 
on hop-by-hop security was the implementation of security mechanisms at the link layer, which 
certainly allowed for lightweight communication stacks and more efficient bandwidth management 
but also restrained the scope of the provided security services (integrity and confidentiality) to one 
single hop. 
Recently, under the umbrella of IoT, integrating sensor nodes with the Internet to support direct 
communications between Internet hosts and sensor nodes became a challenging goal. Accordingly, 
sensors communications stacks became more comprehensive and the all-IP paradigm began to look 
like a viable solution for sensor nodes too. With WSN IP nodes arose the need for end-to-end secure 
connections between these and remote IP Internet nodes, bypassing the dedicated WSN gateways. The 
adaptation of the legacy Internet end-to-end security protocols, namely IPsec and TLS, to the 
constrained WSN systems led to solving a variety of questions. These protocols were initially 
designed for unconstrained nodes, and their applicability to WSN nodes required to reshape them in 
terms of state machine complexity, data structures and, mostly, cryptographic primitives. Accordingly, 
recent scientific works have been proposed that describe lightweight key establishment schemes to 
efficiently implement IPsec and TLS on constrained devices. 
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 The analytical process for doing so is described in the next chapter. 
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This subsection reviews the approaches proposed by the international research community with 
respect to lightweight key establishment for sensor nodes. The reviewed schemes range from the 
initial solutions proposed for traditional WSNs to the latest approaches that try adapting legacy 
Internet security protocols to IP-based WSN nodes, considered as being part of a global Internet of 
Things. 
1.4.2.1. Efficient key establishment schemes in traditional WSNs 
Several key establishment schemes have been proposed in traditional WSN deployments in order to 
cope with the resource constraint nature of sensor devices. Most of the proposed approaches rely on 
symmetric cryptography primitives due to their low resource consumption. Such solutions are 
considered more efficient for sensor nodes. The most relevant researches are described in what 
follows. 
The simplest solution is to set the same master secret key in all the nodes. Any pair of nodes can 
then use this global secret key to achieve key establishment and exchange a secret pairwise key. This 
solution is however highly vulnerable to node compromise, since a successful attack on one node, 
allowing to retrieve the master secret key, means that the overall network security system is broken. 
Another key pre-distribution scheme is to let each sensor node carry N−1 secret pairwise keys, each 
pair being shared between this sensor and one of the other N−1 sensors (N being the total number of 
sensors). However, this scheme is unfeasible for sensors with an extremely limited capacity of storage, 
because N could be large. Eshenauer and Gligor proposed in [18] a random key pre-distribution 
scheme: random sets of keys are distributed to each sensor and after deployment, any pair of nodes has 
at least one shared key to use as their secret pairwise key. Chan et al. in [19] proposed a q-composite 
random key pre-distribution scheme that improves the resilience of the network compared to the 
Eschenauer-Gligor scheme. The difference is that q common keys – instead of just one – are needed to 
establish secure communications between a pair of nodes. The secret shared key is the hash of the q 
common keys. 
Liu et al. proposed in [20] a key pre-distribution scheme that relies on location deployment 
knowledge in order to improve the probability of key sharing. The keys are assigned according to the 
geographical position of sensor nodes. A similar approach is also developed in [21]. Such solutions are 
impractical in sensor networks with randomly deployed topology. A polynomial based key pre-
distribution scheme is proposed in [22]: a polynomial share is distributed to each node and using it, 
any two nodes are able to establish a pairwise key. 
Perrig et al. proposed in [23] SPINS, a key management protocol that relies on a trusted base station 
to distribute keys. Two sensor nodes use the base station as a trusted third party to set up their pairwise 
secret key. SPINS includes two parts: SNEP (Secure Network Encryption Protocol) that secures 
communications between a node and the base station or between two nodes, and µTESLA (µTime 
Efficient Streaming Loss-tolerant Authentication) that authenticates packets coming from the base 
station. 
Nevertheless, symmetric key based schemes are only applicable to legacy sensor nodes, which are 
seen as belonging to sensor networks, themselves connected to the internet via dedicated gateways. 
These schemes are based on pre-shared keys between different nodes within the same sensor network. 
In view of the IoT scenarios, however, a sensor node is considered as a part of the Internet able to 
establish end-to-end communications with external entities without requiring any initial knowledge of 
these external entities or any prior authentication context or pre-shared keys. In terms of security, these 
schemes rely on link-layer security and are especially vulnerable to node compromise. Besides, 
symmetric algorithms offer poor authenticity and data integrity services since Message Authentication 
Codes (MACs) are not publicly verifiable. Scalability and complex key management remain also 
significant issues considering a large-scale sensor network which needs to generate a huge number of 
shared keys and then install them in sensors before their deployment. 
In order to eliminate the complexity of key management and increase the security level within the 
sensor network, many researchers investigated the application of asymmetric cryptography to sensor 
networks in order to provide the best trade-off between security services, computation overhead, and 
memory requirements. The security services (e.g. non-repudiation) and protection level (e.g. resilience 
to node compromise) it offers are more evolved than those offered by symmetric cryptography. Lopez 
in [24] highlights the limits of using symmetric cryptography in sensor networks and promotes 
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solutions based on public key cryptography to enhance the security of the entire system, while warning 
against complex computations. The author emphasizes the important role that Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) can play to overcome the computational complexity of public key algorithms. 
ECC was the top choice among different public cryptography algorithms due to its lower energy 
consumption, fast processing time, compact signatures, and small key size. For example, a 160-bit 
ECC key size guarantees a level of protection equivalent to a 1024-bit RSA key, with an energy 
consumption reduced by half [25]. The authors of [26] present lightweight implementation of public 
key cryptography algorithms relying on elliptic curves and claim that using ECC-based key 
establishment solution is the best trade-off between energy consumption and security level.  
Alternatively [27], [28] focus on making the well-known RSA public key cryptosystem [29] more 
adapted to resource-restrained devices using a small RSA public exponent (e) and a short key size. For 
example, Watro et al. in [28] develop the TinyPK system that allows implementation of PKI in sensor 
networks. The concept requires the use of smaller RSA parameters (key size, exponent) and the use of 
public key operations only at the sensor device. This comes, however, at the price of a lower security 
level [32]. Huang et al. [30] and Kotzanikolaou et al. [31] propose hybrid protocols that combine 
standard Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) key agreement and implicit certificates with 
symmetric techniques in an effort to reduce the expensive elliptic curve random point scalar 
multiplications at the sensor side. The cost per node for key establishment is effective due to the 
combination of symmetric encryption in the randomisation process and the use of Schnorr signatures. 
This approach reduces the high cost of public key operations by replacing asymmetric-key operations 
with symmetric-key based ones and thus joins the advantages of both approaches. However, 
communications with an external party become less feasible, since both peers have to share a 
symmetric key. 
To make public key cryptography practical in WSN, [32] [33] [34] have proposed hardware 
solutions that extend computational capabilities of a standard node through low power hardware 
modules. Results show that these additional hardware implementations help to provide the security 
services with less energy consumption and at a low cost; however, it could be a hard task taking into 
account the cheap and small design of sensor devices 
With the wide deployment of WSN applications, a different model of sensor networks, named 
Heterogeneous WSN (HSN), has emerged over the last several years. Contrary to the homogeneous 
sensor network, in heterogeneous networks different sensors with different capabilities, sensing for 
different applications coexist in the same monitored environment.  
Accordingly, Mache et al. developed in [35] a hybrid key establishment framework for resource-
restrained sensor networks that exploits heterogeneity of sensor node deployment, basing on a 
combination of symmetric and asymmetric operations. The idea is to use less expensive symmetric 
cryptography on the first part of the path from sensor to sink until a resource-rich gateway is reached, 
and then to use more expensive public-key cryptography on the second part of the path.  
Riaz et al. proposed in [36] three key establishment schemes: SACK based on symmetric key 
cryptography, SACK-P based on asymmetric key cryptography and SACK-H which relies on a hybrid 
cryptography approach using asymmetric cryptography for cluster-wide communication and 
symmetric cryptography for network-wide communication. The authors then draw a comparison 
between the three proposed schemes and show that SACK is light on resource consumption but 
provides a low security level since one node compromise makes the whole network vulnerable. In 
contrast, SACK-P is heavy on resource consumption but provides the highest security level with a 
maximum resilience to node compromise. The hybrid scheme SACK-H falls between the two others 
and presents medium resource consumption with a medium security level. 
However, security is provided in these schemes on a hop-by-hop basis. Confidentiality and 
availability are thus compromised since the intermediary translating entity at border between 
“symmetric” and “asymmetric” domains, introduces potentially both a security flaw and a single point 
of failure. 
 
1.4.2.2. Towards secure integration of IP enabled WSNs with the Internet: 
The solutions reviewed above for key establishment in traditional WSNs are not targeting a secure 
end-to-end communication between the sensor node and remote hosts. Instead, they discuss security of 
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communications within the sensor network. Recently, with the advent of WSNs integration to the 
Internet, the need for an end-to-end security protocol between sensor nodes and the legacy Internet has 
been recognized. In order to enable functional implementations of TLS and IPsec in a constrained 
environment, lightweight key establishment schemes have been proposed. They base mainly on the 
use of modified implementations of the corresponding keying protocols: TLS handshake, IKE and 
HIP BEX. 
1.4.2.2.1. Lightweight TLS handshake proposals 
i. Basic TLS handshake   
When a TLS connection is needed between a client and a server, an initial phase called TLS 
Handshake [9] is needed to negotiate security algorithms, to authenticate at least one peer to the other 
and to establish a shared secret between both peers. The TLS Handshake protocol supports two 
different key exchange methods: a key transport method based on RSA asymmetric cryptography and 
a Diffie-Hellman key agreement method. The entire exchange is illustrated in the figure 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Basic TLS handshake with two supported key delivery modes. 
First the client and the server exchange Hello messages. These messages contain nonces and 
negotiate the set of cryptographic algorithms that will be applied to the session. The server Hello also 
contains the server’s Diffie–Hellman public value if a DH key agreement is performed, along with the 
server certificate and a signature for authentication. 
Next, the client sends a message containing either its Diffie–Hellman public value in case of a DH 
key agreement or a generated secret – called pre-master key (PMK) – if a key transport method is 
performed. In this latter case, TLS handshake performs the one-pass key transport so that the pre-
master key is pushed from the client to the server. Indeed, the assumption that the server's certificate 
can be validated by the client sounds more realistic than the opposite; this assumption actually laid the 
bases for today's secured HTTPS transactions. The PMK is thus encrypted using the server's RSA 
public key, which is retrieved from the server's certificate. This message also includes a signature on 
the hash value of the PMK, combined with all past messages exchanged during the current session. 
The client authentication is optionally performed too during TLS handshake: if requested by the 
server, the client provides it with a certificate and a signed message. 
 The client and the server can then retrieve the shared pre-master key using the selected key 
exchange method. That is, each can compute it as the Diffie–Hellman shared secret derived from the 
two exchanged DH public values, or the server can decrypt the encrypted secret pushed by the client 
using its RSA private key. In order to reduce the PMK storage requirement at the communicating 
parties and to ensure the key freshness, a master secret is derived from PMK using a hash function 
applied to the concatenation of the PMK and the two nonces exchanged in Hello messages. 
The Finished message ends the handshake exchange. It includes a hash computed over the master 
key and all the past messages. The receiving entity is able to compute the corresponding hash value 
from its own records in order to check if the result matches the received value. 
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ii. Lighter TLS handshake Declinations 
It is worth noting first that using pre-shared keys for key exchange as in TLS-PSK [37] cannot be 
practical between IoT nodes as explained before, due to the absence of initial authenticating context 
between them. 
As explained above, the use of ECC was generally considered to be the most suitable choice among 
other public key cryptosystems in legacy WSNs. Accordingly, we have identified two different 
lightweight implementations of TLS on constrained devices that base on ECC during the key exchange 
while maintaining the same message exchanges. Sizzle [38] was the first security protocol that 
proposed the use of TLS in the WSN in order to implement an HTTPS stack. Sizzle relies on 
translating gateways that map the sensor nodes local (non-IP) addresses to internet hosts IP addresses, 
allowing them to exchange data directly with remote IP peers. During the TLS handshake, the Elliptic 
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement [39] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA) [40] respectively replace the Diffie-Hellman key agreement and DSA algorithms. Using 
these ECC-based protocols, performance evaluations showed that implementing HTTPS web servers 
on sensor nodes may be supportable for infrequent connections. In 2009, SSNAIL [41] has been 
developed as a second lightweight TLS implementation for IP-based WSNs relying on the same 
cryptographic primitives as Sizzle for the key exchange while eliminating the use of the gateway. 
Authors measure that implementing an ECC-based full handshake takes around 1 second while it takes 
8.5 seconds for an RSA-based one. 
1.4.2.2.2. Lightweight IKE proposals 
i. Basic Internet Key Exchange   
The objective of IKE [12] is to establish a secure channel between two parties and enable them to 
mutually authenticate each other. IKE provides a protocol to establish security associations (SAs) that 
are needed to secure IP datagrams using IPsec: 
 
 
Fig. 5. Basic Internet Key Exchange (Establishment of a simple SA). 
 All IKE communications are in the form of request-response pairs. An IKE transaction consists of 
two required request/response exchanges, as depicted in figure 5. The first request/response exchange 
(IKE_SA_INIT) negotiates cryptographic algorithms (SAi1, SAr1), exchanges nonces (Ni, Nr) and 
performs the Diffie-Hellman exchange to establish a shared key. The messages in this exchange are 
not authenticated; the following exchanges authenticate these messages by including their content 
while calculating the authentication values. At this stage, both sides have enough information to set up 
a master key KM, using both Diffie-Hellman public values and the nonces. All shared keys for the IKE 
SA are then derived from this master key. 
The second request/response exchange (IKE_AUTH) authenticates the previous messages. The 
identities of both sides are authenticated, and a simple IPsec SA, called a child SA, is established. 
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and the traffic selectors (TSi, TSr) are exchanged. Parts of these messages are encrypted and integrity 
protected (with a MAC) using the master key established in the IKE_SA_INIT exchange. 
 At this stage, the IKE transaction has been authenticated and a single child SA has been 
established. If no other child SAs are required, the IKE transaction terminates here. If, however, 
additional child SAs are required, the transaction moves to create another child SA. 
ii. Lighter IKE Declinations 
In 2011, a first compressed IPsec implementation for 6LoWPAN networks has been proposed [42] , 
basing on pre-shared keys for key exchange. Authors recognize that using pre-shared keys is not a 
feasible solution since sensor nodes should be able to communicate with external hosts without the 
need for prior authentication contexts. They are currently investigating the feasibility of Internet Key 
Exchange of IPsec for 6LoWPAN. 
Independently from the integration of WSN with the Internet, two recent variants of IKE have been 
proposed for energy efficiency purposes. V. Nagalakshmi in [43] modifies the IKE protocol by 
eliminating pseudo random generation functions, thus eliminating its repetitive usage during the key 
exchange. The sender transmits a hash of its private key and its Diffie-Hellman private value instead 
of sending nonces. The proposed work leads to cost effectiveness, however, the energy cost of a 
pseudo random function generation (amounting to a symmetric encryption) can be neglected compared 
with the heavy cost of asymmetric cryptographic operations that are required further in the protocol 
exchange. In 2012, an ECC-based IKE protocol [44] has been designed for Internet applications. It 
aims to reduce the heavy burden of the base exchange of the protocol IKE by using ECDH key 
exchange to set up the shared key and using ECC-based public key certificate for the authentication of 
the communicating entities. 
1.4.2.2.3. Lightweight HIP BEX proposals 
Like IKE, HIP BEX aims at generating key material for a subsequent use by IPsec in order to 
establish a secure end-to-end communication between two entities. However, contrary to IKE, no 
certificates are required in HIP BEX for the authentication, because self-certifying identifiers are used. 
The concept of a “self-certifying identifier” can be explained as follows: it is an identifier that only the 
legitimate owner can use, without needing an external proof coming from a trusted third party 
(certificate) to claim its ownership. In order to achieve this functionality, the self-certifying identifier 
is generally built in the form of a “cryptographically generated identifier” (CGA) [45]. This latter must 
be univocally bound to a public key, whose private counterpart is only known to the legitimate owner, 
hence its denomination. Thus, proving the ownership of a certain CGA amounts to proving the 
ownership of the related public/private key pair, hence the ability to use the corresponding private key. 
In HIP, the CGA used to identify a node is the Host Identity Tag (HIT), which is a 128-bit hash of its 
public key. 
i. HIP Base Exchange (BEX) 
The objective of the HIP Base Exchange (BEX) [13] is to perform authenticated key agreement 
between two HIP peers. The entire exchange is depicted in figure 6. 
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Fig. 6. HIP Base Exchange (BEX). 
The message I1 initiates the exchange. This message only includes the initiator and responder 
identities (HITI, HITR). Upon reception of I1, the receiver sends a (possibly pre-computed) message 
R1 composed of a puzzle, its Diffie-Hellman public value, its public key (or Host Identifier) and a 
signature. The initiator has to answer this message with an I2 message, composed of the puzzle 
solution (so as to prevent DoS attacks), its own Diffie-Hellman public value, its own (possibly 
encrypted) public key and a signature.  
At this stage, the initiator and the responder are able to compute the Diffie-Hellman shared key and 
derive the master key as the hash value of this pre-master key concatenated with the two peers’ 
identifiers and a nonce.  
Finally, with the last message R2, the responder finalizes the exchange. This message includes a 
HMAC computed using the DH shared key, and a signature. 
 
ii. Lighter HIP Declinations  
Stemming from the observation of the heavy computational cost of HIP Base Exchange, two 
modifications of HIP have been proposed in order to make the protocol usable by constrained nodes. 
HIP Diet Exchange (DEX) [46] proposes that a node use a long-term Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 
(ECDH) public value as its Host Identifier. DEX then adapts the key exchange, as depicted in figure 7. 
 
 
Fig. 7. HIP Diet Exchange (DEX). 
The Host Identifier being itself the Diffie-Hellman public value, there is no need to authenticate it 
through asymmetric cryptography. The knowledge of the DH key is enough to prove that a node is a 
legitimate peer in the exchange. Accordingly, this DH key is used to transport two random seeds x and 
y that are eventually used to derive the final secret. 
As compared with HIP BEX, the single computation of the long-term Diffie-Hellman public values 
eliminates the DH key generation cost. Likewise, the use of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman and the fact 
that no other asymmetric cryptography operation is required make the key exchange lighter.  
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Lightweight HIP (LHIP) [47] is a much more radical approach, which keeps the same message 
syntax as in HIP BEX for compatibility reasons but does not use any of the HIP BEX security 
mechanisms. No Diffie-Hellman key is computed, no RSA operation is performed and no secure IPsec 
tunnel is set up after the exchange. Instead, hash chains are used to cryptographically bind successive 
messages with each other, which represents a minimal degree of security. LHIP procedure is depicted 
in figure 8. Note that the DHR, DHI, PKR and PKI message fields are present in the exchange but are 
unused in standard LHIP exchange except when upgrading to standard HIP BEX, which LHIP allows. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Lightweight HIP (LHIP). 
LHIP trades security for energy efficiency in a drastic manner. Its security level is therefore very 
low: only HIP control messages (e.g. supporting node mobility) are integrity-protected through hash 
chains. This weak security property only guarantees that an ongoing session has not been hijacked 
(temporal separation property) but does not provide strong node authentication. Besides, HIP data 
messages are not protected since no key exchange mechanism is provided. 
1.4.2.3. Discussion 
As presented above, most of modified variants of TLS handshake, IKE and HIP BEX rely on the 
use of ECC algorithms. In [48], a comparative performance analysis has been conducted between 
RSA-based and ECC-based TLS handshakes on a standard PC node. Results have shown that using 
ECC reduces by 37 percent the energy consumption of the TLS key establishment process compared to 
RSA. Liu et al. in [49] implemented ECC in TinyOS for many platforms including MICAz and 
TelosB. They assessed the ECC (160-bit keys) point multiplications cost needed to perform the ECDH 
exchange and ECDSA signatures. Results have shown that the energy cost of ECDH-ECDSA key 
agreement protocol is around 236 mJ for MICAz and 72 mJ for TelosB. Based on energy costs of 
Table 4, a DH-RSA key agreement protocol consumes around 190 mJ on a TelosB. Hence, the energy 
consumed with the use of ECC is reduced by 62 percent.  
Nevertheless, these measured energy costs of ECC are still non negligible, being in the order of 
magnitude of millijoules. In practice, these energy costs would be hindering for highly resource-
constrained nodes in the IoT. Authors in [63] investigate the practical use of ECC on constrained 
devices in WSNs and conduct a cost comparison between two key establishment schemes ECDH-
ECDSA and Kerberos (a server-assisted key distribution protocol based on symmetric cryptography). 
They conclude that Kerberos is 95 times less costly than ECDH-ECDSA on a MICAz sensing 
platform.  
 
This unsuitability of prior key establishment proposals for constrained devices accentuates the need 
for novel IoT-specific solutions. This need was recognized in [51] and left open. According to the 
literature, the design of an efficient key establishment approach for existing security standards that 
clearly addresses the heterogeneous IoT communications has not been undertaken yet [51]. Further 
careful design is required to reduce the energy cost of key establishment schemes while taking into 
account the heterogeneous nature and the end-to-end security requirement of the IoT. 
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1.5. CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, we addressed the new security requirements of the Internet of Things. This 
promising paradigm aims to the integration of several architectures and the support of new 
communications between heterogeneous nodes, commonly reachable over a global IP-based 
infrastructure, in spite of having highly distinct characteristics. In order to securely accomplish this 
integration, end-to-end communications have to be established. IoT nodes require therefore the ability 
to set up a shared secret between one another, in order to bootstrap secure communications. 
Adoptability of existing security protocols is an important requirement for an IoT key establishment 
protocol, since the IoT will encompass today's Internet and may not be based on clean slate 
approaches. However, straightforwardly reusing existing schemes cannot be feasible because of the 
efficiency requirements of the IoT. Existing key establishment protocols involve heavy cryptographic 
operations that resource-constrained IoT components cannot support. In the literature, the design of 
efficient key establishment protocols that clearly address heterogeneous IoT communications is not 
undertaken yet. 
A first section reviewing existing key establishment schemes was essential in this chapter in order 
to reason on how to efficiently adapt them to the IoT scenarios. We provided a classification of key 
establishment protocols according to three criteria: the key delivery scheme (key transport or key 
agreement), the underlying cryptographic primitive family (symmetric or asymmetric) and the 
authentication method. Considering the initial requirements of the IoT, we have retained TLS 
handshake, Internet key Exchange and HIP BEX protocols as the best candidates. However when 
assessing them in terms of energy efficiency, we have illustrated the heavy computational cost they 
require to run on constrained devices. In the literature, energy efficiency was an important concern in 
WSNs because of the low capabilities of sensor nodes. Unfortunately IoT requirements go far beyond 
those of WSNs, since it is assumed in these latter that the sensor nodes are isolated from the internet 
and connected to external hosts via dedicated gateways. The few works focusing on making lighter the 
retained key establishment schemes proposed to replace the heavy cryptographic operations of RSA 
and Diffie-Hellman algorithms with the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography. However, recent studies 
have proved that the energy costs of ECC are still non-negligible when implemented on highly-
constrained devices. In the second chapter, we take into account the inadequacies of these proposals as 
well as the identified requirements for suitable IoT key establishment schemes for designing new 
keying solutions able to enable end-to-end secure communications between nodes with different 
resource capabilities, in the context of IoT. 
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Chapter 2: COLLABORATIVE KEY ESTABLISHMENT 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
In the previous chapter, we highlighted how heterogeneity of nodes and communications in the 
Internet of Things brings new security challenges that have to be considered for the design of further 
security solutions. In this chapter, we tackle heterogeneity from a different axis, trying to take 
advantage of it to design our solution for IoT key establishment.  
 
Spatial heterogeneity is frequent in the IoT as long as different nodes with different resource 
capabilities acting for different services coexist within a global unified architecture. Heterogeneity can 
also evolve over the time when considering other factors such as the mobility of nodes or the dynamic 
changes in the amount of available resources (resource exhaustion, resource harvesting). Bearing in 
mind this heterogeneity aspect, the main rationale of our solution is to make a highly resource-
constrained node able to establish secure contexts with other unconstrained nodes within a 
heterogeneous IoT architecture. We explored the possibility of reducing the computational load to be 
performed on constrained devices instead of only thinking on reducing the cost of cryptographic 
primitives, as proposed before. Eventually, we proved that we can exploit heterogeneity of nodes in 
order to offload heavy computational operations required at the constrained device to more powerful 
nodes in the surroundings.  
 
 Accordingly, we proposed to redesign existing key establishment schemes so that the constrained 
peer may delegate its heavy cryptographic load to less constrained nodes in neighbourhood. During 
the key exchange, these assisting nodes, or “proxies”, take charge of the session key derivation, in a 
collaborative and distributed manner. However, the session key is known only by the two endpoints of 
the communication, in order to guarantee its secrecy. Several constraints have been considered in the 
design of our approach: (i) the collaborative scheme must not come at the expense of a key disclosure 
risk or a collusion attack (ii) in case of a proxy unavailability or a greedy behaviour, the system should 
continue to run properly (iii) each proxy is required to prove its legitimacy by proving that it is 
authorized by the constrained node to act on its behalf. 
 
We start this chapter in section 2.1 with a description of the prerequisites for our collaborative 
keying solution. Network model, assumptions and initial operations for bootstrapping assisting entities 
are presented in that introductory section. Section 2.2 then details the proposed approaches: two novel 
collaborative algorithmic key establishment protocols are introduced, respectively for key transport 
and key agreement. These approaches are mapped in section 2.3 with the key establishment 
communication protocols identified in previous chapter as relevant for the IoT. Instantiations of the 
collaborative approach are therefore proposed as updated versions of the IKE, TLS and HIP protocols. 
Assessments of these updated protocols, respectively in terms of efficiency and security are proposed 
in next sections 2.4 and 2.5, which respectively address performance evaluation and formal security 
analysis. Finally, section 2.6 concludes this chapter. 
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2.2. REQUIREMENTS AND BOOTSTRAPPING 
2.2.1.  Considered network model 
Our network model is deduced from the paradigm we envision: we consider a global IoT 
infrastructure that interconnects heterogeneous nodes with different capabilities in terms of computing 
power and energy resources. Among these heterogeneous nodes, we especially consider three different 
categories: 
• Highly resource-constrained nodes, unable to support the computational cost of asymmetric 
cryptographic operations required by the key exchange phase, while nevertheless requiring 
end-to-end security (e.g. sensor nodes). 
• Proxies at neighbourhood, less constrained and therefore able to perform cryptographic 
operations. These nodes may either be dedicated assisting servers or nodes belonging to the 
same local infrastructure, though being less impacted by energy constraints (e.g. having 
energy harvesting capability). 
• Unconstrained nodes, not belonging to the same local infrastructure, with high energy, 
computing power and storage capabilities (e.g. line-powered remote servers). 
 
The considered scenario in this thesis can be summarized as follows: a highly resource-constrained 
sensor node (the source node A) needs to exchange sensitive data with an external server (the 
destination node B) on an end-to-end basis. These two entities are supposed to have no prior 
knowledge of each other and no prior shared key. Initially, their objective is therefore to setup a 
session key with each other. This scenario is likely to occur if one considers an IP sensor node (e.g. 
6LoWPAN sensor) that has to deliver sensitive sensed data to remote peers with which it has not yet 
established shared secrets. This delivery may either happen through a pull model, wherein the sensor 
(IoT resource) is explicitly requested to provide data by a remote IoT requester, or through a push 
model, wherein the sensor is intermittently sleeping and regularly wakes up in order to push sensed 
data towards a (configurable) set of peers. 
2.2.2. Assumptions 
1. After the initialisation phase, every sensor node shares pairwise keys with a subset of its one-hop 
neighbours. These keys may have been generated during a specific bootstrapping phase using a 
trusted key management server or through more subtle mechanisms such as transitive imprinting8 
[52]. 
2. The highly resource-constrained node is able to identify a set of less resource-constrained nodes 
that are available for supporting heavy cryptographic operations on its behalf. The identification 
process is detailed in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
3. There exists a local trusted entity within the sensor network that owns a shared secret with all 
nodes in the sensor network and a public/private key pair. 
4. The external server does not communicate with the sensor network trusted entity but is statically 
configured with or able to validate its public key. 
 
The considered network model and assumptions are represented on figure 9. 
 
                                                     
8
 With bilateral imprinting, physical devices establish shared secrets with one another through the use of a 
dedicated short-range wireless transmission such as NFC. In order to resolve the problem of user-interaction 
scalability, transitive imprinting is introduced to allow two devices to establish a secret key based on an 
intermediate device with which both have already secure associations. 
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Fig. 9. Network model and assumptions. 
2.2.3. Preparation of the involved entities  
As an initial phase, the resource-constrained sensor node A carefully selects the P1… Pn proxies that 
will assist its key exchange. This operation is based on the trust management system that is presented 
in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
Our approach requires that the P1…Pn nodes process messages on behalf of the resource-constrained 
node during the key exchange. Hence authorisation and authentication questions arise at the proxy 
sides, since these nodes should be provided with a representativeness proof. This proof could be a 
certificate including the proxy’s public key associated with the right "authority to sign on behalf of A", 
all of which signed with the source’s private key and delivered 'offline' to the proxy, regardless the 
current exchange. However the use of long-time authorisation certificates could be diverted for 
malicious exploits. 
Hence, the certificate should include other dynamic parameters added by the source node in order to 
restrict the ability of proxies to act on its behalf, such as the identity of the destination node, a session 
nonce, or an expiration date. In this case, the authorisation proof should be delivered 'online' to the 
proxy during the protocol exchange. Nevertheless, managing dynamic certificates would be hindering 
for the constrained sensor node. 
For this reason, we propose to move the computational load required to dynamically manage 
authorisation proofs from the sensor node to a local, unconstrained, trusted entity T (in a sensor 
network T can be the base station), which will be the only entity able to assert that a proxy node is 
authorized to sign on behalf of A. On the other hand, the verification of each proxy’s certificate would 
be also heavy for the destination node. We propose therefore to rely on the technique of authenticated 
dictionaries such as Merkle tree [53] or one-way accumulators [54] in order to efficiently authenticate 
participants and validate their membership to the group of selected proxies at the server side. 
 
A Merkle tree structure provides a means to authenticate a high number of items without 
individually signing each of them, but rather authenticating them as a whole. In a nutshell, the items to 
authenticate are placed in the leaves of a binary tree. The item corresponding to a parent node is 
computed from the items of its two children, e.g. through a one-way hash function. Eventually, all leaf 
items are involved in the computation of the root node value. Thus, only this value has to be 
authenticated in order to authenticate all items of leaves. The membership of a leaf in the group can 
then be verified with respect to a publicly known root value and its authentication path, this latter 
being defined as the successive items required to compute the root value from the considered leaf. 
Using this technique, the destination node has thus only to verify once the signature of the root 
value to authenticate all proxies public keys. The process is bootstrapped as follows. From the public 
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keys of the selected nodes P1…Pn, T can securely provide each proxy Pi with its authentication path 
MT  in the Merkle tree of all n public keys, along with a T-signed message consisting of:  
• MT			, the root of the Merkle tree of all n public keys; 
• An anti-replay nonce; 
• R_P (Reconstitution Parameters), the number of proxies sought to participate in the key 
establishment process along with the minimum number of cooperative proxies required to 
recover the original message; 
• A’s identity, which will make B aware of the node obtaining assistance from the proxy Pi. 
 
One-way accumulators are another technique of authenticated dictionaries. One-way accumulators 
are based on one-way hash functions which satisfy a quasi-commutative property. Thanks to this 
property, items of a group (x1, …, xn) agree on accumulated hash of their values y = H(x1, …, xn)  and 
each item keeps this hash function H, its own value xj and an accumulated hash yj for all other items of 
the group xi≠j. To prove its membership, it needs to present the pair (xj, yj) in order for the recipient to 
verify that H(xj, yj) = y. 
Here again, using this technique, the destination node has only to verify once the signature of the 
accumulated hash for all proxies of the group instead of validating the signature of each proxy’s 
certificate apart. The corresponding process in bootstrapped as follows. From the public keys of the 
selected nodes, T can securely provide each proxy with an accumulated hash of all other participants 
public keys. A proxy Pi will thus be provided with H(KP1,…,KPi-1,KPi+1,…,KPn) with H() being a 
commutative one-way hash function, along with a T-signed certificate consisting of: 
• H (KP1…KPn), an accumulated hash of all n public keys;	
• An anti-replay nonce; 
• R_P (Reconstitution Parameters), the number of proxies sought to participate in the key 
establishment process along with the minimum number of cooperative proxies required to 
recover the original message; 
• A’s identity, which will make B aware of the node obtaining assistance from the proxy Pi. 
 
Upon receiving their proof material, proxies are prepared to participate to the collaborative process. 
2.3. KEY EXCHANGE DESCRIPTION  
In order to first give a clear description of the proposed collaborative process, we deal 
independently in this section with each of the two key exchange algorithmic protocols that were 
identified as highly relevant in the first chapter, namely key transport and key agreement. Then, in the 
next section, we modify the retained key exchange communication protocols, namely TLS Handshake, 
IKE and HIP BEX by applying these collaborative key exchange schemes. 
2.3.1. Collaborative key transport 
In this subsection, we describe how we offload the key transport computational load from a highly 
constrained node to a set of proxies. We consider first the one-pass key transport mode and then adapt 
the proposed solution to the two-pass key transport mode.   
2.3.1.1. Collaborative one-pass key transport 
In a standard one-pass key transport mode, a random secret key x is generated by the source A and 
securely delivered to the node B. 
The objective for the highly resource-constrained node A in the collaborative one-pass key transport 
mode we propose is to generate a random secret key x and then to rely on a set of proxies to deliver it 
to the server B, using asymmetric cryptography. We propose two techniques to distribute the 
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computations required for the secret key delivery. The successive phases that make up our proposal 
are illustrated in figure 10 below, and explained later in the following subsection. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Collaborative one-pass key transport. 
2.3.1.1.1. Simple secret partition 
A starts by splitting the secret x into n parts x1,…,xn with x=x1|x2|…|xn and then securely sends each 
part xi to the corresponding proxy Pi. The part of the secret xi is transmitted encrypted with the shared 
key between A and the proxy Pi (see assumption 1). 
Upon reception of the xi secret key part, the proxy Pi encrypts it using the server’s public key and 
signs the result using its private key. 
We propose to use the lightweight one-time signature scheme of Lamport [55] in order for the 
proxy to sign messages on behalf of the constrained node. This signature scheme is especially 
lightweight and computationally efficient compared to other signature schemes [56]. Two drawbacks 
could possibly mitigate its practical applicability: on one hand, a public/private key pair should be 
used only once since information about the private key is divulged along with the signature itself. On 
the other hand, a long key will be needed to sign a long message, since the private (resp. public) key is 
the concatenation of all private (resp. public) values, as numerous as the message blocks and being 
each as long as the associated hash function output. Nevertheless, neither of these shortcomings affects 
our approach, which addresses one-time exchanges of short messages. In this case, we propose that T 
generates the Lamport private/public keys for each proxy Pi and securely provides it with this key 
material along with the authorisation proof of subsection 2.2.3, in the same message. 
After receiving the required key material, the proxy signs the encrypted secret xi and then sends the 
result to the server B. In turn, B verifies the integrity of the received message using Pi's public key and 
eventually decrypts xi. 
We assume that each proxy Pi has initially contacted B in order to request its certificate and to 
provide it with its own proof material. In response, after verifying the signature of T (see assumption 
4), B verifies that the proxy has supplied a valid public key and that it is a valid proxy assisting A in 
its key establishment process. Having received all xi fragments, B becomes able to recover the original 
secret key x. 
2.3.1.1.2. Threshold secret distribution 
At this stage, it is worth noting that the solution proposed above is based on the reliable deliveries 
of all secret fragments xi in order to be able to reconstitute the source secret key at the destination 
node. A single missing message from a proxy makes the information incomplete for the server and 
may9 fail the protocol exchange. 
                                                     
9
 The protocol might be resumed, if one assumes that it implements an acknowledgement/retransmission 
mechanism for fragments delivery. In terms of state machine complexity and bandwidth inefficiency, this may 
not fit however to the envisioned highly-constrained client nodes. 
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Yet, assuming that proxies behave as honest and reliable participants could be difficult in practice: 
even in scenarios where dedicated trustworthy proxies are made available to resource-constrained 
nodes, reliability of those proxies is not guaranteed. In order to reinforce the reliability of the proposed 
distributed scheme for one-pass key transport mode, we rely on a threshold secret distribution wherein 
a forward error correction scheme [57] is applied by the source A to the secret x, in order to handle 
losses and missing secret parts from assisting nodes. 
The principle of forward error correction scheme is to add redundant parity packets to the original 
message, divided into multiple packets, in order for it to be recovered by the receiver even if some 
packets were altered or lost during the process of transmission. Let n be the total number of sent 
blocks, k (k<n) is the minimum number of blocks required to reconstruct the original message. 
First, the source node performs the split process of the secret key. Then it applies the error 
redundancy scheme to the fragments of the secret key as depicted in figure 11 below. 
 
  
Fig. 11. Adding redundancy for reliable one-pass key transport. 
Hence, the server B becomes able to reconstruct the session key provided that a sufficient number 
of packets from assisting nodes are received, without requiring the reception of all of them. This 
technique protects our solution from unreliable delivery in proxyserver connection, though the 
source node should perform more computational operations in the initial phase, to compute the 
redundant packets. 
In addition to the protection against packet loss, the threshold approach can protect our solution 
against malicious proxies. A node incorrectly processing a conveyed fragment of the secret key (e.g., 
replacing the received fragment with a forged one before delivering it to B) can be identified at the 
server side. Indeed, this latter can compute different combinations of k messages from the pool of n 
messages and detect the node providing wrong information. We give the example below to explain 
how the cheater detection process can take place within the threshold approach. 
Let 5 be the total number of proxies and 3 the minimum number of packets required to reconstruct 
the original secret at the server side. We consider that proxy 2 is a malicious node transmitting bogus 
data instead of correctly encrypting its corresponding fragment of the secret key. The server decrypts 
the received messages from proxies and combines the resulting key for each l-uplet (k ≤ l ≤ n) of 
received messages as follows: 
 
Table 5: Malicious proxy identification and key retrieval through multiple l-uplet processing. 
l-uplet obtained key l-uplet obtained key 
{1, 2, 3} α {2, 4, 5} η 
{1, 2, 4} β {3, 4, 5} δ 
{1, 2, 5} γ {1, 2, 3, 4} θ 
{1, 3, 4} δ {1, 2, 3, 5} ι 
{1, 3, 5} δ {1, 2, 4, 5} κ 
{1, 4, 5} δ {1, 3, 4, 5} δ 
{2, 3, 4} ε {2, 3, 4, 5} λ 
{2, 3, 5} ζ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} μ 
 
With these intermediary results it would be possible for the server to learn that the proxy 2 is the 
cheater element of the group, since the same (correct) value δ is obtained for the key whenever the 
fragment retrieved from the proxy 2 is not used during the session key computation. 
Information 
Symbols
Control 
Symbols
Proxy-assigned
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2.3.1.2. Collaborative two-pass key transport  
In a two-pass key transport mode, a random secret key x generated by the source A and a second 
random secret value y generated by the server B are securely exchanged between A and B and used to 
compute the session key. As explained above, it is safer to involve both parties in the session key 
derivation compared with what happens in the one-pass key transport mode where the secret key is 
entirely controlled by only one partner. The phases of the proposed solution are depicted in figure 12 
below. 
We propose to apply the same collaborative approach as described in the one-pass key transport 
scheme to deliver the secret x from the source to the server. After having received a sufficient number 
m (m > k) of xi fragments, the server obtains the secret value x. At this stage, it generates in turn a 
secret key y to be provided to the resource-constrained client. However, this latter cannot decrypt and 
verify the integrity of the received value because of its resource constraints. For this reason, we 
propose that the proxies support also the reception of the secret key y on behalf of A in a cooperative 
manner. That is, these nodes take charge of the computational load required to decrypt and verify the 
received message from the server and then transmit it securely to the source. Yet, the divulgation of 
the secret key y to the proxies would affect the security of our system. In order to preserve the secrecy 
of y, we propose to have it encrypted with the secret key x reassembled by the server in the previous 
step.  The x-encrypted secret key y is MACed with the secret x and then signed with the server’s 
private key. It is finally sent to each proxy Pi, which has to verify the integrity of the received packet 
from the server before decrypting it. Then the packet content (that is, y encrypted and MACed with x) 
is securely transmitted to the client. As long as an appropriate number of the same packet is received 
from different proxies, the client ensures the validity of the transmitted message from the server. 
Consecutively, it checks the MAC in order to ensure that the server has obtained the same secret x and 
verify the message integrity. Once the client A receives a valid message, it can obtain the transmitted 
secret value y in order to complete the set-up of the session key.  
 
 
Fig. 12. Collaborative two-pass key transport. 
2.3.2. Collaborative key agreement  
The key agreement process discussed in this subsection involves heavy cryptographic computations 
at both parties. The most requiring part is the computation of two modular exponentiations, 
respectively for the generation of the Diffie-Hellman public keys (raise the base g to the power of the 
secret exponent modulo p) and the setup of the Diffie-Hellman key (raise the peer public value gx mod 
p to the power of the secret exponent modulo p). Applying the same collaborative approach as in the 
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above subsection, we propose to delegate the heavy cryptographic load to less constrained nodes in 
neighbourhood. The collaborative protocol exchanges are illustrated in figure 13 below, and detailed 
later in this subsection.  
 
 
 
Fig. 13. Collaborative key agreement. 
We introduce two techniques to distribute the computations required by the Diffie-Hellman 
protocol and therefore to enable the key agreement protocol. For each of these techniques, we explain 
how the source's DH private key is shared among proxies (how A computes the different ai it gives to 
each proxy Pi from its secret exponent a), how the server retrieves the source's DH public key from the 
proxies' gai mod p, how the server computes the shares Bi of its own DH public key (each Bi computed 
by B being sent to the corresponding proxy Pi) and how the proxies use Bi to obtain the Ki shares of the 
DH session key KDH, eventually used by A to retrieve KDH. 
 
2.3.2.1. Secret exponent integer partition 
The integer partition technique is the simplest approach for enabling distributed DH key exchange. 
The secret exponent a of the source is split into n parts a1, … , an chosen such that: 
 
 
(1) 
Each ai is then securely sent to a different proxy Pi. Upon reception of ai, each proxy Pi computes its 
part of the initiator’s DH public key gai mod p and delivers it (signed) to the server. The computation 
of the source's DH public key eventually occurs at the server and amounts to the product of the values 
received from the proxies, following: 
 
 
= 
 
(2) 
  = 
   
 
In turn, the server sends a share Bi of its DH public key to each proxy Pi. In this first simple 
partition technique, Bi is equal to the server's DH public key for each proxy. The computation by each 
proxy of the share Ki of the DH session key occurs then as follows: 
 
 
= 
 
(3) 
  = 
 
 
Eventually, the computation of the DH session key is made by the source, which obtains KDH as: 
Proxy Pi
Proxy Pi
A Proxy Pi B
gai mod p, Auth_proof , 
signPi
E(kA-Pi, ai), MAC
Bi, sign
E(kA-Pi, Bi
ai mod p), MAC
Check signature_signPi
Compute DHI ,KDH
Compute Bi from g
b mod p
Check signature_sign
Compute Bi
ai mod p
Check MAC
Compute gai mod p
Check MAC
Compute KDH
Computes a1, …, an from a
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= 
 
(4) 
  = 
 
 
According to this expression, the resource-constrained node only spends n-1 modular multiplication 
operations instead of two modular exponentiation operations, with exponents of considerable length (a 
and b should have twice the length of the generated secret KDH, as per [58]). 
2.3.2.2. Secret exponent threshold distribution 
The previous solution is based on reliable multiple hop-by-hop deliveries of secret fragments, each 
fragment ai being the ith summand of a modular integer partition of the source's DH private key. The 
server needs therefore to receive all messages from all proxies in order to be able to reconstitute the 
source’s public key. A single missing message from a proxy makes the information incomplete for the 
server and may block the protocol exchange. 
In order to reinforce the reliability of the proposed distributed scheme, this kind of defective proxy 
play has been carefully considered in the design of this second proposed approach for key agreement.  
We have implemented a robust technique that ensures a consistent recovery of the source’s DH public 
key at the server even in case of a proxy misbehaving or unreliability. Note that the redundancy 
technique introduced above for key transport could not be adapted to a key agreement protocol, which 
represents a radically different approach where the secret exponent a is never retrieved at B's side. 
The enhanced distributed approach we propose is based on the use of a (k, n) threshold scheme, 
wherein the n proxies obtain a polynomial share of the source secret exponent, k polynomial shares 
being enough to reconstruct the source secret exponent through the technique of Lagrange polynomial 
interpolation. This threshold scheme satisfies the two properties that the integer partition solution fails 
to provide: 
1) Recovery: The server can recover the source’s public key provided that a sufficient number k of 
values from proxies are received, without requiring the reception of all of them. 
2) Secrecy: Nothing is learned about the secret exponent a even if k-1 shares of it are disclosed. In 
other words, data delivered to the server through proxies in order to compute the source’s public key 
will not reveal partial information about the secret exponent. 
 
It is worth quickly reminding the operation of the Lagrange polynomial interpolation. Let f be a 
polynomial function of degree k-1 expressed as: f(x) = q0+q1x+…+ qk-1 xk-1 with q1, q2, …, qk-1 being 
random, uniform and independent coefficients and q0= a. 
From the Lagrange formula, the polynomial f can be retrieved as follows: 
 
 
(5) 
 
In our threshold key distribution scheme, (5) gives that the secret exponent a can be computed 
given any subset of k values of f(x): 
 
 
(6) 
 
In this threshold distributed approach, the distributed shares ai of the private exponent a are 
obtained as ai = f(i). So, in order to bootstrap the key agreement, the source first calculates the n values 
f(1), …, f(n) of the polynomial f, with n > k, and sends each f(i) to the correspondent proxy Pi. Each 
proxy computes then its part of the source’s DH public key gai mod p = gf(i) mod p and sends it to the 
server. 
Upon the reception of a subset P of k values transmitted by the proxies, the server starts by 
computing the ci coefficients as follows: 
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Then, B computes the source’s DH public key DHI based on the Lagrange formula: 
 
 
= 
   
(8) 
  = 
 
 
  = 
  
 
In order to prepare the computation of the DH session key at the source side, B starts calculating for 
each proxy Pi (i∈P) the value Bi = gb.ci mod p (ci being the ith coefficient calculated in the previous 
phase). Pi is unable to compute the coefficient ci since it has no knowledge about the subset P of the 
actually participating proxies. Having received this value, each proxy Pi uses its share f(i) of the 
source's private exponent to compute Ki =/0/= gb.ci.f(i) mod p. Each proxy delivers then this computed 
value to the source A. 
Upon reception of these k values, the source computes the DH session key KDH as follows: 
 KDH  = 
 
(9) 
  = 
  
 
  = 
  
 
By applying the threshold technique to improve the effectiveness of the distributed approach, the 
source is led to perform more computational operations in the initial phase, in order to calculate the n 
values of the polynomial that it sends to the n proxies. The cost of the computation can be better 
estimated if one considers another way of writing f(x), as: 
 
 
(10) 
 
According to this expression, A performs for each computation of f(i): (k-1) multiplications 
between a scalar and a large number and (k-1) summations of two large numbers. It is worth noting 
that k and n are small numbers, smaller than the number of secure relationships that the source is able 
to maintain. On the other hand, the polynomial coefficients are as large as the DH private key of the 
source. 
2.4. COLLABORATIVE IOT KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOLS  
We consider in this section how our proposed collaborative approach, under its integer partition and 
threshold distribution embodiments, can be applied to the IoT key establishment protocols that were 
identified in table 3 of chapter 1. 
2.4.1. Modified TLS handshake protocol 
As described above, the TLS Handshake Protocol supports two key exchange modes: the one-pass 
key transport mode and the DH key agreement mode. We modify the protocol exchange considering 
each of these two modes. 
In the following, we assume that the client authentication is performed during the modified TLS 
handshake protocol. This is in general not the case in the legacy Internet, where human to machine 
communications take place. Indeed, the server does not require the client certificate and just confirms 
its identity relying on login/password authentication techniques once the TLS tunnel is established. 
However, considering the IoT scenarios where machine-to-machine communications are expected, a 
mutual certificate-based authentication is likely to be required. 
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2.4.1.1. Modified TLS handshake in the key transport mode 
The protocol exchange is illustrated in figure 14 below and detailed afterwards. Message 
exchanges are alike when considering either the threshold secret distribution or the simple secret 
partition technique. This is because the redundancy scheme is applied at the client before the delivery 
of the premaster key.  
 
 
Fig. 14. Distributed TLS handshake (one-pass key transport). 
The Hello messages are similar to those of the basic TLS handshake. As described before, both of 
these messages include random values used as nonces to prevent replay attacks and to compute the 
session key. 
Upon successful connection with the server, the constrained client needs to verify the server 
certificate (using the Certificate Authority (CA) public key) and signature (using the server public key) 
and has to securely provide the server with a premaster secret x, used later to compute the shared 
master key. At this stage, it is worth noting that the verification operations, each performed with an 
RSA public key, can be supported by the constrained device since they are far less resource-
demanding than signature operations involving the use of a private key in RSA cryptosystems (see 
Table 4 of chapter 1). Delegating these verification operations would be more resource-demanding for 
the constrained node since it would have first to forward an around 1000 bytes certificate to each 
proxy, thereby consuming about 29 mJ, for a saving of 3 mJ only. 
 Once it has verified the legitimacy of the server, the client calls on the proposed cooperative 
process. It first applies an error redundancy scheme (in case of a threshold secret distribution) to the 
original premaster key x, splitting it into n parts x1,…,xn. It then sends each part xi along with the 
server public key to the corresponding proxy Pi. At this stage, proxies take in charge the cooperative 
transmission of the premaster key as described above. The protocol exchange ends with two 'Finished' 
messages, exchanged between the server and the client, which are computed using the master key and 
including past exchanges. The 'Finished' messages, as in the TLS basic handshake, are used to ensure 
that the master key has been correctly recovered at both parties (mutual key confirmation property). 
2.4.1.2. Modified TLS handshake in the key agreement mode 
During the key agreement mode, the message exchanges in the threshold secret distribution 
technique are different from those of the simple integer partition technique. This is because the 
threshold distributed technique requires more computations at both proxies and server sides during the 
collaborative key exchange (computation of gb.ci mod p at the server and gb.ci.f(i) mod p at the proxy). 
Proxy Pi
Proxy Pi
Client Proxy Pi Server
ClientHello
CERT_Pi, E(PKS,xi), signpi
E (kI-Pi, xi),PKS, MAC
Finished
Check Certificate_Pi
Check signature
Decrypt xi
Compute PMkey
Master key derivation
Check certificate
Check signature_sign
Split  PMkey x into xi…xn
Master key derivation
ServerHello, 
CERT, Sign
Check MAC
Encrypt and sign xi
Finished
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The modified TLS handshake illustrating the two techniques is depicted in the figures 15 and 16 
below. 
 
 
 
Fig. 15. Distributed TLS handshake: key agreement with simple integer partition technique. 
 
 
Fig. 16. Distributed TLS handshake: key agreement with threshold secret distribution technique. 
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During this mode of key exchange, the client offloads the cryptographic operations related to the 
generation of its DH public key and remains waiting for shares of the DH shared key from proxies in 
order to be able to eventually derive the master key.  Upon receiving replies from proxies, the client 
performs the (n or k, depending on the technique) modular multiplications required to recover the DH 
shared key and becomes then able to compute the master secret at the end of the TLS handshake. 
The client and the server then end the protocol handshake by exchanging 'Finished' messages, as in 
the TLS basic handshake 
2.4.2. Modified IKE protocol 
The IKE protocol only performs the key agreement mode. The figures below describe the modified 
protocol exchange obtained by applying the collaborative key agreement with the two proposed 
techniques. 
As in the basic IKE, this modified variant also consists of two phases. During the IKE_SA_INIT 
phase, the two peers perform the Diffie-Hellman key agreement relying on the assistance of proxies as 
described above and finally derive a master key KM using both the DH shared key and the nonces 
(Ni, Nr). During this phase, proxies also provide their certificates to the responder contrary to what 
happens in the basic protocol exchange. This makes the responder in a position to check the legitimacy 
of proxies acting on behalf of the initiator and to obtain the reconstitution parameters required to 
compute DH values. At this stage, proxies’ messages are still not authenticated in order to keep 
authentication process for the second phase, as in the basic IKE. 
During the IKE_AUTH phase, the initiator delegates the computational load of the signature and 
verification operations to the proxies in a distributed manner. It first exchanges with the responder 
encrypted messages using KM for key confirmation indicating the supported cryptographic algorithms 
and the proposed traffic selectors (TSi, TSr). Then, it triggers the authentication process between the 
proxies and the server through the message 'AUTH_start' as illustrated in the sequence exchanges 
below. Once both sides are authenticated, proxies provide the initiator with an 'AUTH_success' 
message ending the IKE_AUTH phase. 
Figures 17 and 18 below represent how the proposed approaches with simple integer partition (Fig. 
17) and threshold distribution (Fig. 18) are used with the IKE protocol. 
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Fig. 17. Distributed IKE: simple integer partition technique. 
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Fig. 18. Distributed IKE: threshold secret distribution technique. 
2.4.3. Modified HIP BEX protocol 
We illustrate below the modified HIP BEX with the two proposed techniques to distribute the 
computations required to perform the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.  
This lightweight variant keeps the same two first exchanged messages as in the HIP BEX (I1 and 
I2). Upon receiving the puzzle, the initiator computes the solution and transmits it to the server 
through proxies within the message I21i. The verification of the responder signature received in the 
message R1 (around 1.5 mJ) is performed at the initiator since this is less resource consuming than 
transmitting this 128-bytes signature message to all proxies for verification, which would amount to 
around 4 mJ. After receiving parts of the initiator secret exponent, proxies provide the server with 
shares of the initiator DH public key within the message I22i. This message also contains the puzzle 
solution, the proxy certificate and a signature. Having checked the validity of the solution and the 
legitimacy of proxies, the server becomes in position to derive the initiator DH public key and the 
master key. It answers then each participating proxy with a message R21i similar to message R2 in the 
BEX, adding a corresponding share (gb.ci mod p) of the DH public value if the threshold key agreement 
technique is applied. The protocol exchange is finalized by the message R22i sent from each proxy to 
the initiator, allowing this latter to compute the master key and check if the result matches with the 
derived master key at the server. 
Figures 19 and 20 below represent how the proposed approaches with simple integer partition (Fig. 
19) and threshold distribution (Fig. 20) are used with the HIP BEX protocol. 
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Fig. 19. Distributed HIP BEX: simple integer partition technique. 
 
 
Fig. 20. Distributed HIP BEX: threshold secret distribution technique. 
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2.5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
As described above, our solution proposes to offload the expensive cryptographic computations to 
powerful proxies during a key exchange process, hence ensuring significant energy savings at the 
constrained device. Nevertheless, a communication overhead is imposed due to the message 
exchanging between the source, the trusted entity T and the proxies.  
A performance analysis is therefore required to assess the respective efficiency of the proposed 
collaborative approaches and compare them with the basic approaches used for the key exchange. 
2.5.1. Computational cost 
In order to precisely quantify the energy savings at the constrained source node, we have 
implemented the cryptographic operations it performs in TLS handshake, IKE and HIP BEX 
protocols, considering both their basic and collaborative approaches. We have evaluated their 
cryptographic energy costs using Crypto++ library [59]. With respect to error correction, we have 
chosen to rely on the Reed-Solomon (RS) code [60] in the threshold distributed approach of TLS 
handshake protocol. In our simulation, we use RS (5, 3) (n = 5, k =3) codes where we generate 2 parity 
packets for 3 source packets. The computational energy cost of RS code was evaluated using IT++ 
library [61]. 
Test programs for individual computational operations were run on an Intel i3 processor and the 
corresponding number of processor cycles for each was retrieved. In order to be able to induce the 
energy cost on a resource-constrained device from the number of cycles on a powerful processor, we 
disabled advanced features on our test processor (hyperthreading, multi-core, variable clock speed). 
Eventually we were able to consider that the energy cost for a sensor (ETelosB, expressed in Joules) can 
be derived from the number of cycles measured on the i3 (Ci3), under the following equation: 
E9:;	<= = U9:;	<=. I9:;	<=N9:;	<= . C9:;	<= = U9:;	<=. I9:;	<=N9:;	<= . Register_sizeKLRegister_size9:;	<= . α. CKL (11) 
 
Where U, I and N are respectively the voltage, intensity and frequency of TelosB and α is a 
coefficient representing the richer instructions of the i3 and approximated to 2 in our analysis. 
Computational cost results for distributed TLS handshake (representative of a one-pass key 
transport protocol) and distributed IKE and HIP (representative of key agreement protocols) 
exchanges are respectively presented in the tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 below. 
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Table 6: Energy costs of cryptographic operations required by the different evaluated approaches on a TelosB processor for 
the TLS handshake protocol in key transport mode. (PMK of 48 bytes, AES 128 CBC, HMAC SHA). 
 
Cryptographic operations Energy cost 
Basic  
approach 
verify_CERT+  
verify_sign+ 
RSA_encrypt_x+ 
RSA_sign_ encrypt_x + 
compute_Master Key+ 
compute_Finished+ 
verify_Finished 
2.1 mJ + 
1.2 mJ + 
1.6 mJ+ 
24.43 mJ+ 
20.92 µJ+ 
267.1µJ + 
686.58µJ 
=30.30 mJ 
Distr. 
approach  
verify_CERT+  
verify_sign+ 
n*(encrypt_xi+ 
compute_MAC)+ 
compute_Master Key+ 
compute_Finished 
verify_Finished 
2.1 mJ + 
1.2 mJ + 
5*(2.47µJ+ 
16.74µJ)+ 
20.92µJ+ 
267.1µJ + 
573.56µJ  
= 4.25 mJ 
Threshold 
Distr. 
Approach  
verify_CERT+  
verify_sign+ 
encode_reed_solomon+ 
n*(encrypt_xi+ 
compute_MAC)+ 
compute_Master Key+ 
compute_Finished 
verify_Finished 
2.1 mJ + 
1.2 mJ + 
350,6 µJ+ 
5*(2.47µJ+ 
16.74µJ)+ 
20.92µJ+ 
267.1µJ + 
573.56µJ  
= 4.6 mJ 
 
Table 7: Energy costs of cryptographic operations required by the different evaluated approaches on a TelosB processor for 
the TLS handshake protocol in key agreement mode.  
 
Cryptographic operations Energy cost 
Basic  
approach 
verify_CERT+ 
 verify_sign+ 
compute_DHc 
RSA_sign_ DHc +  
compute_KDH+ 
compute_Master Key+ 
compute_Finished+ 
verify_Finished 
2.1 mJ + 
1.2 mJ+ 
58.97 mJ+ 
24.48 mJ+ 
104.73 mJ+ 
20.92 µJ + 
267.1 µJ + 
686.58 µJ 
=192.54 mJ 
Distr. 
approach  
verify_CERT+ 
 verify_sign+ 
n*(encrypt_ai+ 
compute_MAC+ 
verify_MAC+ 
decrypt_gb.aimodp)+ 
compute_ mult_gai.b + 
compute_Master Key+ 
compute_Finished+ 
verify_Finished 
2.1 mJ + 
1.2 mJ+ 
5*(22.25µJ+ 
16.74µJ+ 
13.57µJ +  
19.78 µJ) + 
290 µJ+ 
20.92 µJ + 
267.1µJ + 
573.56 µJ + 
 = 4.81 mJ 
Threshold 
Distr. 
Approach  
verify_CERT+ 
 verify_sign+ 
n*(k-1)*( comp_mult_f(i))+ 
compute_add_f(i))+  
n*(encrypt_f(i)+ 
compute_MAC)+ 
k*(verify_MAC+ 
decrypt_gb.f(i).cimodp)+ 
compute_mult_gb.f(i).ci + 
compute_Master Key+  
compute_Finished 
verify_Finished 
2.1 mJ + 
1.2 mJ+ 
5*2*(0.09 µJ+ 
0.05 µJ) + 
5* (22.25µJ + 
16.74µJ)+ 
3*(13.57µJ +  
19.78 µJ) + 
290 µJ+ 
20.92 µJ + 
267.1µJ + 
573.56 µJ + 
= 4.74 mJ 
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Table 8: Energy costs of cryptographic operations required by the different evaluated approaches on a TelosB processor for 
the IKE protocol.  
 
Cryptographic operations Energy cost 
Basic  
approach 
compute_DHI 
compute_KDH+ 
compute_KM+  
compute_sign 
KM_encrypt_msg3+ 
compute_MAC_KM+ 
verify_MAC_KM + 
KM_decrypt_msg4+ 
verify_CERT+ 
verify_sign 
58.97 mJ + 
104.73 mJ + 
16.74 µJ + 
24.39 mJ + 
205.25 µJ+ 
142.31 µJ+ 
138.12 µJ+ 
200.31 µJ+ 
2.1 mJ + 
1.22 mJ + 
=192.11 mJ 
Distr. 
approach  
n*(encrypt_ai+ 
compute_MAC+ 
verify_MAC+ 
decrypt_gb.aimodp)+ 
compute_ mult_gai.b + 
compute_ KM +  
KM_encrypt_msg3’+ 
compute_MAC_KM + 
verify_MAC_KM + 
KM_decrypt_msg4’+ 
n*(compute_MAC+ 
verify_MAC) 
5*(2.47µJ+ 
10.46µJ + 
23.02µJ +  
19.78 µJ) + 
290 µJ+ 
16.74µJ   
29.67µJ  
23.02 µJ 
18.83 µJ 
24.73 µJ 
5*(2.1 µJ + 
2.1 µJ) 
= 702.64 µJ 
Threshold 
Distr. 
Approach  
n*(k-1)*( comp_mult_f(i))+ 
compute_add_f(i))+  
n*(encrypt_f(i)+ 
compute_MAC) + 
k*(verify_MAC+ 
decrypt_ gb.f(i).cimodp)+ 
compute_ mult_gb.f(i).ci + 
compute_ KM +  
KM_encrypt_msg3’+ 
compute_MAC_KM + 
verify_MAC_KM + 
KM_decrypt_msg4’+ 
k*(compute_MAC+ 
verify_MAC) 
 
5*2*(0.09 µJ+ 
0.05 µJ) + 
5*(2.47µJ+ 
10.46µJ )+ 
3*(23.02µJ +  
19.78 µJ) + 
290 µJ+ 
16.74µJ   
29.67µJ  
23.02 µJ 
18.83 µJ 
24.73 µJ 
3*(2.1 µJ + 
2.1 µJ) 
= 610.04 µJ 
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Table 9: Energy costs of cryptographic operations required by the different evaluated approaches on a TelosB processor for 
the HIP BEX protocol.  
 
Cryptographic operations Energy cost 
Basic 
Approach 
verify_signR1+ 
compute_DHI+  
compute_soln+ 
compute_signI2+  
compute_KDH+   
compute_KM + 
verify_signR2+  
verify_MAC_KM 
1.24 mJ + 
58.97 mJ + 
135.6 µJ+ 
24.55 mJ + 
104.73 mJ + 
16.74 µJ+ 
1.24 mJ + 
2.1 µJ 
= 190.88 mJ 
Integer 
Partition 
verify_signR1+ 
compute_soln+ 
n*(encrypt_ai + 
compute_MAC + 
verify_MAC+ 
decrypt_gb.aimodp) + 
compute_mult_gaib +  
compute_KM+ 
verify_MAC_KM 
1.24 mJ + 
135.6 µJ+ 
5*(22.25µJ+ 
18.83µJ+ 
16.74µJ +  
19.87 µJ) + 
290 µJ + 
16.74 µJ+ 
2.1 µJ  
=2.07 mJ 
Threshold 
Distr. 
Approach  
verify_signR1+ 
compute_soln+ 
n*(k-1)*( comp_mult_f(i)) + 
compute_add_f(i)) + 
n*(encrypt_f(i)+ 
compute_MAC) + 
k*( verify_MAC+ 
decrypt_ gb.f(i).cimodp)+ 
compute_ mult_gb.f(i).ci + 
compute_ KM +  
verify_MAC_KM 
1.24 mJ + 
135.6 µJ+ 
5*2*(0.09 µJ+ 
0.05 µJ) + 
5*(22.25µJ+ 
18.83µJ) + 
3*(16.74µJ+ 
19.87 µJ) + 
290 µJ + 
16.74 µJ+ 
2.1 µJ  
=2 mJ 
 
2.5.2. Communication cost 
In this subsection we assess the communication energy costs of the proposed distributed approaches 
at the constrained initiator. These costs are made of the costs of transmission, reception and listening. 
The energy consumption of a node in listening mode can be equivalent to its consumption in reception 
mode since the transceiver remains active in both modes (see Table 10). Nevertheless, most of existing 
works do not consider the listening mode in their communication cost evaluations 
Authors in [62] assess the energy cost of cryptographic algorithms is WSNs nodes and reveal the 
impact of listening on the total energy cost. However they did not consider this element in their 
estimates. Reference [63] includes the listening cost to estimate the energy cost of ECDH-ECDSA and 
Kerberos protocols on TelosB and MICAz sensors and insists on its importance comparing results 
with a prior work that estimates communication cost considering only transmission and reception 
costs. This comparison shows an energy overhead of 45% when the listening cost is taken into 
account. 
 
 
Table 10: Power consumption of TelosB at 4 MHz with a transmit power of -5 dBm (from [63]). 
 
TelosB  platform 
Transmit  54 mW 
Receive  61 mW 
Listen  60 mW 
 
We use the power consumptions presented in the Table 10 as an energy model of the different 
operating modes (transmit, receive and listen) for the TelosB platform [63]. As reported in [63] we 
consider an effective data rate of 75 kbps instead of a 250 kbps claimed one. This important decrease 
of the data rate is discussed in [64]. In a nutshell, both the presence of headers and footers and the use 
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of acknowledgments combine with the expected nominal–effective decrease to further diminish the 
rate available for application data. 
  
From the previous exchange descriptions, we obtain in the table 11 below the number of exchanged 
bytes by the source node in TLS handshake, IKE and HIP BEX protocols, considering both the basic 
exchange and the distributed approaches. 
 
Table 11: Sent and received bytes in the TLS handshake, IKE and HIP BEX protocols. 
 TLS handshake 
protocol (key transport 
mode) 
TLS handshake 
protocol ( key 
agreement mode) 
Internet key exchange 
protocol 
HIP BEX protocol 
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Sent 
(bytes) 
2367 2095 2095 2495 2863 2863 1568 968 932 468 952 952 
Recv 
(bytes) 
4610 3484 3484 4994 4502 4354 1542 1496 1236 608 1140 972 
 
We consider that the constrained node is listening during a delay corresponding to the latency of 
communications (Tx, Rx) and packets propagation (∆) as well as the processing of packets (Proc) at the 
proxies and the server. We estimate below the listening durations required by the constrained node in 
the considered approaches: 
 
 NOP,N/ + QN/ + ∆N/ → T + NOP,T + ∆T → N/ + TN/UVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVWVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVXYZ[/\	Z]]^_Z\`	a/[bcd/de	b/fc + NOP,(N/)UVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVWVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVX
g/[b^/hibcj	Z]]^_Z\`	a/[bcd/de	b/fc
 
 
 
Assuming that the server is an unconstrained node while proxies are 10 times less constrained than 
the server (and thus have a 10-time greater processing time), the listening durations for the different 
keying approaches are presented in the table 12 below.  
 
Table 12: Listening durations (in ms) in the four considered key establishment protocols (basic & distributed).  
TLS handshake protocol 
(key transport mode) 
TLS handshake protocol 
 ( key agreement mode) 
Internet key exchange 
protocol 
HIP BEX protocol 
Basic 
approach 
 
Distributed 
approaches 
Basic 
approach 
 
Distributed 
approaches 
Basic 
approach 
 
Distributed 
approaches 
Basic 
approach 
 
Distributed 
approaches 
401 411 404 444 404 446 405 445 
 
 
We also assume that the proxy is one hop far from the constrained node and that a 200 ms 
propagation delay is required to route packets from the source to the server. Finally, the energy costs 
induced by communications in both basic approach and distributed approaches is shown in tables 13, 
14, 15 and 16 below. 
 
∆klmkn = 
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Table 13: Communication Energy costs on a TelosB processor for the TLS handshake protocol in key transport mode. 
 Basic 
Approach  
Distributed 
Approach   
Threshold 
Distributed 
Approach   
Transmit cost 13.63 mJ 12.06 mJ 12.06 mJ 
Receive cost 29.87 mJ 22.57 mJ 22.57 mJ 
Listen cost 24.06 mJ 24.66 mJ 24.66 mJ 
Energy cost 67.56 mJ 59.29 mJ 59.29 mJ 
 
 
Table 14: Communication Energy costs on a TelosB processor for the TLS handshake protocol in key agreement mode. 
 Basic 
Approach  
Integer 
partition 
Approach   
Threshold 
Distributed 
Approach   
Transmit cost 14.37 mJ 16.49 mJ 16.49 mJ 
Receive cost 32.36 mJ 29.17 mJ 28.21 mJ 
Listen cost 24.24 mJ 26.64 mJ 26.64 mJ 
Energy cost 70.97mJ 72.3 mJ 71.34 mJ 
 
 
Table 15: Communication Energy costs on a TelosB processor for the IKE handshake protocol. 
 Basic 
Approach  
Integer 
partition 
Approach   
Threshold 
Distributed 
Approach   
Transmit cost 9.03 mJ 5.57 mJ 5.36 mJ 
Receive cost 10 mJ 9.69 mJ 8 mJ 
Listen cost 24.24 mJ 26.76 mJ 26.76 mJ 
Energy cost 43.27 mJ 42.02 mJ 40.12 mJ 
 
 
Table 16: Communication Energy costs on a TelosB processor for the HIP BEX protocol. 
 Basic 
Approach  
Integer 
partition 
Approach   
Threshold 
Distributed 
Approach   
Transmit cost 2.7 mJ 5.48 mJ 5.48 mJ 
Receive cost 3.93 mJ 7.38 mJ 6.3 mJ 
Listen cost 24.3 mJ 26.7 mJ 26.7 mJ 
Energy cost 30.93 mJ 39.56 mJ 38.48 mJ 
 
 
2.5.3. Total energy cost 
Synthesizing the computation and communication costs, we provide the total energy costs of the 
two examples of key exchange protocols considering the basic and collaborative approaches in 
figure 21 and table 17 below. 
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Fig. 21. Overall energy consumption on a TelosB in the four considered key establishment protocols for basic & distributed 
approaches (considering the basic and resilient modes for the distributed approaches).  
 
 
 
Table 17: Compared total (computations + communications) energy costs on a TelosB processor for the retained IoT key 
establishment protocols, featuring for each protocol the basic (unchanged) approach, the default collaborative approach and 
the resilient collaborative approach.  
 TLS handshake protocol 
(key transport mode) 
TLS handshake protocol 
( key agreement mode) 
Internet key exchange 
protocol 
HIP BEX protocol 
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Comp. 30.30 4.25 4.6 192.54 4.81 4.74 192.11 0.702 0.610 190.88 2.07 2 
Comm. 67.56  59.29  59.29 70.97 72.3 71.34 43.27 42.02 40.12 30.93 39.56 38.48 
Total 
energy 
cost (mJ) 
97.86 63.54 63.89 263.51 77.11 76.08 235.38 42.72 40.73 221.81 41.63 40.48 
 
 
As shown in figure 21 and table 17, the computed costs confirm the efficiency of the cooperative 
scheme we propose. The most significant energy savings concern the key agreement mode. They 
amount to 75% of what is consumed in the key agreement mode of TLS handshake and 80% of what 
is consumed in IKE and HIP BEX protocols. Concerning the key transport of TLS handshake, the 
constrained node saves around 35 % of its energy, as compared with what is spent during the basic 
exchange. These results were expected since delegating the computation of DH modular 
exponentiations (in the key agreement mode) leads to more energy savings at the constrained device 
than offloading signature and encryption operations in the key transport mode. 
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Energy savings can be increased by reducing the duration of listening mode. Using LPL (Low 
Power Listening) protocols [65], the source node can be temporarily put into a sleep mode when 
waiting for the protocol to run between proxies and server. These saving can be especially important 
for the key agreement protocols, where the listening communication cost amounts to more than 50% 
of the overall energy consumption. 
 
The results also show that the energy costs of the threshold distributed approaches of the key 
agreement mode in the three studied protocols are slightly less small than those of the simple 
distributed approaches; contrary to what may have been expected if one had only considered the 
additional cost of the generation of the polynomial shares. This generation overhead certainly makes 
the secret distribution more complex, but meanwhile it reduces the energy cost of messages processing 
at the source node, which receives and deciphers k packets instead of n .These k packets contain shares 
of DH session key sent from proxies at the end of the protocol exchange to make it possible for the 
source node to set up the master key. 
Concerning the key transport mode of TLS handshake, the overhead introduced by the addition of 
redundant parity packets in the threshold distributed approach slightly increases the energy cost of the 
protocol exchange. On the other hand, the constrained source is not expected to process packets 
received from proxies so that the introduced overhead is not compensated as in the key agreement 
mode. 
In a nutshell, simulation results prove the viability of the proposed distributed approaches in the 
studied context of IoT keying, which involves highly resource-constrained nodes such as the TelosB 
sensor platform. Providing almost equivalent energy costs compared to the simple distributed 
approach, the threshold distributed approach introduces additional recovery and secrecy properties, 
both essential for a collaborative protocol. 
After proving the efficiency of the proposed collaborative variants of TLS handshake, IKE and HIP 
BEX, a formal security analysis of these approaches is required in order to prove their overall 
effectiveness as key establishment security protocols. 
2.6. FORMAL VALIDATION WITH AVISPA 
A formal security analysis was carried out using the AVISPA [66] tool in order to prove the 
fulfillment of the desired security goals of the proposed collaborative keying schemes. AVISPA 
(Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocol and Applications) is a push button security 
protocol analyser based on formal methods, performing analytical rules to illustrate whether the 
candidate protocol is safe or not. If a vulnerability is detected, verification results revolve the attack 
trace, showing at which step and under which conditions an attack was made possible. The tool 
implements the Dolev-Yao intruder model [67] able to eavesdrop, intercept messages, insert bogus 
data, or modify traffic passing through. AVISPA incorporates four different automatic protocol 
analysis techniques for protocol falsification on-the-fly model-checker (OFMC), constraint-logic 
based attack searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-based model checker (SATMC), and tree automata based on 
automatic approximations for the analysis of security protocols (TA4SP) and provides a large library 
of well-known Internet security protocols. 
The first step of the protocol verification consists in modeling it using HLPSL formal language of 
AVISPA. The specification language HLPSL is used to describe the security protocol as sequences of 
exchanged messages between different parties and to express desired properties and security goals. 
Actors interacting in the exchange are modeled as the roles including their message exchanges with 
each other. After that, a session is created by binding the roles altogether, describing message 
exchanges in a normal run of the given protocol. Other sessions are then specified, with the difference 
that they include an active intruder in between the different actors, specifying its optional knowledge 
of keys known to legitimate entities. Modeling the intruder activity is used to interactively find and 
build attacks over the present protocol. Finally a global environment is created including multiple 
parallel sessions simultaneously. The HLPSL specification is later translated into an Intermediate 
Format specification providing a low-level description of the protocol and given as an input to the four 
automatic analysis back-ends of the AVISPA tool. Then the verification of the security properties of 
the protocol, namely authentication, integrity, anti-replay and secrecy, starts. If a specified security 
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property is violated, the back-ends return a trace explaining the sequence of actions that gave rise to 
the attack and exhibit which goal was violated. 
We specified first the actions of each participant in a module, which is called a basic role; the role 
of the constrained client in modified TLS handshake protocol, for example, is modeled as follows: 
role client(A, B, Pi, T : agent,   
 Kat, Kapi, Kpit: symmetric_key, 
              Kb,Ks: public_key, %ks is the public key of a Trusted Third Party 
 SND_BA, RCV_BA, SND_PiA, RCV_PiA,  SND_TA, RCV_TA: channel (dy)) 
played_by A 
The declared variables above represent the initial knowledge of the client. The RCV and SND 
parameters indicate the channels upon which the participant playing “role client” will communicate 
with other roles. Here the client A communicates with the server B and Pi, both sending and receiving 
packets. 
In the same form, the role proxy in the modified HIP BEX is modeled as follows: 
role proxy (A, B, Pi, T : agent,   
          Hash,Soln:hash_func, 
           Kat,Kapi,Kpit:symmetric_key, 
           HI_T,HI_B : public_key,  
           G:nat, 
           SND_TPi, RCV_TPi, SND_APi, RCV_APi,SND_BPi, RCV_BPi: channel (dy)) 
played_by Pi 
 
Each role consists of a sequence of states illustrating all of its exchanges with other parties 
involved in the protocol. The state below describes the exchange between the initiator and the proxy in 
the modified HIP BEX. Having received the list of proxies participating in the key exchange from the 
trusted entity T, the client A sends a message to the proxy Pi containing the solution of the puzzle, the 
server DH public value, the server identifier and a part of the secret exponent ai. 
  State = 8 
       /\ RCV_TA({Pi}_Kat) 
       =|> 
       State' := 10 
       /\ Xi' := new()   
       /\ SND_PiA({Soln(Puzzle). {exp(G,Y).HI_B}_inv(HI_B). ai'}_Kapi) 
 
After defining basic roles, we defined composed roles which describe the whole session by the 
execution of all basic roles simultaneously. 
role session( ) 
Def= 
local 
composition 
  client() 
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 /\ trustparty() 
 /\ proxy()  
 /\ server() 
 
Finally, a top-level role called “environment” was defined including the intruder activity trying to 
play some roles as a legitimate user. The environment role in the modified IKE protocol is modeled as 
follows: 
role environment() 
def= 
   const 
         server_proxy,proxy_server: protocol_id , 
         hash_, mult_: hash_func, 
         a,b,pi,t  : agent, 
         kt,kb,ks,ki : public_key, 
         g,ni,nr : nat, 
         kat,kapi,kpit,kipi,kai,kti:symmetric_key 
   intruder_knowledge = { a, b, pi, t, g, ni, nr, hash_,mult_, kt,kb,ks,ki, kipi,kai,kti, inv(ki), {i.ki}_(inv(ks)}   
   composition 
        session(a,b,pi,t,hash_,mult_, kat,kapi,kpit,g, kt,kb,ks) 
    /\  session(a,b,i,t,hash_,mult_ ,kat,kai,kti,g, kt,kb,ks) 
    /\  session(a,i,pi,t,hash_,mult_,kat,kapi,kpit,g, kt,ki,ks) 
    /\  session(i,b,pi,t,hash_,mult_, kti,kipi,kpit,g, kt,kb,ks) 
 end role 
In the above extract, one can notice that the modeled intruder may have had its public key (i.ki) 
signed by the same certificate authority that authenticates B, as represented by its knowledge of an 
{i.ki}_(inv(ks)) statement. Another noticeable point is the variation of the roles that the intruder i may 
assume in the protocol test, as shown in the last three lines: i is successively described as being able to 
act as Pi, A and B. 
The security goals were finally specified in a “goal” section asserting that the secrecy should be 
achieved for the final master key between the client A and the server B, and for the Lamport private 
key (we model Lamport signatures at the proxy) between the trusted party T and each proxy.  
The secrecy of a parameter was also declared before, in the “role” section of the agent who has 
generated it. For example, after the generation of the Lamport key material in the role of the trusted 
party, we have further described the transition (exchanges) with the following secret facts: 
  /\ Kpi' := new() % material key generation 
  /\ secret (inv(Kpi'),k,{T,Pi}) 
This means that the trusted party T declares that the generated Lamport private key is kept secret 
between T and Pi only and that this security objective is to be referred to as ‘k’. 
In a second part of the “goal” section, we asserted that authentication should be verified between 
each proxy and the server in order to prove that the node is legitimate and authorized to act on behalf 
of the constrained node and that the proxy communicates with the desired entity. 
Goal facts related to the mutual authentication between the proxy and the server are stated at the 
role proxy and role server sections. The goal fact “witness” is used by the role to be authenticated in 
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order to express that he wants to be the peer of the other role and will prove later its legitimacy. The 
goal fact “request” preceded by an accompanying witness is used by the authenticating role releasing 
in the transition after which the authentication is verified and is considered successful. 
In our modified protocols, we have used witness and request facts for the mutual authentication 
between the proxy and the server. Example depicted below concerns the modified IKE: 
• The proxy authenticates the server on the value of Ni (because the server implicitly sends 
back the received fresh nonce Ni signed with its private key). Actually, the server signs a message 
encrypted with the master key which was computed using the nonce Ni. This translates as:    
  /\ witness(B,Pi,proxy_server,Ni')  (at the role server) 
  /\ request(Pi,B,proxy_server,Ni)   (at the role proxy) 
      • The server authenticates the proxy on the value of Nr (because the proxy implicitly sends 
back the received fresh nonce Nr signed with its Lamport private key). This translates as:    
  /\ witness(Pi,B,server_proxy,Nr')  (at the role proxy) 
  /\ request(B,Pi,server_proxy,Nr)   (at the role server) 
Eventually, these three goals (secrecy of (KM, k) and mutual authentication between proxy and 
server) translate to: 
goal 
  secrecy_of k,km   
  authentication_on server_proxy 
  authentication_on proxy_server 
 
Subsequently, we checked the correctness of the implemented HLPSL codes and of the protocol 
state machines by the use of the protocol animation tool called SPAN [68]. 
Finally, the security of the protocols was evaluated by executing the four AVISPA back ends 
(OFMC, SATMC, CL-AtSe and TA4SP) against our defined intended security goals. Peer 
authentication, secrecy, message integrity, delivery proof, identity proof and replay protection were 
evaluated. AVISPA tool produced a formal report as an output indicating that the protocol is “SAFE” 
against OFMC, CL-AtSe, and SATMC and “INCONCLUSIVE” against TA4SP database. No 
vulnerabilities were detected: according to the tool, it is not possible for an intruder to violate a 
security requirement and alter the successful protocols run, based on the specified security goals and 
the described assumptions. The output is provided as follows: 
AVISPA Tool Summary 
OFMC : SAFE 
CL-AtSe : SAFE 
SATMC : SAFE 
TA4SP : INCONCLUSIVE 
 
2.7. CONCLUSION  
This chapter presents a novel collaborative approach for key establishment in the context of the IoT, 
by which a resource-constrained device delegates its expensive computational load to assisting nodes, 
on a distributed and cooperative basis. In order to enable this collaborative behaviour, two distributed 
techniques have been proposed and carefully designed for both the key transport and key agreement 
modes. These techniques have been applied to redesign retained key establishment standards for the 
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IoT, as identified in chapter 1, namely TLS handshake, Internet Key Exchange and HIP Base 
EXchange protocols. 
The cooperative variants of these protocols have then been assessed and compared to the legacy key 
establishment protocols they base on, from the points of view of cryptographic and communication 
costs. Simulation results show that our proxy-based scheme significantly increases the energy savings 
at the constrained device compared with existing standards.  
A formal security analysis performed using AVISPA tool has validated the security of the modified 
exchange protocols against external attackers attempting to violate the major properties related to a 
communication security protocol, that is authentication, confidentiality, freshness and data integrity.  
However, the obvious benefits of our collaborative approach should not hide the new threats they 
introduce that AVISPA tool is unable to reason about. The IoT is also characterized by the fact that it 
interconnects within a single infrastructure a wide variety of entities, some of which being expected to 
become compromised and act maliciously over time. When nodes rely on each other to achieve a 
common goal, more points of failure arise that may deter the efficient service fulfilment. A legitimate 
proxy can act selfishly and refuse to participate to the collaborative key exchange process in order to 
save its energy resources and maximize its own performance. Or it can act maliciously and impair the 
collaborative process with the goal of damaging the whole system. These types of threats, introduced 
by collaborative aspects, are known as internal attacks. Conventional cryptographic mechanisms such 
as signature and encryption can provide confidentiality, integrity and node authentication for 
exchanged messages and protect the system from external attacks; however, they fail to deal with 
insider attackers since the misbehaving proxy is often certified by a trusted authority to be a legitimate 
entity. 
As explained throughout this chapter, this kind of "unfair" proxy play has been carefully considered 
in the design of our collaborative approach. Threshold techniques have been implemented during the 
key exchange for ensuring a consistent recovery of the secret key in case of a proxy unavailability or 
misbehaviour. Nevertheless, further security measures have to be considered in order to identify 
malicious participants through an analysis of their behaviour inside the cooperative group. This 
identification process is essential to isolate untrustworthy elements and refine future proxy selections.   
In the literature, collaboration between nodes has been proposed for enabling various networking 
services, with the objective to improve the communications between any two nodes in a networked 
infrastructure. Accordingly, behaviour analysis systems were designed that aimed at securing the 
proposed collaborative schemes. We conducted a review of these systems in order to assess the 
different forms that collaboration management could take. Especially, our objective was to analyse 
whether any existing behaviour analysis systems could fulfil the specific requirements of our 
collaborative key establishment schemes. This will make the subject of the next chapter. 
 
 69 
Chapter 3: COLLABORATIVE SERVICES AND THEIR 
SECURITY-RELATED WORK 
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
Recently, we have witnessed the emergence of collaboration between nodes in wireless 
communication systems to accomplish jointly a specific task or to maximize the overall system 
performance.   Collaboration has gained momentum with the advent of new communication schemes 
introducing unattended wireless topologies, mostly made of resource-constrained nodes, in which 
radio spectrum therefore ceased to be the only resource worthy of optimisation. Collaborative 
techniques are introduced to improve the performance of wireless topologies in many respects, for 
example by increasing the coverage, enhancing the security or saving bandwidth and energy resources. 
Along the same lines of our solution, other collaborative services have been proposed in the 
literature. Among these, we chose to focus on collaborative networking services, which we define as 
featuring functions that improve the communication abilities of any two networked nodes. Radio 
connectivity, end-to-end routing, establishment of secured channels fit within this definition. On the 
other hand, it excludes both orchestrated applicative services and services that essentially rely on 
assigning different roles to the connected entities, such as aggregation or backup. 
This chapter starts in section 3.2 by presenting the different networking services for which 
collaborative approaches have been proposed in the literature. Next, we review in section 3.3 the 
security measures that are proposed to counter internal attacks that can be launched inside a 
collaborative group. By assessing existing behaviour analysis mechanisms, we build in section 3.4 a 
synthesis of the best practices to use as part of a generic trust management system. We conclude this 
chapter in section 3.5. 
 
3.2. COLLABORATIVE NETWORKING SERVICES IN WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS 
In this section, we survey existing collaborative networking services in wireless communications. 
The considered collaborative processes in our comprehensive approach include routing, security and 
radio services. 
3.2.1. Collaborative routing services 
In a WSN, the main application of sensor nodes is to collect and report events to a sink node.  
Collected data delivery is provided through multi-hop communications, since direct communications 
between sources and the sink node could be not feasible for sensor nodes, because of their constraints 
in terms of transmission range or limited energy. Hence, collaborative routing schemes able to support 
distant communication with a sink node prove out to be a necessity in WSNs. Intermediate sensor 
nodes collaborate to forward packets between the source and the sink node. If clustering is applied, 
dedicated nodes are deployed in the sensor network to support the transmission burden from sensors to 
the sink node. The network is then divided into a group of clusters. 
A cluster head with richer resources capabilities receives collected data from sensor nodes within its 
own cluster, and delivers them to the sink node. This hierarchical collaboration between sensor nodes 
and cluster heads to route data has been proposed to achieve energy efficiency in WSNs.  
Collaboration arises also as an essential requirement in Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs) 
routing. The lack of a fixed infrastructure in a MANET leads to decentralized communications 
between nodes, therefore causing the routing activities to be carried out by participants. A mobile node 
is seen as a communicating node as well as a relay node that collaborates with other nodes to forward 
and route messages from a source to a destination. 
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Collaboration between nodes for routing and packet forwarding is seen as an inherent behaviour 
[69] as compared with other networking services. By essence, routing involves intermediate nodes 
between the sender and the recipient of a packet that are in charge of forwarding the sent packet until it 
has reached its final destination. Routing also involves dedicated control-plane messaging between 
nodes allowing them to build awareness of their neighbours’ own routing capabilities, in order to 
determine the optimal route to send a packet. Existing routing protocols such as AODV [70] and DSR 
[71] assume that all the nodes that form the wireless network have to cooperate and are inclined to act 
as assisting nodes in a routing process by forwarding packets of other nodes in the network. 
3.2.2. Collaborative security services 
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest in the concept of collaboration as a technique to 
apply for enabling security services. Collaboration has first been suggested by cryptographers to deal 
with secret sharing. The concept of secret sharing was introduced in 1979 by Shamir [72] and Blakley 
[73] based respectively on Lagrange interpolating polynomial and Linear projective geometry, as a 
solution to cryptographic keys management. The basic idea consists in splitting a dealer’s secret into 
multiple shares and distributing the result among a set of participants. Then a subset of these 
participants belonging to the access structure can collaborate to combine their shares and recover the 
secret when needed. Such schemes have also been referred to as (k, n) threshold secret sharing 
schemes since the secret is retrieved only if at least k from n participants (n > k) cooperate to combine 
their shares. Secret sharing schemes were proposed to protect and control the access to any important 
information in the network by distributing it over different locations, thereby imposing an attacker to 
have access to these multiple locations in order to learn about the information [74].  
Another security service in which collaboration is required is signature delegation, also known as 
proxy signature, whose concept was put forward in 1996 by Mambo et al [75].  The primitive of proxy 
signature allows a proxy to sign a message on behalf of an original signer. This latter delegates its 
signing authority to a designated proxy, mandated to act on its behalf. However, relying on a single 
proxy node makes the security of the proposed scheme dependent on the reliability of the proxy signer 
and impractical. 
In order to share signing responsibilities, the concept of proxy signature was therefore extended to 
delegate signing rights to a group of participants [76]. Each participating proxy initially receives a 
partial proxy signing key from the original signer. Then, proxies collaborate to generate a valid proxy 
signing key, required to act on behalf of the original node. In order to tolerate some proxies non-
availability, (k, n) threshold proxy signature schemes were proposed in such a way that any subset of k 
proxy signers in a group of n proxies can collaborate to build a valid proxy signing key.   
The need for signature delegation schemes arises for example in MANETs. Permanent 
communications between clients and servers are unfeasible because of the mutable network topology. 
In order to nevertheless guarantee service availability to all clients dispersed in the whole network, 
proxy signature schemes have been proposed to use a fully distributed signature service [77]. An 
original server delegates its signing capabilities to a group of remote members in the network that 
cooperatively sign messages on its behalf. 
In large-scale wireless networks, deploying a centralized Certificate Authority (CA) to manage key 
certificates is a very hard task because of scalability and communication delay problems. Many works 
have adopted the use of proxy signature schemes in order to distribute the CA functionalities to a set 
of nodes in a collaborative manner. Each designated CA server generates a partial certificate and then 
collaborates with other CA servers to derive valid certificates to requesters by combining a sufficient 
number of these partial certificates.  
Nodes in WSNs are deployed in unattended and hostile environments to sense and report sensitive 
data concerning critical applications, such as military surveillance and health monitoring. Providing 
reliable sensed data despite wireless links vulnerability and nodes’ resources constraints is 
challenging. 
The use of collaborative signature schemes has been proposed to prevent the impact of false data 
reported from malicious sensor nodes. In [78], authors use a threshold elliptic curve cryptography 
signature scheme that monitors false data emanating from compromised sensor nodes. A reported 
message should be signed by k distinct sensor nodes before reaching the core node in order to be 
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considered as valid. Traveling along the full path, reported messages are cooperatively verified by 
intermediate nodes and signed again in case of agreement. The global verification phase is performed 
at the core node which verifies the validity of the combined received signatures of all participating 
nodes. In [79], an efficient collaborative signcryption scheme is proposed to monitor alert messages 
reported by sensor nodes deployed in a certain area.  Each node has a share of a local private key and 
produces a partial signature during an alert message process. Then a designated sensor node takes in 
charge the combination of all these valid partial signatures from different participating nodes. If a 
sufficient number of nodes have cooperatively executed signcryption, it generates a final signcrypted 
value and transmits it to the base station.   
3.2.3. Collaborative radio services 
The unpredicted partitioning of wireless networks caused by loss of nodes connectivity or sparse 
node density leads to unreachable groups of nodes and affects the overall network connectivity. Two 
nodes belonging to separated groups are not able to communicate with each other since the route 
between them is interrupted and traditional multi-hop communications cannot restore connectivity. 
Therefore, a solution is to increase the radio transmit power of a delivered message to reach a 
disjointed group of nodes. Collaborative transmission has been suggested as a solution to overcome 
broken links and connectivity problems in multi-hop wireless networks.   
The concept of collaboration in radio transmission field has been first introduced by Sendonaris et 
al. in 1998 [80] for cellular mobile users.  In each cell, a user is responsible for transmitting not only 
its own signal, but also the data of its neighbouring users, which it can detect. The cooperation of in-
cell users increases the uplink capacity to achieve a higher data rate. 
This concept has been extended to be considered for cooperative transmission in wireless networks. 
The principle is similar and consists in combining the transmission power of a group of nodes in order 
to attain a higher transmission power and attain otherwise unreachable zones. Nodes collaborate by 
transmitting identical symbols at the same time to stack up the transmitted waves on the physical 
medium. With the sum of waves, the source can reach far destinations. Different cooperative 
transmission approaches have been proposed in the literature [81], [82]. With wave cooperative 
transmission scheme [83], nodes receiving a message at the same time repeat it together once to 
increase the power transmission range.  The concept was later extended to tackle the problem when 
there is only a single node in the initiator’s radio range to receive the emitted message. In this case, 
repeating only once the message may not suffice to achieve the desired power transmission.  For this 
reason, an accumulating transmission scheme has been introduced in [84]. This new alternative 
proposes that nodes, upon the reception of a message, repeat it cooperatively several times. Hence, 
even a single node can collaborate with the initiator to get a higher power transmission with the 
summation of energy and reach an otherwise unreachable node. This technique is heavy in terms of 
energy consumption since assisting nodes have to retransmit the same message several times. Other 
cooperative transmission schemes that alternate between multi-hop and accumulative cooperative 
transmission phases have been proposed such as in [85] and [86]. This hybrid design aims to use 
multi-hop communication wherever possible and thus to reduce the energy cost of accumulative 
transmission phase. This scheme offers the highest connectivity level but seems to be complex for 
implementation in networks with unexpected node behaviour. Assisting nodes have to be aware of the 
network topology in order to be autonomously able to alternate between multi-hop and cooperative 
communication phases. This may be only suitable for sparse networks settings and for predictable 
scenarios. 
Cooperation has been also exploited to overcome signal fading problems resulting from multipath 
propagation in wireless networks [87]. Collaboration is achieved through spatial diversity by allowing 
multiple users to collaborate and relay each other’s messages, developing multiple transmission paths 
to the destination.  Cooperative transmission has been also investigated in resource constrained 
wireless networks to enable nodes with a single antenna to exploit spatial diversity in order to improve 
signal quality [88]. Contrary to what happens in conventional multiuser systems, cooperating nodes 
make their channel resources available to enhance the transmission quality of each other’s messages. 
Each user can act as the source node in a typical collaborative scheme while other users serve as relay 
nodes. Various collaborative protocols have been proposed based on this concept to advance 
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communication quality in wireless communications. Examples are Amplify and Forward (AF) [89], 
Decode and Forward (DF) [87], Compress and Forward (CF) [90], and Coded Cooperation (CC) [91]. 
AF and DF are the most common cooperative schemes due to their simplicity. With Amplify and 
forward (AF) scheme, a group of relay nodes receive a signal from a source and simply retransmit it to 
the destination without decoding it. It is also referred to as a transparent cooperation. With decode and 
forward scheme (DF), relay nodes are more involved. They decode the received message, re-encode it 
to enhance error protection and retransmit it as a new message. Upon reception of multiple signals 
from the source and the cooperating nodes, the destination combines them and recovers the original 
message.  The advantages of these cooperative schemes often depend on the availability of reliable 
inter-user links. The benefit of AF scheme relies on the quality of the relayed signal since cooperating 
nodes amplify both the signal and the noise received from the source. Likewise, in DF scheme, an 
assisting node can decode and relay the message only if it is able to receive reliably the original 
message from the source.  
The outage probability of a transmission within a cooperation process caused by the quality of inter-
user channels has motivated researchers to propose partner selection protocols [92]-[95]. These 
protocols, also referred to as selection cooperation schemes, aim to assign a set of relay nodes to 
source nodes among a group of potential nodes, and this depending on a figure of merit that takes into 
account channels conditions and available resources at the relays. In a first coordination phase, all 
potential relays receive an emitted signal from the source and process it to the destination.  At this 
stage, relays with poor channels are detected and retracted from the pool of assisting nodes while good 
participants are retained as adequate to cooperate and assist the source transmissions. In a second 
phase, only selected relays participate to forward the source’s messages to the destination.  
In order to offer efficient resource utilisation for these cooperative schemes, flexible power 
allocation techniques have been applied among cooperating nodes [88], [96]. The source and relays 
coordinate by exchanging mutual information in terms of actual transmission power and channel state. 
Then, each node adjusts its power allocation so as to minimize the total power allocation required to 
achieve the desired transmission rate. Opportunistic cooperative transmission schemes [97], [98] 
propose to dynamically select among all available protocols the cooperative protocol that achieves the 
minimum total transmission power. 
 
3.3. SYNTHESIS  
We assume in this section that the different network services presented in the previous section can 
be used concurrently. An example of a packet delivery involving collaboration in the fields of radio 
transmission, routing and security is provided below in Fig. 22. 
 
 
Fig. 22. Involvement of multiple collaborative networking services in a single packet delivery. 
A
B
N1
N2
S
Service Routing
Optimize Delivery
Scope L2/L3 neighbours
Criteria L2/L3 neighbours
Service Security
Optimize Energy consumption
Scope Radio neighbours
Criteria Shared secret, resources
Service Radio
Optimize Coverage
Scope Radio neighbours
Criteria Relative position to B
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Figure 22 is an example of successive use of collaborative services for a packet sent from a node A 
to a node B. Security enforcement of the AB keying algorithm is first performed collaboratively at 
node A with the assistance of resource-unconstrained nodes. Subsequent routing at each intermediary 
node, such as N1, is also a collaborative process that involves the choice between multiple candidate 
next hops and the delivery through the best one. Finally, collaborative radio synchronisation between 
node N2 and a set of its neighbours allows the packet to be delivered to the (distant) sink node S, 
before eventually reaching B. 
3.4. SECURITY MECHANISMS AGAINST INTERNAL ATTACKS 
3.4.1. Classification of security mechanisms  
As mentioned above, collaboration-based services are vulnerable to several attacks caused by the 
selfish or intentional untrustworthy behaviour of some assisting nodes. Indeed, nodes, especially those 
with low capabilities in terms of energy and computing power, may be reluctant to make their 
resources available to other nodes as part of a cooperative act. Therefore, such nodes may prefer to 
behave at times in a selfish manner in order to maximize their energy savings. With this behaviour, the 
selfish node unintentionally prevents the system from working properly. Meanwhile, a node 
intentionally manifesting a malicious behaviour during a cooperative service is not interested in 
energy savings but in carrying out an attack with the objective to disturb or even damage the system. 
That is why it is important to develop dedicated security mechanisms in order to secure 
collaborative services, especially when conventional cryptographic mechanisms lack to provide 
required protection against untrusted cooperating nodes. We consider in this section existing security 
approaches designed to thwart different attacks against collaborative services.  
In the literature, security mechanisms are normally classified as prevention, detection and recovery 
mechanisms. A prevention mechanism is implemented to enhance the security during the execution of 
a system and prevent an attack from occurring. A detection mechanism is used to detect both 
successful attacks and also attempts to violate the security of the system. This security mechanism is 
usually followed by a reaction phase, used to exclude the attacker or take further measures to prevent 
or mitigate a future attempt. A recovery mechanism is defined as a technique that ensures the system 
restoration after an attack has been detected.   
With respect to the scope of the collaborative approach we are studying, this classification of 
security mechanisms can be regarded as a distinction between security-by-design mechanisms and 
behaviour-analysis mechanisms.  
Security-by-design mechanisms refer to techniques implemented during the design of the solution 
to prevent and/or overcome potential attacks. These mechanisms encompass prevention techniques 
such as access control mechanisms, which actually deny an attacker to be in position of launching an 
attack, and also include other implemented techniques such as threshold security, which mitigate the 
attack in order to guarantee a normal operation of the system even in presence of attackers. These 
mechanisms run inside the service program and can sometimes slow down the system; however, they 
cannot be dissociated from the service.   
Behaviour-analysis mechanisms refer to detection and response techniques. These mechanisms 
track the system behaviour and interactions between nodes to detect attack attempts and/or 
occurrences. Once a security anomaly is detected, a reaction mechanism is launched to take security 
and service repair measures. Security measures include attacker exclusion and punishment techniques. 
Service repair measures involve recovery mechanisms, such as restoring the firmware of a 
compromised node to factory default settings. They also consider cognitive techniques used to re-
adapt the service to deal with new threats and environment conditions. These mechanisms run along 
with the service process and can be handled either by the node itself or by another centralized entity. 
In the literature, behaviour-analysis mechanisms are commonly designated as trust-based 
mechanisms. This terminology will be used for the rest of this document. 
Both of security-by-design and trust-based mechanisms complement each other and are designed to 
be applied together in order to establish a safe environment of cooperative entities. Security-by-design 
mechanisms (threshold secret key distribution using the Lagrange interpolation and error correction 
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scheme respectively for the key agreement and the key transport modes) are already taken into account 
in the design of our collaborative solution, enabling the recovery of the session key even in case of  
node misbehaviours. Trust-based mechanisms have to be considered as a next step to detect untrusted 
elements. At this stage, we review existing security solutions proposed to deal with internal attacks in 
collaborative services in light of the above classification. 
3.4.2.  Security-by-design mechanisms 
3.4.2.1. Collaborative routing services 
Several security implementations have been incorporated in routing protocols to stimulate 
cooperative behaviour among malicious and/or selfish nodes and thwart attacks in wireless networks. 
Most of these implementations are based on payment models such as in [99]. These systems 
provide economic incentives for cooperation. Cooperating nodes are rewarded with virtual currency. 
The source node has to pay to transmit a packet and assisting nodes are rewarded upon packet 
forwarding. It is thus advantageous for nodes to cooperate in the packet forwarding process in order to 
be able to send their own packets. The payment-based model has been firstly introduced by Buttyan 
and Hubaux [100] in the form of nuglets and establishes a virtual trade market between nodes to 
enforce cooperation. Nodes are stimulated to cooperate in packet forwarding because they need to earn 
nuglets. To ensure that nodes do not forge payments, [101] proposes the use of tamper-proof hardware 
to secure the credit exchange. Nuglets are transported within the packet and stored in a specific 
encrypted header called secure module. The tamper proof based mechanism encourages nodes to 
cooperate; however, it requires deploying a new secure module using cryptographic operations in each 
node, which introduces a significant implementation complexity and communication overhead. A 
good economic incentive mechanism has to provide lightweight overhead in the network and secure 
credit exchange. During the last decade, several solutions have been proposed aiming to secure the 
payment process and to efficiently implement it in the routing protocols. In [99] a central bank based 
mechanism named Sprite proposes to replace the use of a specific hardware module with a central 
controller called Credit Clearance Service (CCS). CCS stores and manages nodes accounts in the 
system. Nodes periodically report receipts resulting from their cooperative actions to the central 
controller in order to update their accounts. Sprite model motivates node cooperation without need for 
hardware implementation; however, it induces an extra communication overhead in the network due to 
the large number of reported receipts. In [100], proposed solutions still focus on securing the payment 
packet routing process and rely on centralized authorities and public key infrastructure to manage the 
credit exchange between nodes.  Although these solutions claim achieving security requirements, the 
heavy computational cost and extra overhead they introduce degrade the network performance and 
drain nodes resources. For this reason, further solutions have focused on reducing the heavy cost 
induced by payment-based models especially for resource-constrained networks. In [104] and [105], a 
payment aggregation mechanism is introduced to generate a receipt for multiple packets instead of 
delivering a receipt per packet. In [106] and [107], a probabilistic payment technique is proposed to 
reduce the overhead resulting from the large number of reported receipts in the network. Other 
solutions addressed the question of how much a cooperating node should be paid for forwarding 
packets. In Ad hoc-VCG [108], cooperating nodes are rewarded according to the energy they consume 
to relay the packets. However, a node may cheat on its real cost in order to maximize its payment. 
Based on the concept of game theory, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) model was designed to 
ensure that the profit of each cooperating node is maximized when it reveals its true cost regardless the 
declarations of other nodes. Thus, it is no longer profitable for nodes to cheat on their cost during a 
routing protocol. In [109], the pricing mechanism increases the rewards for cooperating nodes 
proportionally to the load of the network. In [110], nodes rewards are assigned based on their available 
bandwidth and power level. In [111]-[113], authors address the case where a group of colluding nodes 
work together to maximize their benefits and propose collusion-resistant payment mechanisms based 
on standard concepts for collusion resistance in game theory. 
Apart from payment based models, other mechanisms have been designed for routing protocols to 
maintain a reliable packet forwarding process in presence of misbehaving nodes. These solutions take 
advantage of route diversity (multiple routes between nodes) in wireless networks to apply diversity 
coding [114]. Exploiting route diversity has been firstly introduced in [115]. Authors highlight the 
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need for specific mechanisms to ensure routing service availability in case nodes are compromised, 
especially since traditional cryptographic mechanisms are not effective by themselves in these 
situations. The proposed mechanism consists in transmitting redundant data through additional routes 
in the network for error correction. Hence, even if the primary route is compromised, the receiver can 
recover the original message using redundant data received from additional routes. Transmitting 
through multiple routes is a robust prevention mechanism to cope with malicious behaviours. For this 
reason, multipath routing approaches become an attractive research field in wireless networks to 
enhance transmission reliability and provide fault-tolerance against attacks and node failures [116]-
[117]. The solutions detailed in [118]-[120] rely on specific metrics such as energy consumption and 
node stability to select routes between a given source and a destination in order to increase the 
reliability of packet transmission.   
3.4.2.2. Collaborative security services 
Traditionally, proposed collaborative security approaches either implicitly or explicitly assume that 
cooperating nodes are trustworthy. Basic schemes such as polynomial based Shamir scheme and proxy 
signature scheme of Mambo suppose that all players are honest and an adversary is assumed to be 
unable to disturb the system. Afterwards, security analysis for these collaborative approaches started 
being considered in the literature, since trusting all players is impossible in practice. 
In order to prevent dishonest behaviour of some participants, a number of robust secret sharing 
schemes have been proposed. Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) schemes [121]-[123] were designed to 
deal with malicious players. These schemes guarantee a correct reconstruction of the secret in case a 
dishonest dealer or participant provides fake shares respectively during the dealer distribution or the 
combiner reconstruction phase. Proactive secret sharing solutions have been proposed to overcome 
mobile adversary attacks [124]. In fact, a mobile adversary may take profit from the long lifetime of 
the secret so that it attacks a sufficient number of servers one by one to learn and destroy the secret. 
We consider that our collaborative key establishment schemes are less vulnerable to mobile adversary 
than secret sharing schemes since assisting nodes store secret shares for a short period of time and are 
to delete them after the key exchange. The basic defence against this attack is to renew the secret 
periodically; however this could be impractical for long-lived information such as cryptographic 
master keys or sensitive data files. Proactive schemes [125]-[126] protect the secret sharing against 
these attacks by periodically refreshing shares while keeping the same secret. Since attacker 
capabilities are likely to increase over time, it will become simpler for it to compromise many 
participants in a short time. To counter this threat, authors in [127] have introduced the changeable 
threshold secret sharing scheme, proposing to adjust the threshold parameters according to the 
environment reliability. Thereafter, several secret sharing schemes have investigated the flexible 
change of the threshold value in their solutions. First proposals [128] and [129] required establishing 
secure channels between the dealer and participants to redistribute shares corresponding to a new 
threshold value. Then, more flexible schemes have been proposed, eliminating the dealer presence 
during the threshold update process [130]-[131].  
Likewise, other authors have reviewed the security of proxy signatures schemes and proved that 
they are insecure against various insider attacks [132], [133]. This was not surprising, since basic 
constructions of Mambo’s proxy signature scheme overlooked insider misbehaviours emanating from 
the original signer and proxy signers.  
The concept of threshold proxy signature has first been proposed by Kim et al. [76], based on the 
secret sharing schemes. K. Zhang [134] proposed a new (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme. The 
common idea is that a proxy signature key is distributed among a group of n proxy signers in a way 
that at least t proxy signers can cooperate to sign messages on behalf of the original signer.  
After that, Sun in [135] revised the security of Kim and Zhang’s scheme and proved that it suffers 
from some weaknesses: indeed, a proxy signer can repudiate a signature creation since the proxy 
signature does not provide any authentication information about the identity of the signer. In order to 
solve the problem of unknown signers, Sun improved Kim’s scheme and proposed a non-repudiable 
proxy signature scheme with known signers so that a verifier could identify the actual signers and 
determine whether the group signature key was generated from a legitimate group of proxy signers. 
But, Hsu et al. in [136] revealed  that Sun’s scheme suffers from a collusion attack that any group of t 
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proxies or more can modify the threshold strategy to a new (t', n) one. They proposed a new non-
repudiable threshold proxy signature scheme with known signers. 
Shum et al. [137] introduced a strong proxy signature scheme with a proxy signer privacy 
protection. A proxy signer can sign messages on behalf the original signer while protecting his privacy 
against outsiders. Lee in [138] showed that Shum’s scheme lacks the property of strong unforgeability, 
since either the original signer or another third party can play the role of proxy signers and generate a 
valid proxy signature. Zhang et al. [139] proposed a new proxy ring signature to resolve this problem. 
So far, many proxy signature schemes [140]-[142] have been proposed pointing out security 
weaknesses of some previous schemes and proposing countermeasures to improve them.  
3.4.2.3. Collaborative radio services 
The vast majority of research studies on cooperative transmission focused on improving the 
efficiency of signal transmission and reliability in the network, assuming that cooperating relay nodes 
are trustworthy. More recently, a limited number of studies have considered security issues in 
cooperative transmission. In [143]-[144] authors highlight the vulnerability of current cooperative 
transmission schemes to misbehaving relays without proposing special security countermeasures. In 
[143], simulations are carried out to evaluate the performance degradation of cooperative transmission 
systems under relay misbehaviours. In [144], the authors assess to which extent a cooperative 
transmission can outperform a single transmission in the presence of misbehaving nodes. Motivated by 
the lack of security mechanisms to ensure the commitment of a relay node to the cooperation strategy, 
recent works provide cooperation incentives in cooperative communications. These studies are 
inspired by the pricing-based mechanisms proposed for cooperative routing services discussed above, 
and adapted to the cooperative transmission context with multiple relay nodes. In the same way, 
cooperating nodes are rewarded with virtual currency. Source nodes make payment to participating 
nodes for using their resources to relay their packets. Unlike the payment in packet forwarding 
schemes where prices are fixed and the utility of a relay depends only on its own strategy, payment in 
cooperative transmission is shared among a set of players participating in the same relaying process. 
Hence, the utility of a node will depend on the strategies of other relays creating a competitive 
scenario. In case of one source node and multiple relay nodes, authors in [145]-[146] formulated the 
interaction between players as a buyers’ market, and modeled it as a Stackelberg game with the source 
node as the leader and the relay nodes as the followers. In game theory terms, Stackelberg model is a 
strategic game in economics where the leader takes action first and the followers take actions 
afterwards. The leader knows in advance that the followers perceive its action and takes action 
considering that fact. Zhang et al. in [147] studied the case of one relay node and multiple source 
nodes; the market is expressed as a sellers' market. In this mechanism, only the source nodes are 
players and compete to obtain from the relay node the bandwidth they require. Reference [148] 
proposed an auction scheme where relay nodes propose prices on their relaying services and allow 
source nodes to bid on them. Resources allocation for each source node depend on source nodes bids. 
In [149], authors showed that the above pricing schemes proposed for cooperative transmission only 
deal with selfish behaviour of players and are vulnerable to cheating behaviour. In other words, a 
source node can submit a bid higher than its true valuation in order to maximize its profit in terms of 
resource allocation. Motivated by this weakness, they designed a trustworthy auction scheme based on 
VCG model which enforces players to reveal their true valuations to maximize their individual profit, 
thus eliminating the impact of cheating behaviour on the cooperative system performance. 
3.4.3. Trust-based mechanisms 
All of the above security-by-design schemes aim either to stimulate cooperation between nodes in 
order to prevent selfish and/or malicious attacks, or to guarantee a proper operation of the cooperative 
service in presence of attackers. But generally these mechanisms are not able to detect misbehaviours 
nor to handle ongoing attacks, since they are not designed to trace nodes interactions during the 
service execution. 
Trust management mechanisms aim to track nodes past experiences to detect malicious attacks and 
selfish attitudes. These mechanisms should also apply punitive measures as a reaction phase after 
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detecting an attack in order to deter the misbehaving node. Trust-based mechanisms help improve 
node selection decisions by designating only reliable participants, based on their historical activities. 
We have extensively studied existing trust-based models proposed for cooperative services in 
wireless communications. We have identified that the most proposed models addressed packet 
forwarding services. Limited related work has been recently conducted in the field of cooperative 
transmission. No existing work on trust is proposed for cooperative security services. 
We describe in this subsection research work on trust-based mechanisms proposed for both routing 
and cooperative transmission services. We discuss then their applicability for our collaborative key 
establishment schemes in the context of the IoT. 
3.4.3.1. Trust management systems for collaborative routing services 
Several trust management systems have been designed for packet forwarding services in wireless 
networks. The goal of these systems is to detect misbehaving nodes causing routing disruptions, to 
penalize malicious nodes and therefore to enhance decisions making in the future. Marti et al [150] 
have proposed the first work that introduces trust and reputation based mechanisms. They recognize 
that misbehaving nodes in packet forwarding can significantly affect the network throughput and 
underline the case where malicious nodes accept to relay packets but later do not accomplish the 
assigned task. To defend against this threat, they make use of the watchdog technique, which consists 
in monitoring the neighbouring traffic in order to detect misbehaving nodes. They also use the 
pathrater technique to avoid misbehaving nodes when selecting the most likely reliable route for 
packet routing. However, this model has not specified any punishment measures against misbehaving 
nodes. 
In [151], a distributed trust model called CONFIDANT is proposed. It considers Dynamic Source 
Routing protocol and aims at detecting and isolating misbehaving nodes during the packet forwarding. 
The proposed model takes into account both first-hand and second-hand information to update trust 
values. In the first-hand information based models, the system relies only on its direct observations 
and own experiences to update nodes trust values as in [150]. This reflection can be useful when a 
node is active but when this latter has sparse interactions or its requirements change frequently, it may 
lack sufficient information to make trust decisions about other nodes. To make both the trust model 
more robust and the computed trust values more reliable, CONFIDANT extends the previous work to 
disseminate trust throughout the network. Thereby, it also takes into account indirect experiences and 
observations reported by neighbouring nodes to evaluate the trustworthiness of relay nodes. Only 
negative observations are exchanged between nodes, assuming that misbehaving nodes sending false 
reports will be the exception and not the norm. Obviously the system, with such assumption, is 
vulnerable to false reports causing the trustworthiness of benign nodes to decrease (bad mouthing 
attacks).  Low reputation nodes are completely rejected from the packet forwarding process. Authors 
in RRS [152] improved CONFIDANT and introduced a Bayesian model with Beta distribution to 
explain how actual trust values are computed. Both positive and negative reputation values provided 
by second-hand information are used to compute a trust value about a specific node. The confidence 
put in collected reports is integrated as long as the reporting node is classified as trustworthy. The trust 
metric is used to determine whether the node can be trusted or not to perform an assigned task. The 
proposed model assigns a higher weight to recent behaviours, considering that a misbehaving node can 
initially build a high reputation with good behaviours and then remain trusted while misbehaving.  
SORI scheme [151] proposes another distributed trust-based model to enforce node cooperation in 
MANETs. Each node in SORI listens in promiscuous mode to packet transmissions within its one-hop 
range. Trustworthiness is evaluated through ratio between the number of packets a relay node has 
forwarded and the total number of packets it is assumed to relay. Neighbouring nodes exchange these 
local evaluations periodically. If the trust value of a node falls under a threshold, this latter is detected 
and signaled as a suspicious node. The SORI model is more tolerant than CONFIDANT in terms of 
punishment decisions. A misbehaving node is never completely excluded from the routing path and 
can continue to increase its reputation value by behaving cooperatively with other nodes. 
In [153], the CORE model is proposed. It is a generic trust-based mechanism aiming to detect 
selfish behaviours for different cooperative services. The watchdog mechanism is implemented to 
monitor interactions between nodes performing a cooperating service, which is not limited to packet 
forwarding. The model assigns a global trust value to a cooperating node for all provided services. 
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Unlike CONFIDANT, CORE mitigates bad-mouthing attacks caused by malicious nodes reporting 
false evidences to decrease the reputation value of a node. Indeed, it allows only positive witnesses to 
be propagated in the network, assuming that a node has no advantage to give a false praise about 
unknown nodes. Nevertheless, this model overlooks the case where nodes collude together by 
disseminating false evidences to increase their reputation values (called ballot stuffing attacks). 
CORE does not apply the same measures to punish misbehaving nodes and considers that a selfish 
node restrained by its low resources should not be penalized like a malicious node deliberately 
affecting the service performance. 
In [154], authors highlight that previous trust models suffer from low scalability since reputation 
information has to be propagated among all nodes in the network and can be biased when poisoned 
with false reports. They propose a novel trust-based approach to enforce collaboration in routing 
services considering these problems. Reputation values are kept local and the node monitors only its 
one-hop neighbour nodes through direct observations. Once a non-cooperative behaviour is detected, 
benign neighbours will redirect received packets through another route to avoid the misbehaving next 
hop node. This latter is implicitly rejected from the network since in turn all of its neighbours will 
reject its packets as response to its future routing service requests. A cognitive reputation based 
scheme is proposed in [155] to reinforce routing in heterogeneous wireless communications. To 
monitor nodes behaviours during path selection, a routing algorithm is created to compute reputation 
of next-hop nodes based on feedbacks reported by the two-hop neighbours. A feedback is transmitted 
along other routes different from the forwarding route that contains a hash value of the received data 
encrypted with the source’s public key. In a nutshell, the source learns to classify the behaviour of the 
one-hop neighbours from the testimonies of its two-hop neighbours. Authors recognize that feedback 
information can also be vulnerable to unreliable paths and propose to send redundant feedback 
information through multiple disjoined paths. Reputation values are computed locally at each node 
using the Beta Bayesian approach. 
RFSN [156] is the first trust-based model proposed for wireless sensor networks to monitor sensor 
nodes interactions. Each node maintains trust values of other nodes using its direct observations from 
the watchdog mechanism and second-hand information from other nodes observations. The 
computation of trust is based on the beta distribution giving more weight to latest observations. Like 
CORE, the proposed system allows only positive observations to be propagated, making the bad 
mouthing attack impossible. It relies on the trustworthiness score of the witness node to weigh its 
reports in order to overcome ballot stuffing attacks.     
An agent-based trust model for wireless sensor networks is presented in [157]. It allows to move the 
heavy computational and storage cost required to handle trust at constrained sensor devices to 
dedicated agents in charge of cooperation management inside the network. The proposed system 
claims to be safe from bad mouthing or ballot-stuffing attacks, assuming that the deployed agents are 
trusted-third parties and would not engender these types of attacks. 
3.4.3.2. Trust management systems for collaborative radio services 
Authors in [158] were the first to design a trust-based model for cooperative transmission in 2007. 
In the proposed scheme, each node maintains link quality information between itself and its neighbour 
nodes. The link quality is computed using the beta function model and stored as a trust value. A node 
checks the cyclic-redundancy-check (CRC) and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the received signal 
and can infer a trust value of this link. This trust value is estimated directly from its own observation 
and is therefore considered as direct Link Quality Information (LQI). On the other hand, each node 
also receives indirect LQI reports, estimated by other nodes. Gathering this information, a trust 
manager module implemented at each node detects links with low quality and disregards them during 
the relay selection. The proposed approach allows malicious attacks detection at the destination by 
putting in opposition the observed link quality from real data transmission and the estimated reports 
from other nodes. Lying relays are penalized by reducing their associated weights to zero during the 
signal combination. 
Authors in [159] show that the above work bases only on the number of successfully received 
packets in its trust computation process and does not consider the channel condition and relay 
selection policies. They make clear that unsuccessful packet transmissions from a relay node are not 
always the result of a malicious behaviour, but can be also due to other factors such as channel 
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congestion or packet overflow. They introduce a new distributed trust approach that modifies the trust 
establishment method and takes into account the channel state information and relay selection decision 
for signal combination at the destination. 
Some studies have been proposed to provide trust management mechanisms in cooperative 
communication without explicitly designating them as trust-based models. In [160], authors revealed 
the vulnerability of cooperative wireless communications to garbled signals generation by 
compromised nodes. A cross-layer framework for tracing malicious relays is proposed. The basic idea 
from the tracing scheme is that the source inserts pseudorandom tracing symbols along with the initial 
signal before transmitting it to the relays. These tracing symbols can be extracted and verified by the 
destination only to detect the ground truth of each relay node. Indeed, the destination is the only node 
sharing the tracing key with the source. 
In [161], a smart destination which analyses relay signal prior to applying signal combination is 
considered. The analysis phase consists in computing correlation between signals received from the 
source and relays. Since the malicious behaviour significantly decreases this correlation, the 
destination becomes able to detect the responsible relay node. Authors expect that this detection 
mechanism can be further explored as a part of a global trust management framework, which also 
implements reaction mechanisms, imposing penalties to misbehaving partners. 
In [162] authors highlight that existing work on misbehaving relays detection requires perfect 
channel state information that may not be always available. Based on this weakness, they redesign the 
malicious relays tracing technique described in [160] in the absence of instantaneous channel 
information at the destination. This lack of information makes the destination unable to demodulate 
the received tracing symbols in order to detect malicious relays. In this work, authors propose to 
identify misbehaving relays by sensing the distribution of the phase rotations of the tracing symbols. 
As long as relays behave in a cooperative way, these tracing symbols undertake similar phase 
rotations. Simulations show that the proposed scheme has considerable detection performance 
compared with existing work requiring perfect channel state information knowledge. 
3.5.  DESIGN DECISIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF A TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN 
THE CONTEXT OF OUR COLLABORATIVE KEYING SOLUTIONS 
As network aspects have changed with the advent of the Internet of Things, new design decisions 
are to be taken into account for the design of a trust management system, in order to fit additional 
requirements of the IoT and make viable decision makings for our collaborative key establishment 
protocols. 
By essence, the role of a trust model is to assist network entities in the decision making process. As 
such, it is reasonable to expect that a trust model will perform better if it processes more input data, 
being able to issue a recommendation out of a set of diverse gathered elements that all help to build a 
clearer model and assessment of the situation. Yet, this recommendation must also be adapted to the 
context of the node requiring assistance for decision making. The rule of thumb in trust model design 
can therefore be seen as an instantiation of the famous "think globally, act locally" paradigm. Among 
the various elements a trust model is made up of, some have to be considered together, some others 
have to be kept separated and yet some others have to be put in relationship with each other through 
thoroughly designed weighting functions. 
Considering reputation and trust separately is maybe the first design decision that should be taken 
into account. While reputation refers to the good or bad behaviour of an entity, trust refers to the 
ability or inability of an entity to fulfil a certain function. Most of prior trust models do not make the 
difference between reputation and trust metrics. In this thesis, we recognize that a node under the 
context of the IoT may change from a context to another due to its variable resources capabilities 
(energy exhaustion, energy harvesting) and variable status (mobility, processor availability). So the 
fact that a node has a good reputation when it is in a specific context gives no information about how 
much it can be trusted to provide assistance for a cooperative service when changing to another 
context. A node classified as honest could behave well with 80% of available resources. Yet, there 
would not be any guarantee that the same level of benevolence would be obtained for the same service 
in another situation where only 20% of its resources would be available. To that aim, additional 
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parameters are to be considered such as energy resources and availability of the scored entities, 
evaluated by the trust model. If one takes the example of a node candidate for assisting in a security 
service, it becomes perfectly clear that the computing power of this node has to be evaluated, along 
with its ability to remain present and available during the service exchange. 
A second important design decision is that a trust model should be able to monitor behaviours 
according to different functions, considering for which service the assistance of a given node was 
required. Demanding aspects may change from one service to another. A node trusted to provide 
assistance for a simple service (e.g. routing a packet) may not necessarily behave well for a resource-
demanding service (e.g. signing messages). The CORE model [160] proposes such a functional trust 
management system. However, it eventually assigns a single, global, trust value to a node. This 
simplification comes at the expense of a lack of flexibility and adaptability to complex malicious 
patterns. Indeed, when considering a global trust value for all services, a subtly behaving malicious 
node may show a high level of benevolence for a non-demanding service while behaving poorly for a 
resource intensive service, which would allow it to keep an overall fair trust value. 
Though the contextual and functional environments of each observation should be kept along with 
the observation report itself in order to satisfy the second design decision, there is of course a need to 
combine distinct reports (positive/ negative evaluations issued from different nodes without any initial 
restrictions), to make the information complete when a candidate assisting node has to be evaluated. A 
third design decision would therefore consist in defining a rigorous method to perform this 
combination. An evaluation being obtained from a synthesis made over a plurality of individual 
reports, defining the combination operation amounts to defining a weighting algorithm that gives an 
optimal weight to each individual report. This weight reflects the relative confidence put in each 
report, with respect to its representativeness of the situation in which the evaluation is performed. As 
such, the weight of a report changes depending on the situations where this report is used (time, 
context, type of service). The report weight also reflects the confidence that is put in the report 
originator, which leads us to a fourth design decision. 
The confidence in a report originator depends on the evaluation of the originator recommendation 
quality. Currently, there is no trust management system in wireless communications that handles 
reports received from witness nodes basing on their quality of recommendation. Prior trust models 
propose either to only consider direct experiences while overlooking reports of other nodes to avoid 
false witnesses or to base on the trustworthiness score of a node when assisting a service to estimate its 
trustworthiness when providing reports. The first case would be efficient for a node involved in 
numerous transactions with other peers; however, a node having only sparse interactions with assistant 
peers or whose requirements are changing frequently may lack information to make trust decisions 
about other nodes. In the second case, mixing two trustworthiness scores together would encourage a 
node to take advantage of this fact and send correct recommendations while misbehaving as a service 
assistant. It would then remain overall trusted, since its bad behaviour in service setup would be 
compensated with good behaviour in recommendations. The score given to a node to evaluate its 
recommendation quality should thus be kept independent of the score evaluating it as an assistant in a 
collaborative service.  
The four design decisions listed above (trust / reputation distinction, combined {function, context, 
observation} storage, weighting factors rigorous definition and update, service assistance and 
recommendation quality separation) will be carefully considered for the design of a generic functional 
trust model. These design decisions can be applied in general and do not depend on a specific 
topology. In addition to these generic principles, a few other incidental ones have to be taken into 
account. Deciding when to trigger the operation of the trust management system and where to 
instantiate this system are choices that are much more dependent on the studied topologies and the 
capabilities of the nodes they are made of. In what follows, we answer these 'when' and 'where' 
questions with respect to a heterogeneous wireless topology that includes highly resource-constrained 
nodes. 
The trust information can be computed on demand (whenever a node has to rely on collaborative 
peers) and delivered to the requesting node at that moment, or it can be computed on a regular basis 
and be propagated throughout the topology. In the heterogeneous topology considered in this thesis, 
the former option appears much more viable for two reasons. First, a real-time trust information flow 
would result in communication overhead, detrimental to network performance as well as to 
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constrained nodes battery life. Second, unsolicited trust information would have to be stored for 
subsequent use, which memory-constrained nodes may not be able to afford. The storage cost of trust 
information chunks would be all the more complex when these chunks are multidimensional (our 
second design decision forbids globalizing a node's trust value) and likely accompanied with 
cryptographic authentication MACs. 
The choice between centralized and decentralized instantiation of the trust management system 
must take into account its complexity in terms of trust computation formulas and processed 
information quantity. Here, our second and third design decisions lead us to favouring a centralized 
approach, wherein a central server would handle the complex node evaluations, based on a wide range 
of reports.  
Offloading the charge from the most constrained nodes by taking profit of a much more powerful 
entity is not the only advantage of the centralized approach. Having to send its observations to the 
central server instead of sending them to other nodes, a malicious node would not be in position to 
send false reports to specific victims only, in order to fake their decisions. With a central entity 
responsible for trust management, it becomes a common profit for all nodes to provide reliable 
evidences since false ones can globally affect decision making at the central entity, and could 
eventually be detrimental to the attacker itself. Finally, relying on a central entity reduces the 
information asymmetry by letting a node with a global view of the network compute the trust value of 
all nodes. 
Though centralisation appears as the right architecture scheme with respect to trust management 
systems for resource-constrained entities, local parameters depending on initial network setup must 
not be neglected. Relative and absolute locations of a candidate assisting nodes can be provided as 
examples of these configuration parameters. The relative location of the candidate assisting node to the 
requesting node may indicate whether the former shares a pairwise key with the latter or belongs to the 
same multicast group (clustering). The absolute geographic location or at least an estimation of the 
candidate node's location within the considered topology could be required as well and is actually 
needed in some collaborative signature schemes. Both location information elements help the central 
trust management system to issue relevant recommendations. 
To summarize we provide the table 18 below. 
 
Table 18. Assessment of trust model design decisions. 
Prior trust models practices IoT requirements/constraints Trust model design decisions for our 
collaborative keying approach 
Mix trust and reputation metrics together.  Variable contexts of IoT nodes and different 
resource capabilities. 
Evaluate the trust level of a node by taking 
into account additional parameters 
concerning its current context.   
Define a global trust score for all assisted 
services. 
A node trusted to provide assistance for a 
lightweight service is not necessarily trusted 
to assist for a service demanding more 
resources and increased availability during 
the service execution. 
Design a functional trust model that takes 
into account the specific demanding aspects 
of the assisted service when assigning a trust 
level. 
Restrict the reception of certain reports from 
witness nodes to avoid bad mouthing and 
ballot stuffing attacks. 
Lack of information to take trust decisions 
due to the sparse interactions of constrained 
IoT nodes. 
Consider all received reports and past 
interactions in making trust decisions by 
defining new methods to perform the 
combination and bypass the underlying 
attacks. 
Do not separate received reports from 
witness nodes basing on their quality of 
recommendation. 
IoT nodes belong to different groups and 
may provide false witnesses since they do 
not work towards the same goal. 
Trusting a node as an assistant node does not 
imply trusting it as a reporting node. 
Weight reports basing on the trustworthiness 
of nodes as reporting nodes. 
Consider both centralized and decentralized 
instantiation of the trust management 
system. 
Most of IoT nodes are characterized by low 
capabilities in terms of both memory and 
computing resources which make them 
unable to support the complexity of trust 
computation and data storage.  
Favor the centralized approach to offload the 
underlying charge from constrained nodes 
and reduce the communication overhead 
between nodes. 
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3.6. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we explored the different manners of addressing collaboration for diverse 
networking services. In these services, collaboration ensures a much better operation of a cooperative 
topology than the mere juxtaposition of individual, self-oriented decisions. Machine to Machine 
(M2M) and Internet of Things (IoT) architectures accentuated the collaboration trend that was initiated 
in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). They did it not only by involving wider architectures but also 
by adding heterogeneity, resource capabilities inconstancy and autonomy to once uniform and 
deterministic systems. Indeed, M2M and IoT nodes have a greater need to collaborate with each other 
when they are constrained and/or diverse, when they share a common rare resource - such as our 
collaborative solution for key establishment - or when they are expected to feature an adaptive / 
cognitive function such as self-healing. 
However, we highlighted that the emerging advantages of collaborative approaches could be 
hindered by their inherent exposure to internal attacks: during a collaborative task, a single or a group 
of malicious node(s) can disturb the proper operation of the entire system. 
The internal attacker may be prevented from performing harmful actions through a careful design of 
the collaborative protocol that may, for example, require redundant processes to be performed by 
different nodes or a threshold security procedure enabling a proper operation of the system in presence 
of this attacker. These prevention and recovery techniques are designed as security-by-design 
mechanisms. Or it may be detected as malicious through an analysis of its behaviour, which becomes 
more complex with large-scale heterogeneous architectures such as M2M and IoT. This detection 
technique is designed as a trust-based mechanism. These two ways of mitigating attacks against 
collaborative schemes are complementary and should coexist together in order to safely manage 
collaboration inside a group of nodes. Among these security mechanisms, our solution presented in the 
previous chapter did provide security-by-design. However, its reliance on a trust management system 
for selecting trusted elements and assessing cooperating nodes behaviours was only implicitly 
mentioned at this stage. 
By studying existing trust management systems, we could pinpoint gaps in current approaches with 
respect to the context of our keying solutions. Hence, we identified a set of relevant design practices 
that oriented the conception of a novel trust model, which we propose in order to build a generic 
functional trust management system, fitting the requirements of our solution and the IoT environment. 
This will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DESIGN AND 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we propose a novel Trust Management System (TMS) for the IoT that involves nodes with 
different resources capabilities. As compared to legacy Internet, the Internet of Things exhibits a greater 
autonomy, instantiated in the form of multiple self-* functions. The wide majority of TMSs proposed for 
wireless networks are today bound to a single function. As such, they cannot use past experiences related to 
other functions. Even those that support multiple functions hide this heterogeneity by regrouping all past 
experiences into a single metric, which strongly degrades the quality of results. They consider that a node 
will behave fairly or maliciously as a whole, but do not take into account the current status of the node 
(available resources). Neither do they separate reports based on the demanding aspect of the services they 
refer to.  
Based on a set of guidelines identified in the previous chapter for TMS design, we propose a context-
aware multi-service trust management system that manages cooperation between nodes for establishing a 
community of trusted elements assisting each other. This system is able to induce from a node's past 
behaviours in distinct collaborative networking services, including our collaborative key establishment 
services, how much trust can be put into that node for accomplishing a required task. Eventually, only the 
best partners with respect to a sought collaborative service are proposed to a requesting node. Our system 
quickly identifies poor/misbehaving nodes, even in the presence of wrong or malicious recommendations. 
The design description of the proposed TMS is detailed in the section 4.2 of this chapter. Section 4.3 
presents then the technical implementation of the proposed solution. We analyse in section 4.4 the simulation 
results we have obtained, which prove the effectiveness of the proposed trust model and its robustness 
against attacks. Finally, we conclude this chapter in section 4.5. 
4.2. PROPOSED TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
4.2.1. Overview  
The main objective of the proposed solution is to manage cooperation in a heterogeneous wireless 
topology involving nodes with different resources capabilities, in order to establish a community of trusted 
elements assisting each other. 
The operation starts with the trust manager assigning cooperating nodes, or "proxies", to requesting nodes 
in order to assist them for the collaborative services they are demanding. After having obtained assistance, 
each requesting node sends a feedback to the trust manager, specifying its satisfaction level about each 
participating proxy. By analysing the received reports, the trust manager learns about the results of its last 
assignment decision. It becomes able to detect misbehaving nodes and to refine its selection in the future. 
In the considered architecture, the trust manager is thus the component that is in charge of storing the 
experiences of nodes in the network and making global trust decisions. The other nodes that exist in the 
network play either the role of service requesters asking for assistance from other nodes to accomplish a 
service, or proxies (Pi) designated by the trust manager to assist for specific services. 
A description of the different phases of the proposed model is presented in the figure 23 below. This 
model involves a cyclic succession of operations wherein: 1) the trust management system (trust manager) 
obtains information about the trustworthiness of the available proxies, 2) the trust management system issues 
recommendations about proxies to a requesting node that intends to set up a collaborative service, 3) the 
requesting node relies on the collaborative service provided by the recommended proxies, 4) the requesting 
node assesses the quality of each individual service provision from each assisting proxy and 5) the trust 
management system learns from its past operation by performing self-updates intended to improve its future 
operation. These five phases our proposed model is made up of are reviewed in the next subsection. 
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Fig. 23. Proposed model phases. 
4.2.2. Operation phases 
4.2.2.1. Initialisation and information gathering 
At the beginning of the lifetime of the network, the proposed model is initialized with all nodes being 
assumed to be trustworthy and well-behaving.  In a controlled architecture (e.g. wireless sensor network), all 
nodes are indeed supposed to be verified for failures before deployment. Only once the network becomes 
operational, nodes may happen to become compromised and their trustworthiness levels will therefore have 
to be adjusted with respect to their behaviours. Uncontrolled architectures (e.g. Internet of Things) offer 
fewer assumptions about the initial status of nodes. Yet, here also, initially assuming that all nodes behave 
trustworthily makes the system converge quicker to the state where it is able to identify the nodes for which 
this assumption was false. This requires, however, that the number of trustworthy nodes exceeds 50% of the 
overall nodes population. 
Before being able to produce trustworthy results, a trust management system has to gather enough 
information from the network, during a so-called bootstrapping period whose precise definition depends on 
the requirements on the recommendation quality. A trust management system is indeed expected to produce 
better results over time: a compromised node may remain unnoticed for a while (especially since the 
initialisation process will have set its initial trustworthiness level to the maximum value); but it will be more 
easily spotted if it gets involved in a large number of transactions, all of which are poorly rated. 
The bootstrapping period can be long, since a true assessment of nodes behaviours needs to be carried out 
over multiple transactions. In order to minimize the bootstrapping period, the trust manager may be involved 
in the setup of the trust management process by targeting some nodes and inducing dummy artificial 
interactions between them (in essence probing the nodes), in order to accelerate the rating of their 
trustworthiness. However, this process could be exploited by intelligent attackers, who would pretend to be 
benevolent during the bootstrapping phase only: the bootstrapping dummy transactions would therefore have 
to be made non-distinguishable from the subsequent legitimate ones.  
 
 When a service is provided, the requesting node is able to evaluate the behaviour of each assisting node 
as either positive or negative, depending on whether it has accomplished its assigned task properly or not. It 
delivers then the evaluation to the trust manager. 
The evaluations are stored in the trust manager and used as inputs for the trust management system.  In 
order to make assisting nodes recommendations more accurate and specific there is a need to store, along 
with the evaluation score, additional contextual metrics concerning the type of executed service, namely the 
time of execution and the current state of the evaluated node (aging, resource capacity, etc.) It is indeed 
important to know in which circumstances the cooperating node has obtained the reported evaluations. 
Contrary to what is proposed in the literature, our trust model proposes an objective mechanism providing 
dynamic trust ratings for the same node, adapted to the different behaviours exhibited in different contexts. 
This mechanism states that an evaluation report is accompanied with a set of contextual parameters, as 
1. Information 
Gathering
2. Entity 
Selection
3. Transaction
4. Reward and 
Punish
5. Learning
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follows. A report Rij referring to the jth report sent to evaluate the quality of the service provided by an 
assisting node, or proxy, Pi is therefore made up of the following information: 
• [Sj] (Service): the service for which the node Pi provided assistance. 
• [Cj] (Capability): the capability of node Pi when assisting the service. 
• [Nj] (Note): the score given by the requester node to Pi for evaluating the offered service. Nj ∈ 
{-1, 0, 1}. The score '1' corresponds to a good-quality service; the scores '-1' and '0' respectively 
correspond to a bad-quality or not-provided service and to a partially acceptable service.  
• [tj] (Time): the time at which the service was obtained. 
4.2.2.2. Entity selection 
Upon receiving a request from a node asking for assistance, the trust manager starts the entity selection 
process to return a set of trustworthy assisting nodes to the requester. We propose a step-by-step selection 
process. This process is the most important of the trust management system. It is made up of five consecutive 
steps that all happen within the trust manager. 
 
Step 1: Restriction of the set of proxies Pi 
The system first restrains the set of nodes by selecting the potential candidates. This selection depends on 
the requirements of the service. A security service such as our collaborative key establishment scheme 
requires that the requesting node shares a symmetric key with each assisting node, which typically narrows 
the set of acceptable proxies. Likewise, the need for lightweight communications may also require that all 
assisting nodes belong to the same multicast group and can therefore be contacted simultaneously through 
the (cheap) sending of a single message. 
In the case of signature delegation schemes, the requesting server looks for assisting nodes dispersed in 
specific locations in the network in order to sign messages on its behalf, and hence to ensure service 
availability to all of its clients. In radio transmissions services, neighbours in the same radio range are the 
only possible candidates for assistance. 
 
Step 2: Restriction of the set of reports Rij for each proxy Pi 
After the prior selection, a set of nodes are designated to compete for the final selection. In order to rate 
the trust level of each of these candidates, the trust manager needs first to narrow the set of collected reports 
about each node independently. The most meaningful reports are those that pertain to the same context as of 
the current request: ideal reports would be pertaining to the same service that is being requested; they would 
also have been issued when the evaluated nodes were in the same status as of the new request moment. 
It is very likely, though, that the system will not find enough such ideal reports to calculate the 
trustworthiness of a node in a specific context. This may happen either because the candidate node has not 
yet been evaluated for the current requested service, or because it was in a different condition when 
evaluated for the same service. To resolve the problem of this lack of information, we proposed to calculate 
context similarity. 
The graph below in figure 24 describes how we restrain the set of potential reports needed to evaluate the 
trust level of a node by considering the principle of context similarity in terms of type of service (x-axis) and 
node capabilities (y-axis). This two-dimensional context representation assumes that one is able to quantify 
the two values it relies on. Node capabilities can easily be quantified, for example as a percentage of node 
resources in terms of processing power, memory and/or battery level. It is more complex to quantify the 
former term, namely context similarity in terms of type of service, since multiple collaborative services exist 
that share little in common. 
We consider that an adequate metric for assessing service similarity is the amount of resources that are 
required to run a given service. Within the resources that can be measured, we recommend to consider 
energy consumption whose decrease is generally a strong incentive to selfish behaviours. Let us take an 
example of how we use service similarity in order to measure a context similarity. We assume for example 
that both a cooperative key establishment service and a signature delegation service require the same level of 
resources capabilities (asymmetric cryptography operations). So that, receiving a report about a node 
performing one of these security services at around the same resource capabilities level can be used to 
evaluate the trust level of this node for performing the other security service. 
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Fig. 24. Proxy reports history. 
Figure 24 presents various reports Rij (Service Sj, Capability Cj, Note Nj) stored at the trust manager, sent by 
all nodes j evaluating past interactions with a common assisting node Pi. This figure can be read as follows. 
The horizontal axis on the graph shows the different services for which the evaluated node Pi has provided 
assistance before. These services are ordered according to their resource-demanding requirements. The 
vertical axis shows the capabilities of the Pi node when assisting for these services. Each graph is 
characterized by the target report RTarget (STarget, CTarget) depicted as a black diamond on figure 24: 
• [STarget] (Service Target) is the current service in request. 
• [CTarget] (Capability Target) is the current Pi capability. 
RTarget refers to the next report to be received, in case the proxy Pi is selected for the current service 
assistance. The goal of the context similarity computation process is to retrieve from the graph the most 
relevant reports, helping the trust manager to foresee the score received within the target report if the proxy 
Pi is retained for the service assistance. 
Context similarity between a report about a previous interaction and the present target report is computed 
by considering a global contextual distance dij between the old report and the target one. To compute dij, we 
first define dSj as the difference between the target service STarget and the report service Sj and dCj as the 
difference between the target capacity CTarget and the report capacity Cj. 
 opq = rpsZ^ecb 	 % pqr (12) 
 
 
otq = utsZ^ecb % tqu (13) 
 
We then obtain dij as: 
o/q = min#vopfZwx 5 otfZwx  $ y opqxopfZwx 5 otq
x
otfZwx z ,v1opfZwx 5 otfZwx 2 $ {y 1pfZw % pq2pfZw % 1psZ^ecb % |2z
x 5 y tqtsZ^ecb 5 |z
x}* 
(for reports carrying a positive evaluation) 
(14) 
Or:  
 
o/q  min#vopfZwx 5 otfZwx  $ y opqxopfZwx 5 otq
x
otfZwx z ,vopfZwx 5 otfZwx  $ {y 1tfZw % tq2tfZw % 1tsZ^ecb % |2z
x 5 y pqpsZ^ecb 5 |z
x}* 
(for reports carrying a negative evaluation) 
(15) 
 
The purpose of this computation is to make the distance metric more subtle than if it was merely 
measuring the sole similarity of an old report to a current situation. Indeed, some reports are meaningful 
although they are not close to the (STarget, CTarget) target on the graph. To that respect, an asymmetry arises. A 
node behaving well for an expensive service is likely to behave well for a less demanding service too, 
whereas the fact that a node behaves well for a simple service gives no information about its expected quality 
when providing assistance for a demanding service. 
The computation of dij takes this asymmetry into account by decreasing the distance (hence, increasing the 
probability to be selected) for the reports that give a good score when the evaluated node was at a much 
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lower capability level, or those that give a bad score when the evaluated node was at a much higher 
capability level. Figure 25 below explains how equations (3) and (4) orient the selection of the most relevant 
reports, and how the chosen parameters affect the distance computation. Indeed, each of these equations is 
obtained as the min of two terms. The first term merely relates to the distance between the evaluated report 
and the target. It is equal to ~opfZwx 5 otfZwx  for the points that belong to the ((STarget, CTarget), dSmax, 
dCmax) ellipse, and tends to zero when a report gets closer to the center of that ellipse. The dSmax and dCmax , 
respectively x and y semi-axes of the ellipse, express the tolerance of the selection mechanism. The larger 
dSmax (resp. dCmax), the smaller the increase of distance when Sj (resp. Cj) gets further from STarget (resp. 
CTarget). 
The second term is where said asymmetry comes into play: it is proportional to the distance between the 
evaluated report and the point (Smax, 0) for positive scores, or to the distance between the evaluated report 
and the point (0, Cmax) for negative scores. Smax refers to the most complex service in terms of resource 
consumption and Cmax is the maximum resource level that could be available at a node. A positive report 
close to (Smax, 0) means that the candidate node performed well for a complex service while having only few 
available resources. A negative report close to (0, Cmax) means that it performed poorly for a simple service, 
while being nevertheless at the maximum of its resources availability. 
The parameter η is an adjustable parameter that allows to take into account through the second term a 
greater number of significant reports, by enlarging the upper-left and lower-right quarters of ellipses, thereby 
increasing the number of considered reports. 
Finally, the computed dij distance is used as follows: a retained report Rij should have a distance 
dij (Rij, RTarget) < t, with k=~opfZwx 5 otfZwx  acting as an adjustable threshold, characterizing the similarity 
interval we want to use. 
 
 
Fig. 25: Schematic representation of reports selection functions. 
Three domains are represented on figure 25. The central ellipse is where reports are considered relevant 
under the dSmax, dCmax tolerance factors. The upper-left and lower-right quarters of ellipses, whose size can 
be adjusted through the η parameter, represent the areas where reports are meaningful in accordance with the 
score they carry. For each domain, the darker the shading colour, the lower the dij distance. The white areas 
represent the portions of the graph where the reports are not selected, since their computed distance exceeds 
the threshold t. 
 
An example of the dij variation with (Sj, Cj) positive reports for (STarget, CTarget, dSmax, dCmax) = (50, 70, 25, 
15) is provided in figure 26. 
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Fig. 26. Contextual distance for positive reports. As can be seen, the reports having the minimal dij distances are those that are either 
close to the target (central ellipse), or that reflect a node behaving particularly well in difficult conditions (bottom right corner).  
 
Using the defined distance for restricting the set of considered reports leads to selecting only a subset of 
them, as shown below in figure 27. 
 
Fig. 27. Retained proxy reports. After computing the contextual distance of proxy Pi reports originally depicted in figure 24, only 
those for which dij < t are retained. 
 
Step 3: Computation of the weights  for each retained report Rij in the step 2 
Among the set of selected reports, not all have the same significance: those exhibiting a smaller contextual 
distance dij are more relevant than those with higher dij values. Meanwhile, old reports may not always be 
relevant for the ongoing trust rating, because a node may change its behaviour over time: recent reports are 
thus more meaningful than reports obtained for a long time. It is therefore necessary to assign a weighted 
value for each report, which bases on those two considerations and expresses the overall report relevance for 
the selection phase. 
The weight wRij of the Rij report is thus calculated as a product of two exponential factors that respectively 
decrease with the report age 	kd_%kq and the report contextual distance calculated above in step 2. The 
adopted scheme gives progressively less weight to older and contextually more distant reports. 
   j[bb 
 
(16) 
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With 
• ,  being parameters in the range of [0, 1] that express the 'memory' of the system.  (resp. ) is 
adjusted according to the expected rapidity of change in the observed node along the time (resp. 
among services). The lower  (resp. ), the lower importance the system gives to past (resp. 
contextually more distant) reports.  
•  s  1 2 ∗ Nx % N being a parameter computed from Nj (the score given by the witness node in 
the report Rij) such that s is equal to 1 when this score is equal to -1 and 0 when this score is 
either 0 or 1. This way, the weight of negative score is doubled as compared to that of neutral or 
positive scores. The goal of the weighting factor s will be clarified in what follows. 
 
Step 4: Computation of the trust value Ti for each proxy Pi 
At this stage, the system is able to combine all opinions about the evaluated proxy Pi. This happens 
through a weighted average where the trustworthiness Ti of the proxy Pi for the sought collaborative service 
is eventually obtained as follows: 
 
Q/  1∑ dq 			$ 		 	
d
q . Tq . q (17) 
 
With: 
• T (Quality of Recommendation of the node j having issued the report Rij about the proxy Pi) is 
the trustworthiness score assigned to a witness node depending on the accuracy of its past reports. 
It ranges between -1 and 1, 1 representing a very trustworthy node and -1 a node reporting the 
opposite of the actual service quality. 
•  is the weighting factor computed above in step 3. 
 
Step 5: Provision of the best rated proxies Pi 
Upon computing trust levels for all selected candidates, the trust manager responds to the requesting node 
by securely providing it with the list of the best rated nodes, in accordance with the sought collaborative 
service and the respective current statuses of the assessed proxies. 
4.2.2.3. Transaction and evaluation 
In order to perform its planned collaborative service, the client node relies on the list of assisting nodes 
obtained from the trust manager. At the end of the transaction, the client node is able to assess the offered 
service received from each assisting node and sends a report to the trust manager in which it either rewards 
(positive score) or punishes (negative score) the participating nodes. The technique carried out to assess the 
offered assistance depends on the type of the service. It could be either derived from the client node local 
observations or from feedbacks received from other peers involved in the collaborative process, such as 
neighbours or the destination node. In our collaborative key establishment scheme, local observations may 
consist in suspicious communications occurring between proxies during the key exchange execution. These 
may mean that a collusion attack is being set up among the contacted proxies. The second assessment means, 
namely feedbacks received from other peers, is more likely. At the end of the collaborative key 
establishment procedure, the remote server B provides the client node with the list of participating nodes 
and/or those participating to the key exchange but having sent bogus shares. In turn, the client node transmits 
this list to the trust management system. 
It is then of high importance to deal with received reports in our trust model by adequately taking care of 
the credibility of the node providing it. This is what the next 'Learning' operation is about. 
4.2.2.4. Learning 
The learning phase of our proposed trust management system qualifies it as a cognitive process. This 
phase is what distinguishes a cognitive process from an adaptive one. Translated to security scenarios, this 
means that adaptive security consists in dynamically reacting to a change in the environment by applying 
new security policies while cognitive security introduces a learning step wherein an assessment of the 
enforced action is carried out, which will eventually modify the system behaviour, so that a different action 
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may be taken when the same situation occurs. Indeed, a cognitive process is classically [163] described as a 
cycle involving four steps namely observation, planning, action and learning.   
These steps almost straightforwardly correspond to the phases proposed in our TMS, as depicted in table 
19. 
 
Table 19: A Cognitive Trust Management system. 
Cognitive process terminology Proposed TMS terminology 
Observation Information gathering 
Planning Entity selection 
Action Transaction 
Reward and punish 
Learning Learn 
 
The proposed learning phase consists of two steps: quality of recommendation update step and reputation 
update step. 
 
4.2.2.4.1. Update of witness nodes’ qualities of recommendation 
Having received a report evaluating an assisting node, the trust manager learns about its behaviour. The 
trust manager can then update the trustworthiness score of all nodes having already sent a report about the 
same proxy, in similar contextual conditions. The underlying idea is quite simple: a node having previously 
marked as 'bad' a proxy node that eventually received a 'good' score will be considered a poor recommender 
(irrespective of its trustworthiness with respect to assistance in collaborative service, if any) and its Quality 
of Recommendation (QR) will be decreased (made closer to -1). Likewise, a node having previously given a 
good mark to a good-rated node will be considered as a good recommender, and its QR will be increased 
(made closer to 1). 
This can be achieved by applying a weighted average function for trustworthiness score for each 
cooperative node on each node having sent a usable report about this cooperative node. This weighted 
average function serves two purposes. First, it avoids excessive variations of QR. For example, a generally 
good recommender will not suddenly be classified as a poor one for having issued a wrong report, but its 
recent history will mitigate its QR decrease. Second, the weighted average function allows to choose 
precisely to which extent a node's QR must be oriented either towards 1 (good recommender), or 0 (reporting 
non-usable data), or -1 (maliciously reporting the opposite of what happened). To that respect, weighting is 
important since a node being wrong in one old report relative to a contextually distant service will be far less 
penalized than a node being wrong in a very recent report about the same service, provided at the same 
capability level. The QR of the node having issued the report used to update the QRs of nodes having sent 
reports about the same proxy node is also an important parameter to take into consideration in the 
computation of the weight: saying the opposite of a very good recommender is more penalizing than 
contradicting a barely trustworthy recommender. 
Let X be a witness node that helped the trust manager to evaluate a node Pi, which was used later as a 
proxy for assisting the node F. Depending on whether it has successfully accomplished the assigned task, the 
node F sends a report RF to the trust manager that contains an evaluation score N: {-1: bad; 0: neutral; 
1: good}. 
The trust manager uses this report to update the recommendation trustworthiness score QR of each node 
having participated as a recommender during the proxy selection stage (which means that the report issued 
by this node must have been judged relevant at step 2, from contextual distance point of view). We defined X 
as being one such node. 
The steps the learning stage is made up of are the following: 
• First the system retrieves the n stored quality recommendation scores (that is, the history of their 
recommendation quality) for all witness nodes. X has for example T		(T, … , Td, Td) 
with T being the last updated (the most recent) quality recommendation score. 
• The system then extracts the score N from the received report	T and retrieves the weight  	corresponding to	T . 
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• Afterwards, it calculates QRF, which represents the direction towards which the QR should 
evolve. QRF is computed as follows: 
 
T  t	 $ O						  O  %|	–| 5 	1	t   $	T 									 (18) 
 
 
 
In the above formula, r is computed from  (the score previously given by X) and (the score 
just given by F) such that r is equal to 1 when these grades are identical, to -1 when they are 
opposite and to 0 when they differ by 1. r is therefore the value towards which the weighted 
average function should lean the QR of the witness node X, since this latter must tend towards 1 
when the report is coherent with the newly received one, and tend to -1 when it contradicts it. 
In accordance with our weighted average approach, CF is the weight of r. As explained above, CF 
increases when the weight of the report previously sent by X is high (an error by X is less 
tolerable if it pertains to a similar context). It also increases if F is a good recommender, as 
expressed with the T factor (the current recommendation quality of node F). 
• Finally, the system computes the new recommendation quality _T	for node X as follows: 
 
_T  1∑ ,/					d/ 5			 |t| $ {		,/
d
/ . T/ 5 T} (19) 
 
The last term of this weighted average, r (in the form of T that includes its weighting factor) 
has already been discussed above. The other terms are the QRi, which are representative of the 
history of X's recommendation quality. Their respective weightings, ci, are computed such as to 
be weighting values that assign a higher weight to the latest recommendation quality values. We 
propose to have ci defined as ( being presented in Step 3): 
 ,/  bb (20) 
 
 
Once computed, the _T value is added to the QR historic list stored in the trust and reputation manager. 
It will be used as a recommendation quality for the future processes. _T can fall off below zero and become negative, which means that the witness node is reporting the 
opposite of the real service quality. At that time, instead of applying a report discard, we propose to consider 
the opposite of what is provided in order to still make use of the maliciously reversed reports. 
 
4.2.2.4.2. Update of assisting nodes’ reputation levels 
As explained above, we distinguish in this thesis between trust and reputation concepts. While trust 
measures the ability of a node to fulfil a specific task in a specific context, reputation refers to the global 
opinion of a node’s trustworthiness in the network after having provided assistance for various services. The 
reputation level of an assisting proxy Pi is computed as follows: 
 
Tn/  #		,qdq .  . T* (21) 
  is the score given by the requesting node q having obtained the assistance from Pi for a specific 
service and T is its quality of recommendation. The weighting factor ,q, presented above, is applied to 
gradually forget old feedbacks. 
It is important to update reputation levels of nodes in the network after each interaction in order to identify 
assisting nodes commonly judged as untrustworthy. Upon receiving a feedback from the requester node F, 
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the trust manager takes into account its evaluations to recalculate the reputation levels of the involved 
assisting nodes. If the reputation level of one of these falls below a certain threshold, its activity is 
interrupted and it is added to a list of ill-reputed nodes. It is also reported by the trust manager to the network 
operator, which may then examine the reasons for its misbehaviour. Indeed, a node might provide wrong 
information or bad services either due to a deliberate, malicious misbehaviour, or just as a result of a 
malfunction or an environmental change. 
4.2.3. Synthesis 
In this subsection, we provide a quick assessment of how the proposed solution as well as the most 
common prior art trust models behave when matched against the design decisions that were identified in 
previous chapter. 
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Table 20: Assessment of the proposed solution and the most common trust management systems against the identified best practices. 
 
CONFIDANT [151]  CORE [153]  Zhu Han et al. [158] Proposed solution 
Functional trust 
decisions 
routing services multi-service cooperative radio 
transmissions 
multi-service 
Contextual trust 
decisions  
not addressed not addressed not addressed compute context similarity 
to gather the most 
significant reports and 
derive trust scores 
Trust scores 
computation 
single global score for 
routing service 
single global score for 
multiple services 
single global score for 
radio transmission  service 
• take into account 
variable node status and 
assigns dynamic trust 
scores for each service 
assistance and node 
capabilities. 
• define a second trust 
score reflecting the 
recommendation quality 
of a node reports  
Reports trustworthiness 
evaluation 
checks the global trust 
level of the witness node to 
evaluate the credibility of 
the corresponding report  
evaluating trustworthiness 
of reports is not addressed 
 
all reports are trusted as 
long as the reporter is 
never classified as a liar 
node 
check the recommendation 
quality score of the witness 
node to evaluate the 
credibility of the 
corresponding report 
Exchanged observations only negative observations 
are exchanged in reports  
only positive observations 
are exchanged in reports 
both positive and negative 
observations are 
exchanged 
both positive and negative 
observations are 
exchanged 
Reports weighting 
factors 
no weighting factors are 
assigned 
gives more weight to past 
reports 
no weighting factors are 
assigned 
• give more weight to 
recent and context- 
similar reports 
• give more weight to 
negative observations 
• give more weight to 
reports provided from 
nodes with high 
recommendation quality 
scores 
Storage and decisions 
making localisation 
• local observations and 
other nodes reports are 
stored at the node 
• local trust decisions 
making  
• local observations and 
other nodes reports are 
stored at the node 
• local trust decisions 
making 
• local observations and 
other nodes reports are 
stored at the node 
• local trust decisions 
making  
• local observations are 
reported to a centralized 
entity which provides 
nodes with trust 
decisions making on 
demand 
Learning about decisions 
making  
once an assisting node   
trust level falls below a 
threshold,  it is excluded 
from future routing path 
selections 
once an assisting node   
trust level falls below a 
threshold, all of its service 
requests are denied and it 
may only act as a service 
provider 
• detect lying nodes and 
send them warning 
message 
• once the number of 
received warning 
messages exceeds a 
threshold the witness 
node is discarded 
• no punishment decisions 
concerning misbehaving 
assisting relays are 
specified 
• update the 
recommendation quality 
of previously involved 
witness nodes 
• once the 
recommendation quality 
of a witness node 
approaches to -1 the 
system considers the 
opposite of what is 
provided 
• once an assisting node   
trust level falls below a 
threshold, it is excluded 
from the future 
selections  an all its 
service requests are 
denied  
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4.3. TRUST MODEL TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION  
4.3.1. TMS subsystems overview  
The trust model we propose can be viewed as a package of functionalities linked with one another in order 
to ensure a reliable trust decision and offer the best assistance to the requesting node. 
As shown in the following figure (Fig. 28), the proposed TMS consists of various subsystems with 
different roles and functionalities. There are three main components, namely the database, the core and the 
input/output interface. 
• The Database (DB) is a structured collection of useful information gathered from the 
environment; 
• The Core is the smart component of the system performing functions such as analyse, 
computation and update; 
• The Input/output interface is the interface used to communicate and exchange information with 
the requesting nodes. 
 
 
Fig. 28. Proposed trust management system. 
4.3.2. TMS subsystems design  
Among the three components our proposed TMS is made up of, two can be qualified as major ones and 
will be discussed in the rest of this subsection: these are the core of the system and the database. We present 
in the following the structure and the role of each of these components. 
4.3.2.1. Database design 
Reliability and robustness of the proposed system rely on the quantity and quality of stored data, since 
computing a node trust level requires the knowledge of its past behaviours. To that aim, the database 
component saves all information that will be helpful in the decision-making. 
We designed the TMS database in two steps, namely conceptual and logical modelling. 
• Conceptual modelling allows to model data at higher level, learning about the different involved 
entities and how they relate to one another; 
• Logical modelling derives from the conceptual modelling and presents the final appearance of the 
database. 
Based on the trust model specifications, we extracted the following constraints in order to define attributes 
and relationships for the Entity-Relationship diagram corresponding to the proposed TMS: 
• Network topology contains one or many nodes; 
• Each node has a particular conduct (fair behaviour or misbehaviour); 
• Nodes must share secrets with the neighbourhood; 
• Each node belongs to one or more group, for example multicast or neighbouring groups;  
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• Each node has a type (proxy node, able to provide collaborative services and/or simple node, able 
to consume collaborative services); 
• Each node can execute one or more collaborative service(s) (e.g. routing, aggregation, signing-
verification, encryption-decryption, key establishment); 
• The TMS must keep all QR values stored in the database; 
• The TMS must process each request sent by a node; 
• The TMS must respond all nodes requests by assigning one or many assistant node(s). 
 
Figure 29 represents the logical model of our system. It contains seven main entities, namely: 
• Node: to store all nodes that make up the system 
• Node Type: to store the different types of nodes that exist in the system 
• Service: to store the different existing services in the system 
• Group: to store the group(s) within which the nodes of the studied topology fall 
• Misbehaviour: to store the intrinsic nodes behaviours 
• Quality_Recom: to store the Quality of Recommendation score of the node 
• Trust req: to store the exchanged request 
 
 
Fig. 29. Logical model of TMS Database 
 
4.3.2.2. Core design 
The core design relies on a modular approach, wherein the core component is seen as being made of 
multiple "blocks", or logical entities, as depicted on figure 30. These blocks interact and communicate with 
each other. We present in what follows the different building blocks of our trust model, along with their 
specifications and algorithmic solutions. 
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Fig. 30. TMS blocks. 
 
4.3.2.2.1. Listen block 
The Listen block is the first block in our TMS. It is responsible for listening to any node’s request. This 
block can be designed as a server model that enables a client node to establish a connection in order for this 
latter to send and receive information from the TMS, in the form of a request for assistance and the 
associated proxies list response. 
 
Fig. 31. Listen block. 
 The connection between the two communicating entities is ensured by UDP sockets. Indeed, the UDP 
transport protocol is more suitable than the heavier TCP for what concerns IoT nodes. 
 
4.3.2.2.2. Preselect block 
The main goal of the Preselect block is to increase the relevance of the decision task in the next step, 
through the narrowing of all assisting nodes into a subset of most relevant candidates (N in the figure 32), 
which can be able to assist the requesting node. 
 
 
Fig. 32. Preselect block. 
At the receipt of the request, the Listen block forwards it to the Preselect block. At this stage, the Preselect 
block consults the TMS database and restrains the set of potential candidates. This preselection depends on 
both the service requirements and the proximity link (for what concerns collaborative key establishment, 
nodes have to share a secret key with the requester, and they may have to belong to the same group). 
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Algorithmically, we can present the Preselect block as a function called FnPreselect(), described as 
follows: 
 
 IN_Pnode: contains the entire set of proxy nodes 
 OUT_Pnode: will contain the subset of preselected nodes 
 ReqSRC: the source requester 
 
function FnPreselect (ReqSrc, IN_Pnode, OUT_Pnode) { 
for each Pi ∈ IN_Pnode do  
check whether Pi is able to perform the requested service  
if (True) then  
check its suitability to assist ReqSrc 
[Has a shared secret and belongs to the same group] 
if (True) then  
add Pi to OUT_Pnode 
} 
 
At the end of this phase, the Preselect block is able to deliver the list of selected proxies to the Select 
block in order for this latter to analyse it and determine the preselected proxies trust levels, with respect to 
the requested service. 
 
4.3.2.2.3. Select block 
The Select block is the main engine of the proposed trust management system. It is responsible for the 
trust decision making and implements most of the computational operations described above. The main goal 
of this block is to assess the trust level of each proxy Pi belonging to the subset of nodes received from the 
Preselect block. 
 
 
Fig. 33. Select block. 
The Select block collects each stored report that is related to the proxy Pi, selects the most relevant ones 
and computes each report weight. 
Algorithmically, we can present the Select block as a function called FnAct(), described as follows: 
 
 IN_Pnode: input table containing the nodes retained from the Preselect block 
 OUT_Pnode: output table including the best-rated nodes, assigned to the requesting node to assist 
its collaborative service 
 Report: local table storing reports related to the current proxy  
 
function FnAct (IN_Pnode ,OUT_Pnode) { 
for each Pi ∈ IN_Pnode do { 
Get_Report (Pi, Report); 
SumT  0;  SumCoeff  0;  
For each Rj ∈ Report do { 
QRj  Quality of recommendation score related to the report Rj originator  
NRj  Score evaluating Pi given in the report Rj 
Wj  Calcul_weight (Rj); 
SumT  SumT + QRj * NRj * Wj; 
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SumCoeff  SumCoeff + Wj;} 
TrustPi  ( if _c00) * SumT 
} 
Add the best rated proxies to the OUT_Pnode table 
} 
 
Get_Report (Pi, Report): This function evaluates the stored reports about Pi and selects the most relevant 
ones. As explained above, a retained report must have a contextual distance lesser than a threshold t.  
Calcul_Weight (Report): This function computes the weight for each report passed in parameter and 
returns a weighting score as a float value. 
 
4.3.2.2.4. Respond block 
Upon computing trust levels for all selected proxies in the Select block, the trust manager responds to the 
requesting node by providing it with the list of the best-rated nodes. This operation is ensured by the 
Respond block. 
 
Fig. 34. Respond block. 
 
4.3.2.2.5. Learn block 
In order to perform its service on a collaborative basis, the requesting node relies on the list of assisting 
nodes obtained from the trust manager. After the service completion, the requesting node is able to assess the 
service obtained from each assisting node and sends a report enclosing this assessment to the TMS. 
 
 
Fig. 35. Learn block. 
The reception of this report triggers an update function. This function is instantiated within the Learn 
block, which analyses the received reports in order to update the QRs of witness nodes as well as the 
reputation of assisting nodes. 
Algorithmically, we can present the Learn block as a function called FnLearn() described as follows: 
  
 IN_Report: Received report 
 
function FnLearn (IN_Report) { 
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for each Pi ∈ IN_Report do { 
Ni  Note related to Pi 
Fill the W vector with the witness nodes that helped TMS in selecting Pi 
 
for each Wi ∈ W do { 
Fill the QR vector with previous QR scores related to the witness node Wi 
 
NewQR   Comp_NQR (QR, Ni, Pi ) 
 
add the NewQR value to the database  
} 
} 
} 
 
The main role of the Comp_NQR() function is to compute the new quality of recommendation of the 
witness node that helped the TMS to choose Pi as an assistant node. 
4.3.2.3. State diagram 
The transitions between blocks were controlled following the state diagram shown on the graph below 
(figure 36). 
 
 
  
Fig. 36. TMS state diagram. 
Once started, the system turns to the Listen state. At this stage, the system will wait until a message is 
received from a client on the input interface. Received messages can be either requests or reports. If it is a 
request, the system switches to the Preselect state; otherwise, it moves to the Learn state. 
The system then continues its evolution in accordance with the type of received data. Indeed, in case the 
system is in to the Preselect state, it performs all preselection functions described above and returns a value, 
called Set, representing the potential proxies selected at this stage. If Set is null then the system reverts to the 
Listen state. Otherwise it switches to the Select state where it first eliminates the less relevant reports and 
then calculates the trust level of each of these potential candidates obtained while in the Preselect state. 
Finally, it provides the list of the best-rated proxies to the requesting node in the Respond state. 
In case the system is in the Learn state, it performs the update functions and then reverts to the Listen 
state. 
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4.4. SIMULATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In this section, we provide performance results in order to prove the proper operation and effectiveness of 
the proposed system. These results were obtained through the development of a dedicated simulation 
framework, which was favoured over the use of an existing networking simulation environment, such as 
OmNet++ [164] or NS [165]) for efficiency and simplicity reasons. Indeed, our simulation framework makes 
it easy to implement specific design decisions (e.g. databases customisation, trust patterns, behaviours and 
interactions model), as well as to integrate and add new functionalities while, in the meantime, allowing for 
straightforward porting onto actual physical devices. Also, graphical outputs were conceived so as to meet 
our specific requirements. 
4.4.1. Simulation lifecycle 
The operational phases of our simulator are depicted in figure 37 below and explained later in this 
subsection.  
 
 
Fig. 37. TMS operational phases. 
4.4.1.1. Initialisation  
During the initialisation phase, the simulator clears all stored data within the database. To do so, the 
system calls the database package and executes the InitiateDatabase() function for each database table. 
 
4.4.1.2.  IoT Network configuration 
This phase is where the initial network configuration takes place. The system defines the network 
topology according to the configuration parameters (number of proxy nodes, number of requesting nodes, 
proportion of poor witness nodes, percentage of malicious nodes, initial qualities of recommendation, groups 
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and services). It generates a set of nodes with random attributes (e.g. services, group, (x,y,z) position, real 
quality of recommendation) and maintains them in the database. These attributes will be used during the 
simulation lifecycle. 
For the rest of this chapter, we consider the following configuration (table 21): 
 
Table 21: Simulation configuration parameters. 
Number of proxy nodes (PNs) 100 
Number of  nodes 200 
Poor witness nodes (%) 20% 
Malicious nodes (%) 10% 
Initial quality of recommendation (QR) 1 
Services 6 
 
Once the connection with the database is established, the simulator executes the InitiateDatabase() 
function in order to ensure that the database is empty. At this stage, the network topology generation can be 
launched.  
 
 
Fig. 38. Generated IoT network topology. 
As an example, figure 38 represents a topology where our simulator generated 111 nodes: 
 10 proxies (yellow colour);  
 100 constrained nodes (empty/white colour); 
 1 trusted entity (including the TMS) (green colour). 
Each of the simulated nodes is characterized by a set of attributes, e.g. for node 12: 
 
Table 22: Simulated node attribute set. 
Node ID 12 
Position (x,y,z) (600,20,0) 
Quality of recommendation (QR) 1 
Services {S4,S2} 
Malicious node False 
 Real quality of recommendation (R_QR) 0.8 
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This node is located at location (600, 20, 0). It is able to run the services S4 and S2. From the system point 
of view, its quality of recommendation is initially set to 1 in order to be adjusted progressively revealing its 
real trustworthiness level as a witness node. Its real quality of recommendation is set to 0.8 in this example 
and is of course not known by the trust manager. 
At the beginning of the lifetime of the network, all nodes are assumed to be trustworthy and well-behaving 
since they are supposed to be verified for failures before deployment. Once the network becomes 
operational, it may happen that nodes become compromised. Their trustworthiness levels can therefore 
change with respect to their behaviours. 
4.4.1.3. Request/Response simulation 
Once the topology is defined, the simulator activates all nodes (figure 39).  
 
 
Fig. 39. Activated nodes and their respective listening ports. 
Once the network becomes operational, the simulator selects a random node, generates a request for 
assistance and sends it to the trust manager. Based on the type of service and specific requirements of the 
requesting node, the system selects potential proxies that run this service and fulfil its requirements. 
This pre-selection phase is performed within the Preselect state, as explained in the previous section. 
Figure 40 shows the system response upon receiving a request from the node 12, requesting assistance for a 
key establishment service. Proxies 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are able to assist this key establishment service, 
and proxies 1, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 share a key with the node 12. Hence, only proxies 1, 3, 4, 9 and 10 are 
retained for the subsequent selection step. 
 
 
Fig. 40. Preselect state results. 
At this stage, the trust manager switches to the trust decision making process. Based on a set of selected 
reports, the TMS computes trust levels of preselected proxies 1, 3, 4, 9 and 10. The figure  41 below presents 
the results of this phase. To obtain proxy 1 trust level, 332 reports have been analysed.   
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Fig. 41. Select state results. 
Upon computing trust levels for the proxies 1, 3, 4, 9 and 10, the TMS responds to the node 12 request 
and provides it with the list of the best rated proxies. The node 12 will rely on a set of nodes that contains 
proxies 3, 4, 9 and 10 (we assume that the key establishment service requires the involvement of 4 
collaborating proxies).   
After the service execution, the node 12 is able to assess the service obtained from each proxy and sends a 
report assessment to the TMS (figure 42). The evaluation score depends on the node assessment. This score 
is randomly generated, according to the malicious status of the assisting node and to the real quality of 
recommendation of the requesting node (fixed at the start-up stage).       
 
 
Fig. 42. Respond state and received reports. 
 
Having received a report evaluating proxy 4, 9, 3 and 10, the TMS learns about their respective 
behaviours and updates the QR of all witness nodes having already sent a report about the same proxies 
(figure 43).  
 
 104 
 
Fig. 43. Learn state results. 
 
The scores “1” and “-1”given by node 12 to respectively evaluate the proxy 3 and 10 induce the decrease 
of the QRs of witness nodes having previously assigned different scores while they increase the QRs of those 
that had previously given identical scores. This variation of witness nodes QRs is adjusted basing on the QR 
of the node 12 itself and on other weighting parameters, as described in previous section. 
4.4.2. Performance evaluation 
4.4.2.1. Evoluation of quality of recommendation score 
As mentioned in the design of our solution, a real quality of recommendation R_QR is set, that defines the 
intrinsic behaviour of each node when reporting evaluations about other nodes. These subsequent evaluation 
reports are then used as input in the trust manager in order to calculate trust values. A clear vision of the 
quality of recommendation influences thus directly trust computations, leading to reliable decision makings 
and offering the best assistance to requesting nodes: discarding poor/lying recommenders and promoting 
efficient recommending nodes are indeed required in order to have the computed trust match the actual 
trustworthiness of an assisting node.  
This provides us with a simple means to check whether the proposed TMS behaves properly: if yes, the 
interpolated quality of recommendation should tend towards the real quality of recommendation. The figures 
below show examples of the evolution of the quality of recommendation for some nodes. 
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Fig. 44. A perfect recommender (QR=1) is recognized as such by the 
trust manager, which constantly assigns it the "1" score as quality of 
recommendation. No incident interferes with this rating. 
 
Fig. 45. Perfect recommender and poor witnesses. Here, a node that is 
intrinsically a perfect recommender has its quality of recommendation 
score initialized at 1. Two incidents, caused by poor witnesses' errors 
cause the trust manager to decrease its QR score. However, the system 
behaves properly and quickly reverts to the proper value.  
 
Fig. 46. Good recommender. We see here a situation where the 
considered node is a good, yet not perfect, recommender. QR=0.77 
means that the node, though generally giving a good recommendation, 
will be wrong 23% of time. Hence, as compared with the previous case, 
this node's quality of recommendation is not only affected by poor 
witnesses but also by its own errors.  
 
Fig. 47. Poor recommender. With an even lower real QR (QR=0.58), the 
node's score is regularly affected by its own mistakes, in addition to the 
wrong reports from poor witnesses. The score therefore oscillates 
between 0 (node is estimated to issue useless reports) and 1 (node is 
estimated to issue trustworthy reports), with rare occurrence of negative 
scores (node is estimated to be intentionally issuing false reports). 
Mitigation of these oscillations would require relying on non-linear 
formulas: trying to mask them with slower increase/decrease slopes only 
would also slow down the convergence of the system for recognizing a 
fully trustworthy node (more frequent case) and would therefore damage 
the entire system behaviour.  
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Simulation results confirm the proper operation of the proposed trust management system. As 
shown above, positions of curves in the vicinity of the R_QR prove that the integrated learning module 
performs properly and succeeds in fine-tuning the quality of recommendations.  
4.4.2.2. Detection of misbehaving assisting nodes  
Based on the received reports evaluating each proxy and the recommendation quality of their 
originating nodes, we can detect assisting nodes with bad reputations. As shown in the figure 48 
below, the proxy 10 had more than 60% of bad evaluations. Fixing the threshold of bad evaluations to 
60%, our trust management system considers it as a misbehaving node. 
 
 
Fig. 48. Assessment of proxies 4, 9, 3, 10 reputations. 
4.4.2.3. Protection against attacks 
Previously, we have proven the proper operation of our TMS when making trust decisions, fine-
tuning QRs of witness nodes and detecting misbehaving assisting nodes. Meanwhile, a trust model 
which is built to counter internal attacks inside a collaborative group and reduce the impact of 
misbehaving nodes can be itself hindered by specific attacks that can disrupt its functioning. It is 
especially vulnerable to three potential attacks that have been classified as critical in [166]. In the 
following, we investigate the effectiveness of our TMS under these three threats, namely bad 
mouthing / ballot stuffing, selective misbehaviour, and on-off attacks. 
 
4.4.2.3.1. Bad mouthing and Ballot stuffing attacks 
As long as reports from witness nodes are taken into account in a trust management system, the risk 
of receiving wrong recommendations is present.    
Malicious nodes may provide dishonest recommendations either to boost the trust values of 
malicious accomplices (referred to as the ballot stuffing attack) or to drop trustworthiness of honest 
parties (referred to as the bad mouthing attack). Currently, there is no trust management system in 
wireless communications that can deal with these two types of attacks without making initial 
assumptions about the behaviour of the nodes. The CONFIDANT trust model allows only negative 
reports to be propagated, thereby assuming that bad mouthing attacks could not be performed by a 
node. As for the CORE model, collected reports take into account positive reports only, thereby 
assuming that a node has no advantage to carry out ballot stuffing attacks for unknown nodes benefit. 
Other trust management systems either do not address these attacks and consider all reported 
evidences as reliable, or are content with checking the global reputation of a node to weigh its reports. 
The trust management system we propose in this thesis defends against these attacks by building 
and updating separately trust recommendation values from regular trust values. Our trust management 
system involves a learning phase allowing it to learn from the consequences of its actions in the entity 
selection phase. This knowledge is used to fine-tune the trustworthiness of previously used 
recommendations, in order to improve the selection in the future.  As presented above, Quality of 
recommendation scores (QRs) are computed by checking consistency between the current evaluation 
and previous recommendations used during the proxy selection phase. A malicious witness node can 
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be detected during the learning process by putting its dishonest recommendations up against others' 
evaluations, which progressively decreases its QR and reduces the impact of its recommendations 
during the entity selection phase. 
As shown in figure 49, without considering the QR, the trust level of an honest node (red graph) 
significantly drops when impacted by a bad mouthing attack (characterized in this case by a group of 
ten witness nodes sending negative evaluations about a well-behaving assistant node). Considering the 
QR of a node when assessing its reports, the system becomes able to decrease the QR of these 
malicious witness nodes by putting their dishonest recommendations up against others' evaluations. 
Our trust model (blue graph) decreases in a first time the node trust level but quickly recovers its 
trustworthiness by reducing the impact of wrong reports provided by malicious nodes. 
 
 
Fig. 49. Resilience against bad mouthing attack. 
 
4.4.2.3.2. On-off attack 
This attack exploits the forgetting property of trust management systems, which gives more weight 
to recent recommendations. Such weight adjustment is required since trust is variable over time. For 
example, in wireless communications, a honest mobile entity may suffer for a period of time from bad 
channel conditions, which deteriorate its trust level as a relay node. After it moves to a location where 
the channel condition is better, it should be made possible for that node to recover its original trust 
level. Hence, old and recent recommendations about a node do not carry the same weight. 
However, a dishonest entity can take advantage of this property and behave alternatively well and 
badly, since it can compensate past bad behaviours by behaving well for a period of time and 
eventually regaining trust.  This attitude is referred to as an on-off attack. 
In order to make our trust model robust against such attacks, we adapt our system such that a bad 
behaviour will be memorized for a longer time than a good behaviour. We accordingly add a 
weighting factor s in the computation of the report age in step 2, so that we make negative scores 
appear less old, compared with neutral and positive nodes.  
This decision discourages dishonest nodes to recurrently switch between bad and good behaviours 
and require them to perform many good actions to recover their trust values. 
We see in figure 50 a situation where the node changes its behaviour alternatively. It behaves well 
for the ten first interactions. Then it provides bad services for the second ten interactions and reverts to 
normal. Without considering s (blue graph), the system takes more time to detect the bad behaviour of 
the node since the node past good behaviour is more emphasized, and therefore hides the malicious 
transition for longer. Once the system recognizes this bad behaviour and starts to slightly decrease its 
trust level, the node stops bad behaviours and regains trust. With the use of s (red graph), the system 
detects earlier the node misbehaviour and decreases its trust level. Since bad behaviours are 
memorized for a longer time, it takes much longer for the node to regain trust from the system point of 
view. 
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Fig. 50. Resilience against on-off attack. 
 
4.4.2.3.3. Selective behaviour attack 
While a dishonest node switches between bad and good behaviours over time in the on-off attack 
described above, it can also behave alternatively badly and well between services. This attack is 
referred to as selective behaviour attack.  If a node behaves well for simple services, it can still behave 
badly for other resource-demanding services. Thereby, the average trust level will remain positive and 
the node will selfishly save energy.  
Existing trust models suffer from this attack since they rely on a unique trust value that globally 
characterizes a node including all assisted services. Our system defends against selective behaviour 
attack through the implementation of a functional model that assigns multiple trust values to a node, in 
relation with all assisted services. A node that would always perform poorly in demanding 
collaborative services would always receive bad scores, which would not be compensated for by good 
scores obtained for good behaviour in simpler services. In the short term, this means that the node 
carrying out this attack would no longer be selected for demanding services, which it would no longer 
be in position to damage. In the longer term, such behaviour could trigger action from the system 
administrator, if the accumulation of poor scores reaches a predetermined threshold. 
We consider in figure 51 a situation where the trust level of a dishonest node is evaluated with 
respect to a resource demanding service. We can see that this node, being considered under a global 
trust value, manages to hide its misbehaviour when performing this service. It maintains an overall 
high trust level (red graph) since it compensates received bad scores with good scores obtained for its 
good behaviours in simpler services. Our trust model (blue graph) succeeds to decrease the trust level 
of the node when performing this specific service despite its good behaviours in other services. 
 
 
 
Fig. 51. Resilience against selective behaviour attack. 
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4.5. CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, we proposed a multi-service and context-aware trust management system as 
required for our collaborative key establishment approaches and, more generally, as required for 
collaborative networking services. Indeed, this trust model manages cooperation and enables nodes 
requesting for assistance to identify the best partners when setting up collaborative networking 
services. The proposed trust model fulfils the specific requirements of the environment we consider, 
characterized with heterogeneity and nodes energy constraints. At the same time, it goes beyond the 
shortcomings identified through our study of prior trust models, such as flexibility to handle variations 
of nodes and/or services contexts and ability to process all reported information without making initial 
assumptions about the behaviour of nodes. A qualitative comparison of TMSs is provided in this 
chapter to show the strengths of our proposal, as compared with prior trust models. 
In addition, a set of testbeds and simulation results have been reviewed in order to prove the proper 
operation and effectiveness of the proposed system. This effectiveness is assessed by considering how 
our trust management system responds to specific situations. Among these situations was its ability to 
fine-tune the real quality of recommendation of a witness node through its reported evidences, its 
efficacy to identify a misbehaving proxy and take true decisions and its conduct when subjected to 
specific attacks that may be launched against trust management systems. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis addresses new security issues in the Internet of Things (IoT). The heterogeneous nature 
of IoT communications, coupling resource-constrained networks with powerful Internet makes it 
challenging to provide end-to-end secured communications between IoT entities. Indeed, applying 
existing end-to-end key establishment protocols with their heavy resource demands could be hindering 
for most IoT components due to their low capabilities in terms of computing power and energy 
resources. Since the IoT will not emerge through the design of entirely novel protocols, these security 
standards have to be revisited in order to adapt them to the IoT scenarios. In that light, this thesis 
provides several significant contributions aiming at addressing IoT security challenges and specific 
requirements. Each contribution was presented and detailed in a separate chapter. 
CHAPTERS SUMMARY 
The first chapter is a thorough overview of existing end-to-end security standards and key 
establishment schemes in the literature and a study of the generic design decisions helping to 
characterize a key establishment protocol for the Internet of Things. Indeed, we provided a 
classification of key establishment protocols according to three criteria: the key delivery scheme (key 
transport or key agreement), the underlying cryptographic primitive family (symmetric or asymmetric) 
and the authentication method. Considering the initial requirements of the IoT, we have retained TLS 
Handshake, Internet Key Exchange and HIP BEX protocols as the best candidates for key 
establishment in the IoT. However, when assessing them in terms of energy efficiency, we have 
highlighted their resource-intensive design. Then we gave an in-depth study of the efficient key 
establishment solutions that have been proposed for constrained devices, from legacy WSNs to 
Internet-integrated pre-IoT topologies.  
 
The second chapter proposes novel collaborative approaches for key establishment designed to 
moderate the requirements of existing security protocols, in order to be supported by resource-
constrained devices. Contrary to prior proposals, we explored the possibility of reducing the 
computational load to be performed on constrained devices through collaborative offload instead of 
doing so by relying on weaker cryptographic algorithms. Our solution exploits spatial and temporal 
heterogeneity of nodes in the Internet of Things to offload heavy computational load required at the 
constrained device to more powerful nodes in the surroundings. Retained TLS Handshake, Internet 
Key Exchange and HIP BEX protocols are redesigned so that the constrained communicating party 
may delegate its expensive cryptographic operations to less constrained nodes. During the key 
exchange, these assisting nodes take charge of the session key derivation, in a collaborative and 
distributed manner. Two distributed techniques have been proposed and carefully designed to perform 
the collaborative key exchange approach. The first distributed approach depends on reliable multiple 
hop-by-hop deliveries of secret fragments by proxies (dedicated assisting servers). In case these 
proxies are non-dedicated nodes belonging to the same local infrastructure of the constrained device – 
though being less impacted by energy constraints – misbehaving and/or unavailability behaviours may 
arise.  In order to reinforce the reliability of the collaborative approach, a second threshold distributed 
technique is proposed enabling the recovery of the session key at the two endpoints of the 
communication even in case of proxies misbehaviour or unreliability. A formal security analysis 
performed using AVISPA tool has validated the security of our collaborative variants of TLS 
Handshake, Internet Key Exchange and HIP BEX. Assessed from the points of view of cryptographic 
and communication costs, our proxy-based schemes show a significant gain in terms of energy at the 
constrained device compared with the basic approaches of key establishment standards. 
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The third chapter is an exhaustive overview of the literature in the field of collaborative 
networking services. We highlighted the vulnerability of these emerging collaborative approaches to 
internal attacks, launched from within the group of cooperating nodes, that may prevent the system 
from working properly. We then assessed the security mechanisms proposed in the literature to 
counter these attacks. We classified these mechanisms into two main categories: security-by-design 
mechanisms and trust-based mechanisms. Much attention was especially devoted to studying existing 
trust models and identifying a set of relevant design practices to use as part of a generic trust 
management system, required to ensure the proper operation of our proposed collaborative key 
establishment services. 
 
The fourth chapter focuses on the design of a new trust management system that fulfils the 
requirements of our collaborative approaches and bypasses identified shortcomings of prior trust 
models. This trust model manages cooperation between nodes and enables them to identify the best 
partners when setting up collaborative networking services. It takes into account variable node status 
and assigns dynamic trust scores for each class of service assistance and node capabilities. It also 
handles received reports from witness nodes without any initial restrictions, basing on their quality of 
recommendation scores. These scores are updated during a learning phase and kept independent from 
the scores evaluating them as assistants in a collaborative service. In order to evaluate the performance 
of the proposed trust model, we have developed our own experimental simulation environment. The 
system performance was assessed by considering different aspects. Simulation results proved the 
proper operation of different integrated modules and formulas in our trust management system. 
Obtained graphs proved that the integrated learning module succeeds in fine-tuning the quality of 
recommendations. Revealing the real trustworthiness level of a witness node makes our trust model 
able to take relevant decisions since trust is built based on reported evidences from previous 
experiences. We also proved its effectiveness against potential attacks targeting trust models namely 
bad mouthing, selective misbehaviour, and on-off attacks.  Obtained results showed that the system 
recognizes quickly malicious attempts trying to induce these attacks and succeeds to overcome them 
before they affect the proper operation of the trust model. 
DISCUSSION AND OPEN ISSUES 
There are many interesting open issues that deserve further investigation: 
 
• Specifying the number of proxies for our collaborative key establishment schemes: Selecting 
the right number of proxies is not an easy task. Obviously, we cannot specify the exact 
number of them without other joint parameters. Indeed, this number should be a function of 
the network size and topology, the degree of resilience required against attacks and the 
quantity of resources that a proxy is devoting to collaborative services. That is, it would be 
interesting to carry out simulations to identify the appropriate number of proxies according to 
the variation of these parameters. It is evident that choosing a small number of proxies causes 
bottleneck and creates performance problems while selecting a high number of proxies 
increases the communication and, in certain cases, computational overhead during the protocol 
exchange. 
• Making the proxy-based approach transparent at the server side: allowing this transparency 
makes it possible for the constrained node to take assistance from proxies and delegate to them 
its heavy cryptographic operations while the server remains unaware of this phase during the 
key establishment process. In that case, the proposed proxy-based solution will require new 
protocol implementations at the constrained device only, which make our approach more 
flexible. However this solution increases the computational charge at the constrained device 
since this latter gets involved in more transactions with the proxies and more computations. 
• Protecting our collaborative approach against collusion attacks: while most studies only 
consider attacks coming from an individual node, the assumption that a group of malicious 
nodes may collude is often overlooked despite its probability of occurrence in collaborative 
services. Collusion attacks are even more detrimental and hard to detect than individual 
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attacks since a group of nodes may coordinate to achieve a common malicious purpose. In our 
collaborative key establishment schemes, assisting nodes can collude by gathering their 
private fragments to recover the session key between the source and the destination. This type 
of collusion attack occurs undetectably since the system still works properly during the 
session key exchange. However it will have serious impacts later on, when a secure 
communication using this "secret" key will start between the source and the destination. This 
attack has been considered for the design of our trust model. We assume that the constrained 
node would be likely to be able to detect communications between assisting nodes during the 
key exchange as long as they are within the same radio range. Yet, malicious proxies may 
postpone the collusion attack once the key exchange has been completed, in order to make 
sure that the constrained node is no longer monitoring their activities. As a first way to defeat 
collaboration of malicious nodes during the supporting mechanism, the constrained node may 
keep a small key fragment of the premaster secret (of a size equivalent to the final session key) 
that it would transmit later to the server, encrypted with the server public key. For a small 
fragment (as opposed to the entire premaster secret), the encryption overhead on the 
constrained node would remain limited. Further work in this direction would be interesting in 
order to fully grasp the possibilities of nodes collusions in collaborative services and take 
security measures (further enhancements of our trust model) against these threats. 
• Studying the situation where the two endpoints of the communication are resource-constrained 
nodes. It might be gain incentive to check whether the two peers can rely on the same set of 
assisting nodes at the same time, or if two distinct groups of proxies have to be assigned.   
 
Let us conclude this thesis with another open issue which is not specifically related to the present 
study but rather to the general field of key establishment in the IoT. 
• Give more interest to Lamport and Merkle tree signatures. Lamport signatures are proposed to 
be used by proxies in our solution to perform signatures replacing heavier asymmetric 
algorithms while Merkle scheme is used as a binary tree for authentication of Lamport 
signature verification keys. These two schemes make it possible to create digital signatures 
based on one-time signature schemes. With the advent of quantum computing, widely-used 
signature schemes such as RSA, DSA and ECC are threatened and about to become entirely 
insecure, whereas the former two schemes relying on hash functions are conjectured to be 
unbreakable using quantum computers. It would be promising to investigate the use of one-
time signature schemes along with symmetric ciphers, also resistant to quantum computing 
attacks, for designing quantum-safe cryptosystems. Especially, to investigate the adaptability 
of such cryptosystems to constrained devices. Likely, memory capacity should be the most 
hindering factor for these. 
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